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Cornelius Dubois Jr.
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
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
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
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Cornelius De Bois Jr


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
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






























Actions ex dicto

Slander.

13

Slander consists in maliciously defaming a person

1. By words written or spoken which tend to in-
-jure him in any point of personal security
connections, office profession or interest
4 Bac 483. 4 Co 14. Bull g. 3 Bl 123. Esp 496.

II. Without words as by figures Pictures or
Emblems of the above tendency Esp 496. 3 Bl
125. 5 Co 125 b

Commenced according to the usual division in
3 ways. 1st By words (spoken) 2^d By writing -
3^d By signs, pictures &c -

Slander by words is of two kinds - 1st ^{by} words
in themselves actionable: 2 Words not in them-
-selves actionable - but becoming so, by reason
of some special damage sustained in con-
-sequence of them. 4 Bac 483 - 494 -

The action of Slander is an action of trespass
on the case founded upon the Equity of the
Stat of Westminster 2^d - (13 Edw 1st -)

The rules relating to oral slander, apply in
gen^l to written (4 Co 14-) but not univer-
-sally - They are to be taken as applying
to both kinds - except when the contrary is
stated -

I. Of Oral Slander - To render words
slandering in Law. falsity & malice must
concur ^{in uttering them -} (vide def) - Malice in Law means
not necessarily personal ill will, or ma-

Slander.

= violence, but any wicked or immoral motive. If from ill will to A one should defame B (a wife, child or parent) the words would be maliciously spoken of B (The word malice here has the same meaning as in homicide or murder) -

General Rule - For words in themselves actionable the Plff may recover, on merely proving the words (same exceptions page 18-21) ^{no need of proving actual damage or malice.} for damage is implied - & such words per se = ma facie import malice: but this presumption of malice may be rebutted, in some cases, by proving that they were spoken under circumstances, which exclude the inference of malice (Ex post, 4 Bac 483 - Bull 6. 15 R 111 ^{arg} assented to by L^d Mansfield - (as where a former master gives the character of his former servant: this being considered confidential) vide 2. 18.

Classes of actionable words - 1st Those which bring the person of whom ^{they are spoken} into danger of legal punishment - (Finch's L 185) 2^d Tending to exclude ^{him} from society - 3^d Injuring in his trade or profession - 4th Tending to injure one in his office. F. 306 123. Finch's L 185 b. 4 Bac 483. 493 -

According to this classification words may be actionable, per se, tho' they do not injure one's moral character - & they may injure his moral reputation & yet not be actionable -

I. Bringing into danger of punishment - if the false words charge a fact, which would incur corporal punishment - the

Slander.

17

words are clearly actionable - Ex. charging
Treason, felony, Perjury, forgery &c
 4 Co 15. 4 Bac 483 &c. Cro J 638. 502-609.
 1 Roll 65-6. 49 63-77. 1 Wils 177-180. 4 Co 20
 Cr J 114 -

Words spoken which would subject to
 transportation are actionable - 4 Bac 480
 &c to casting - 4 Bac 486 - pl 45. 1 Roll 36 -

Words ^{falsely} charging what would subject to im-
 prisonment are actionable - & imprisonment being
 corporal punishment. 1 Com 179. 1 Roll 46-
 C 15. Sal 694. 2 Vent 260. 266. 4 Bac 486-7
 Camp 137. Cro C 318. Finch L 185 (Sal 696
 contra, & denied 4 Bac 487 - 3 Wils 186 -

Held in Com^t. that words charging what
 would subject to a fine, are actionable, or
 not, as the fact charged is infamous
 or not. So decided by our Sup^t Ct. 2^d. Is
 there any such rule in Eng.? the books
 are not explicit on this subject. Tho the
 cases cited below appear to commence
 the distinction - 1. To charge with keep-
 ing a lewd house is according to this dis-
 tinction - actionable - Being infamous
 & finable - 4 Bl 168. 4 Bac 487-8 pl 50
 55. 60 - Charging a finable offence is
 positive Law. Ex. not performing milita-
 ry duty - not actionable - because not
 scandalous -

Ex. 497. That to charge one with any crime
 which makes the person spoken of, liable

Glander.

to prosecution is actionable (he cites Finch L 186. 4 Bac 487. pl 82) Is not this too general? Suppose a case of mere suspicion charged (4 Bac 485 pl 27 Sid 104 - Cr 2 34. 4 Bac 487 pl 55) Which is inductible - Would this be actionable?

Is then any case in which words have been held actionable, under this head, unless the offence charged might be punished corporally? -

Words charging what would subject to punish - must must to be actionable, charge a criminal act committed - charging evil intentions not sufficient Sid 573. 1 Bull 57-53. 1 Com 191 - Esp 496. Cr. he gave J.S. counsel to kill me - & not actionable 4 Co 166 (Qu - as to this example - Is not such counsel a high misdemeanor?) So "I expect to see him indicted for stealing" not sufficient ^{action} Holt 18. It is caput - give only of an expectation that he will steal

So, "he is in gaol for stealing a horse" not sufficient ^{action} Holt 2 - Esp 497 - Qu - For words of a similar import are held sufficient after verdict 2 Wils 300 or 301. Are not these words actionable on demurrer? Sent not - The true meaning of the words are that he is in gaol on a charge of horse stealing - Adjective words under this head are actionable or not as they pre-suppose an act committed or not Ex "Seditious" "Treason" "Traitorous" & not sufficient "Perjured" is sufficient Esp 497 - 4 Co 186. 192

(5). "He is forewarned" not actionable unless it be

added - in a "judicial proceeding" or in such a court - 4 Bac 484 - 4 Co 15. Cro & bog 3 Lev 150 - Without such addition the words are supposed to purport only the breach of some vow, or of a profane extra-judicial oath. See 90. Is this a fair construction? See 2 Conn. R 40 - Where a charge of perjury in a meeting of church-~~wardens~~^{members} was adjudged actionable - Judge Gould was on the bench & held contra -

To call one a thief after a full pardon is actionable - pardon clears him from legal guilt Esp 497. Hot. R. 1. 2 Bac 487. pl 52. 3 do 516 & Ray 95. So, if the particular theft had been pardoned - suppose the words to be "he stole so", would these words subject the speaker - they are true & therefore not actionable -

To falsely charge one with having committed a crime of which he has been before acquitted - 4 Bac 487 pl 52. Owen 150 There is no danger of punishment in fact. But it is sufficient that the crime charged, is one which is of such a nature as to expose to punishment -

If the words charge a crime which it appears could not have been committed, they are not actionable - "He has killed J. S." J. S. being still living - But that supposes - I trust, that J. S. is then known to be living - Esp 498 - 4 Co 16a - But 5 - or "he killed me" - But this matter must

be pleaded as Exc^d - cannot be given in Evid^{ence} except in mitigation of Damages - Bull 5.

(b)

If to words charging a crime, a description not corresponding to the crime charged, nor to any crime be added. the words are not actionable - Ex - calling one a thief because he had committed a certain act - which amounts only to trespass or 4 Warr 370. 585 - pl 27-8 - Sid 104 - 1 Roll 51 - Cr J 674 - 4 Co 13 - 14 - 19a Ech 511 377 - Bull 5 - 2 A R 335. Ex "He stole my growing timber"

But falsely charging a crime for which all prosecution is banned by the statute of limitations at the time of the words spoken is actionable (Sup Ct 1793. 10th or Fitch) The statute is mere matter of defence to a prosecution - a proof of innocence would be - Besides it is sufficient that the fact charged is of such a nature as exposes to punishment -

If words in themselves actionable - admit of an innocent meaning, it lies on deft to show that they were used in that sense - p 15. Peak 4 n

When words are claimed to be actionable as imputing an act, or fact, punishable corporally it is a rule that - If the punishment of the act or is in the alternative i.e. corporal or not - according to circumstances the words are actionable, if the circumstances are such, as to require corporal punishment - Otherwise not - Ex - charging one with being the father or mother of a

Bastard which has been chargeable; ^{to the Parish.} This is actionable - Aliter if the child has not been chargeable (ut p 3-) for a putative father & is not liable to imprisonment, unless the child has been chargeable - 1 Bac 317. Croc 315. Sal 694 - 4 Bac 487 pl 57. 488. pl 42-3-4 4 Co 17 -

II. Tending to exclude one from society as to charge one falsely of having a contagious disease Esp 498. 3 Bl 123. Cr J 144 - 1 Pol 44 - Holt^e 219 - 1 Lev 205. 4 Co 17 a 4 Bac 488. 1 Com 184

But the words to be actionable under this head must charge a present disease. Str 1189 - 2 JR 473. Formerly otherwise Cr & 214. Cr J 430.

Under this head adjective words in the present tense are actionable - 12 Mod 248. 4 Bac 488 Cr J 144 - Ex - "Leprous" -

III. Tending to injure one in his profession or trade 4 Bac 490 - 1 Com 182 - Esp 498. Ex - Falsely calling a Lawyer a knave is actionable - 3 Bl 123. Finch L 180 - 1 Pol 52 - C 35 - 53 L - 5 - 15 - 52 - 56 - 1 Com 182 - 2 Vent 28. For want of integrity is a disqualification for his profession -

So - "he has revealed his clients secrets" 1 Pol 57 C 50 1 Com 182 - So "he is no Lawyer" no more a Lawyer than the Devil" - 1 Pol 54. 3 Wils 59 Same reason -

Tradesmen.

(8).

To in general, charge a Lawyer with ignorance in his profession - Cro 5 382. or 278
 Tail 297. Sid 327. Mol 54. + Bac 491-2. 1 Com 182
 Reason *supra*

In these cases the Lawyer must state in the declaration, that at the time of the words spoken he was a practising Lawyer. Aliter no injury is presumed. Stiles 231 - 4 Bac 491 - 2 Vent 28. Fox 207
 See 4 T.R. 300 - "False imprisonment p 15" -

Proof of plaintiff's acting as a Lawyer is prima facie sufficient 4 T.R. 300 - 2 N.E. 487 - without record of his admission -

To, falsely calling a trader a bankrupt & actionable (To, "he is a bankruptly knave" -) To, he will be a bankrupt in 2 days. 4 Co 19a 2 N.E. 702
 Est 499 - 1 Com 183 - 4 Bac 493 - Sid 299 - Carl 330 -
 Mol 61 - For the latter words tho' in the future time tend to injure his credit - & therefore his profession or trade, credit being deemed essential to success in trade

To to charge him with cheating his customers & to advise others not to deal with him -
 4 Bac 493 - 2 Lev 62 - 2 R 1480 - 1 Com 183 -
 Burr 1688. It tends to injure him in his calling - For his occupation consists in "buying & selling" -

In actions by tradesmen in these cases, it must appear by laying a colloquium, or, otherwise that the words were published with reference to his trade - 4 Bac 492 - Tal 694 -
 Al 696 - 1169 - 5 Mod 398. T.R. 11 - 169. 2 R 1417 - Ex "He is a cheat" - Here a collo-

= colloquium concerning his trade (i.e. an allegation that ⁱⁿ a certain discourse concerning Plff's trade, or concerning him as a trader (h)) is necessary to be laid

But if the words were "he is a bankrupt" (Ech 514) it would be sufficient I suppose merely to aver that he was a trader &c 1 Lev 115. 250 4 Bac 492. 2 Lev 62 (part 12) It implies a reference to one as a trader - "He is insolvent" would not - For any man may be insolvent but no one except a trader can be in strictness a bankrupt, under the Eng. bankrupt law If then the latter words were laid a colloquium would be necessary - "Do not deal with him he is a cheat" good without a colloquium

Falsely to call a clergyman a liar, decided to be actionable in our Sup Ct & Ct of (Bach, vs Bishop) Tends to injure him in his profession & in Eng^d to charge a clergyman with preaching lies is actionable 3 Lev 17. 1 Com 181 - 1 Rot 58. c 36-

To call him a drunkard - 4 Bac 490. Step 63. See ^{Comp} 253. Str 946 - to other points as calling him a rogue &c.

7) To call a Physician a Quack is actionable - 1 Roll 54 1 Com 182 To say "he has killed a patient" said not to be actionable (Cro & 620) unless it be added "knowingly" - "wilfully" or the like - Clinck just contra Law - As it supposes ignorance in his profession - 4 Bac 491 - See 11 Mod 221 - were the same words said of an apothecary were judged ac-

Slander

= tionable (Rule as to Lawyers *supra*) -

So, false words tending to injure a mechanic in his trade are actionable 4 Bac 491 Str 898. They tend to deprive him of customers -

IV - Tending to injure one in his office - Words charging one in an office of profit with want of ability & integrity are actionable 4 Bac 488. Esp 500. 2^d Barn 1296 - 1 Com 180 - Sal 695. 1 Rol 65. For they tend to impair his livelihood -

But words charging a person in an office of trust or honor (not of profit) with want of ability are not actionable; as they do not injure his livelihood or moral character - 4 Bac 488. pl 73 - 480 - Sal 695. Seem if they impeach his integrity Sal 695 Str 617 2^d R 1369. 4 Co 10a Hob 140 -

To call a man a "Beetleheaded Justice" - not actionable (Sal 695) not an office of profit.

11) Charging a person in office (in either case) with inclinations and principles which disqualify him is actionable, without charging any disqualifying act - if the charge of the disqualifying act would be actionable (Bull 5) as "He intends to subvert the government" -

When the words spoken do not of themselves import to have been spoken with reference

Hander.

to plff's official character, a colloquium is necessary - (2^o Ray 1369. Str 518. 4 Bac 489 pl 88. 488. pl 74. 1 Lev 280) - to show the reference. As "in a certain discourse of & concerning the plff's office &c - It should be previously stated what his office &c is - The office of a colloquium is to explain the reference of the words to some collateral fact - to which they do not of themselves expressly refer -

Secus if the words in themselves import a reference to plff's official character - Ex J 557. 1 Lev 280. Ex - "He is a knavish justice" - Spoken of a magistrate - It being alleged that Plff was a justice no colloquium is necessary -

So generally, where the words are not actionable except as they refer to some collateral fact - to which the words themselves do not upon the face of them refer, a colloquium is necessary to shew their reference to the fact! Ex To say of one who is a trader "he is a cheat" - 5. Mod. 308 - 2 Sand 307 - Ex 501 2 Str 1009 -

These words will not support an action without a colloquium laid, to shew their reference - "in a certain discourse &c touching the Plff's trade &c

Colloquium laid by Ex 514. to be necessary when trader is called a bankrupt - See - the plff being a trader & this fact being alleged (p 9) the rule itself supposes the words I think necessarily import a reference to his trade as no one except a trader can be a bankrupt - no authority cited by Ex (1^o Lev 280) where

(12)

Standard.

The words were "he is a forsworn justice" - & col =
 - colloquium holden unnecessary. 4 Bac 515 p 55
 40 (1 Roll 54 - Croc 270 296) calling a ply =
 - sician no scholar - 4 Bac 515 pl 55) 2o
 12 Ser 62. 'Saying of a tradesman "do not deal
 with him he is a cheat" or colloquium not-
 necessary. - 2o Dan 1480 - "He is a knave com-
 - mended to" - holden not necessary 4 Bac 513
 pl 36 - 515 - Cr J 240. 684 502. In all these
 cases, however the plff's trade or office must
 be alleged -

If the words themselves do not show their own
 application by designating in express terms
 the subject matter or the person - to which
 they are applied - innuendo's are necessary
 Or He (meaning the plff or) 4 Co 17 b
 The office of an innuendo is to explain the
 application of the words to persons, or subject-
 matter -

Rule "Nothing (no words) which would other-
 wise remain uncertain (ie to hearer)
 "can be reduced to certainty by an innuendo"
 4 Bac 516 - 4 Co 17 b - More correctly! Any-
 thing which taken in connection with all
 that passed between the parties to the conver-
 - sation remaining uncertain to the hearer
 cannot be made certain by an innuendo
 = do - It can make certain only by an
 inference to something said, or happening
 before, which is certain - 4 Co 17 b - 1 Roll 73
 Comp 684 - Or - A certain person (meaning
 the plff) "killed his neighbor" (meaning JS)
 there being no other words spoken to identify

the person meant - innuendo bad -

Alibi, if in a discourse concerning the Plff the Deft has said "He killed his neighbor" - Here the innuendo "meaning the plaintiff" would be good -

An innuendo can therefore never extend the (113)
meaning of the words beyond their proper import. Ex "I burnt my barn" - (mean-
ing a barn full of corn) innuendo not-
good; if no other fact or circumstance
appears to make it so - But if it had been
averred that Deft had a barn full of corn
& that in a discourse about that barn, the
Deft spoke the above words; innuendo good
Coup 684 275. 622 511 - 4 Co 20 a - Cr & 834

So "he stole half an acre of my corn" innuendo
"the corn which grew on half an acre after it
was reaped" innuendo is bad - Cr & 428. See
1 Roll 52 p 1 - Coup 684 - For it is inconsistent
with the words -

When an innuendo is unnecessary, a bad
one is surplusage. Ex "He was perjured" (In-
nuendo) in a certain will exhibited in such
a court" the innuendo is bad, but the declara-
-tion is good without it 4 Bac 516. 1 Roll 83 - Cro
& 609 - So - "He has forsworn himself" innuendo
"in such a court" - innuendo impertinent -
The words spoken can not bear such a mean-
-ing -

So if the person is uncertain from all the
words spoken; an innuendo cannot make
it certain "One of the servants of P is a thief" -

Slander.

innuendo "the plff" - innuendo is not good
 Esp 511 - 4 Co 176 1 Sid 52 - Cro E 497 - Hob 245.
 So "one of you is perjured" - innuendo "the
 plff" - not good - 4 Bac 514 - pl 38. 1 Roll
 81 -

141.

It has been holden, that when action is
 brought for words tending to injure in trade
profession, office &c it must appear in the
 declaration by express averment, or in ex-
 -press words, that the plff was at the time of
 the words spoken of such a trade &c
 Esp 515. ^{Hutton} 49. That plff has been a mer-
 -chant, trader &c for "many years past" not
 sufficient Cro E 794 - sent no jury. Cro C 205
 Cases contra - 4 Bac 513 - Cro E 273 - Yelv 159
 Cro J 222. Cro C 282. 1 Sid 425. & that he
 shall be presumed from his averment to have
 been a trader at the time -

The weight of authority seems to be on this
 side of the question; But the words do not
 import that strict certainty usually required
 in the language of pleading -

So in case of a trader that "he gained his
 living "by buying & selling" - necessary - Esp
 515. 1 Sid 299. But the principle can not
 require, that "he should have gained his li-
 -ving, exclusively by 'buying & selling'" -

Words of heat & passion said to be not ac-
 -tionable Esp 520. 4 Bac 522. 1 Lev 49. 30 E
 185 - badly expressed

Rule - When they import no definite charge

as "rogue" "rascal" "villain" &c - For these are words of mere vituperation & charge no specific offence (So, perhaps, when wantonly provoked by Plff) Secus - if left in a paroxysm of unprovoked anger, utter actionable words - 2 N R 335. (Hist 19) - Construction of words.

Action of Slander anciently rare, words then taken in mitiori sensu - afterwards frequent construed in severiori sensu -

These & common words in mitiori sensu & now expious - Idem are to be taken in that sense in which they would naturally be understood by the hearers - Eccl 511 - 4 Bac 497 - Corp 688 - 275. 4 Bac 505. Bac 4 (# 10 Nov 198) Hist 12 Peak Cas 4 (n) 2 Nov 159. 3 Selw NP 1061 - 5 East 463 - # (This volume not considered very good authority - many mistakes)

(15)

Where words in themselves actionable, admit of an innocent meaning, it lies on the deft to shew that they were used in that sense Peak Cas. 4. 2 N R 335. 1 Vin? 507 - 1 John 279 3 do 180. Hence in such cases enquired of, how he understood them - Semt - suppose the charge is ironical & so understood. Vide also 2 Camp 574. & h 371 -

Slandorous words in a foreign language are actionable - if understood by any of the hearers - Secus not - 4 Bac 498. 1 Roll 74 Cro C 805 - 740 126 -

All the sentence or language used at the time by deft in immediate connexion

Slander.

with the words complained of, is to be taken together (Esp 511). For the subsequent words may explain the former - so as to fall short of slander - As in case of a description added - (h b) 4 Co 19 a But 4 2 Mod 159 - "Nescitur a sociis" - (The accompanying words need not be stated in the bill?)

16/-

Courts will not do violence to Language to find an innocent meaning - Esp 512. Ex "Your husband died of a wound you gave him" - Sufficient though the wound might have been given by accident - Gilt 2 243 - But 4 -

So, a forced construction not given to make words actionable, which bear prima facie an innocent meaning - Esp 512 "He is a common maintainer of suits" of a Lawyer Hot 117 - For it is his professional business to conduct suits -

General Rule. Words must to be actionable import a direct charge of a slanderous nature, not by inference -

Esp 512 - Ex - J.S. got his manor by "swearing & forswearing" - not actionable 4 Co 15 a 1 - Too general - 2 They do not import any charge upon J.S. might have been by testimony of others - J.S. could not swear in his own case -

Yet where the intent to charge a crime, (or any thing else of which the charge is actionable) is clear the words are actionable, tho' somewhat indirect - Esp 512

Slander.

45

Bul. 4 1 Com 185. "I will make you
an example for a perjured knave"-
1 Roll 49 & 45. yelv 180-

So, I will prove that he perjured JS 1 Com 185
1 Roll 50. & 1-5 - Cro & 504. Pitt 381. 1 Vent 276-

17/

So. When will you relieve the sheep you have
stolen? actionable 1 Com 181. 1 Roll 48. 2 do 165 -
12 Co 134 -

Tho' generally actionable words prima facie
imply malice; the presumption may, by circum-
stances, be rebutted - Ex. In case of confidence -
- that communications, which exclude the pro-
- bability of malice - As character of a servant - anti 2
given by a former master, or mistress, on rea-
- sonable inquiry (h 2) tho' false (i.e. not proved
true) malice must be proved - 4 Burr 2422
17 Q 110. Bull 8. Cro & 91 - 4 Co 91^{7.19} Esp 502 - 3 -
5 Esp 110 & notes. 3 Bos 587 -

Information on such points is useful & impor-
- tant & ought not to be restrained - In such
cases also the facts communicated are presumed
to be of a private nature & probably confined
to Deft's knowledge - So that it would be
difficult to justify if they were true -

So, where one confidentially & by way of
warning to another, said of a trader "he
will be a bankrupt soon" the words were
held not actionable - tho' special dam-
- ages were stated - Esp 503. Bull 8 3 D R 60-1
arg.^{do}

The retailing slander fabricated by another (19/)

generally actionable - 517. Bull 10. Term if
 he truly name his author at the time. 12 Co 133
 4 Co 400. 3 Bull 225. 75 R 17 2 East 220
 30. 400. 4 B & C 24 1 Inst Rep 533 -
 5 Bingham 392 Late report held cont. - Law Intellig. 379

But circumstances are carefully to be regarded
 in such cases, as to the intent, 4 Bac 498.
 Ex. Where one in the spirit of ^{censure} said
 "I have heard that J. S. was hanged for stealing
 to action lay not 1 Lev 102 - 4 Co 14 - Bull 9. 10
 4 Bac 498. 12 28.

Def't's suspicion is however no justification
 518. Cro & 38. tho' it may assist in alle-
 -viating the presumed malice - I should think
 a man repeating the words of another should
 be liable: whether he believed them or not - he
 might truly give his informer who might be
 a vagabond - words extorted by pressing or
 provoking questions by Plff himself, not ac-
 -tionable 4 Bac 498. 12 29. Cro & 297 - "Have
 you say I am perjured" Ans - "Yes, if you
 will have it" - (14) -
 Justification.

(21)

The truth of the words is always a complete
 justification - 4 Bac 510 - 1 Roll 87 - (Bull 8. 9
 cited contin.) For words to be slanderous -
 must be false -

So, the Def't may sometimes justify tho' the
 words are in themselves actionable & false
 or rather false & of an actionable kind
 As where false words are published in a
 course of justice - Ex in declaration or count

Slander.

49

4 Bac 499 - 518. 1 Com 194 - 62k 503 - 4 Co 14 -
Cro & 230 - 248. Hot 82 - Hutt 113 - 1 Rolt 43 -
3 Leon 138. 103 - 24 285. Or in articles of the peace
otherwise it would be dangerous to prefer com-
plaints to courts of justice (see 3 Eek 32 for
words used in giving charge of another to an
officer, on a complaint for a crime - (Action
for malicious prosecution may lie.)

But it has been holden if plff charges crimes
not cognizable by the jurisdiction to which he
takes action lies to him - not justified Eek 503
4 Co 14. 1 C Cro & 230 - 248. Hot 267 - 200 - 1 Rolt
34 - 1 Com 194 - See also 2 Ludo 1571 - 1 Hawk B 1. C 73
§ 8. 1 Lound 132 n. 1 - Cr 4 432 - 5 Eek 109. 110 a
contra The rule seems not to be Law (See Mal-
icious Prosecution) p 23 - I G. thinks ma-
licious prosecution is the proper remedy -

So, the person charged in articles of sum-
plaint (tho' they were exhibited under oath)
may justify saying that the complainant has
slandered falsely For this is in his defence, in
a court of justice - 4 Bac 499 - 518. 1 Rolt 87
2 Burr 807 -

So, a party to a suit may say that a witness
is perjured by way of objection to his ad-
mission - 1 Com 194 - 1 Bult 33 - 1 Lound
132 - n. 1 - 3 Leon 138. 103 - 1 Rolt 87 - If his
objection is false not liable -

Words used in a complaint to a grand ju-
-ry, or proper magistrates or in an in-
-dictment are not actionable - 4 Bac 499
Cro & 147 - 3 Leon 138, ^{4 Co} 14 Hot 82 - 3 Eek 32 - Secus,
no one could safely complain of an offence

Slander.

To, if words used in petition to Legislature for redress of grievances, delivered to the members only 2 Sainsd 131. 2 Barr 810-11 - 5 Eek 110 n
This is to preserve the great legislative privilege -
- life of petitioning -

To of words used by way of defence, by a person accused before a Church presbytery -
5 Eek 110 n - 1 Binnay 178.

To of words used in pronouncing the sentence of a Court Martial - Ex that the charges were false, malicious & groundless. not liable
2 N R 341 -

23) - Tho' if one falsely, maliciously & without probable cause - exhibits a complaint or action for malicious prosecution will lie
14 Bae 500 "Malicious Prosecution" - but not an action of slander -

To in general in the above cases of complaint or prosecution, if the course of justice is made a mere cloak for malice - action for malicious prosecution lies - Semb - 4 Bae 500 - 3 Bk 126 - Finch L 305. F N B 116 - (not as in Grand jurors.) 17 R 508.

To slanderous words spoken by witness in Court are regularly not actionable -
4 Bae 499 - 518. C2 E 230 - 2 Balst 269. Hunt 11 - Seems if he goes beyond the issue & slanders a 3^d person - Eek 504 - 4 Co 14 -
Suppose he do slander a party - Is there no remedy?
The books are silent on this point - I see no

reason why he should not be liable as well as when he slanders a 3^d person -

To subject a witness whenever he can not verify his testimony by other witnesses, would be both unjust & impolitic - no one would dare to testify to a criminal charge -

So, if one witness in testifying charges another with having testified falsely, no action lies -
 62k 505. 518. 1 Saund 131 - 4 Bac 518. 1 Com 194
 Burr 807. 2 Bulst 269 - Nutt 11 - Cro & 230
 52k 110. 2 -

It is only supporting his own testimony - or a mode of asserting it to be true -

So, that the words charged were spoken by 1247
 deft, as counsel in a cause, is in some cases a good defence, or justification - in some not so; 4 Bac 498. 518. Bull 10. Cr 941
 52k 110 n Rule. When the words (the false &c) are pertinent to the cause (& suggested by his client) he is not liable - 62k 517. 1 Com 194 - 4 Bac 484. 518. Cro & 90 - 3 Bl 29 - 1 Holl's N.R. 621.
 Is the client's suggestion at all important?
 20k 53-87. Exp 10 517. Bull 10.

But if the words are impertinent (tho' suggested by client) action lies - 3 Bl 29. Cr 90-1
 So as seems implied in 3 Bl 29.) If the words tho' pertinent are slanderous & not suggested by the client - Is this correct? -

Most of the books however make no difference between their being suggested or not suggested Bull 10 - 62k 517. 1 Role 87. c 25 -

1 Com 194 - 1 Roll 33 C 20 -

Does that circumstance affect the reason of the case, when by the supposition, they are impertinent - How can counsel be justified in impertinent accusations by any one's suggestions or directions?

It has been decided that for the purpose of mitigating damages, in favor of a client an advocate may use slanderous words not pertinent &c - 4 Bac 498. Hot. 328. 1 Roll 47 - C 10 Lu -

25)

In a subsequent case (Styl 462 4 Bac 498) holden that an advocate is never liable for slanderous words in defending his client's cause; It is his duty - presumed that he was influenced by client (Late writers do not maintain the last two cases) Lu. is the rule founded upon any principle? -

Piercing -

In declaring it is usual to state "falsely, maliciously &c" maliciously" it is said is not necessary # 1 Com 196 - 1 Pains 242 a Noy 35 4 Bac 512 p 8. 1 Hot 273 Burn 57) if the words are in themselves actionable; for malice is *prima facie* implied (i.e. such words if false prove or imply malice - *prima facie* at least the fact of malice; But should not the fact itself be alleged? (as in murder) for the words do not necessarily imply it, as a proffment does living &c; Searcant W^{ms} - seems however to consider the rule as Law -

Glander

Pleadings -

1. Pleading 242 a(n) sed quia still - A direct averment that the words are false - not necessary - "Falsely published" are sufficient -
 601 516. Bull 8. (# It has been holden that the omission of - "maliciously" was not fatal after verdict sed quia) -

Declaration usually states that the plff is of good fame, name & reputation &c (1 Com 195) not necessary in any case - The Law presumes every man is of the above character till the contrary appears -

Alleging that the words were spoken "open & publicly" sufficient without saying - "in the hearing of &c" in the presence of divers persons" is insufficient - 4 Bar 512. Cro E 861- 486. Noy 57 - & is usually put in -

When there are two counts one charging actionable words - the other words not actionable - & on a plea to the whole - entire damages are given, judgment will be arrested & venire de novo awarded - 8 TA 564 - Secus if the words are all in one count (10 Co 130 - 320 ib 137 - Cro E 320 - 788. Str 1094 - 1 TA 508 - 592 - see 1 TA 582 - (ie laid to have been spoken at one time, Bul 8. 2 Bar 7. Root 346 - 432 - 10 Co 31 - The first of these rules has been rejected in Count. - 1 Count. R 324 Coleman vs Wolcott (on indictment for libel the first rule does not hold.) (* good on demurrer) via 2 Bay 204-439, 1 Hen 4 & Mump 361 - sed quia. P. 9 - "Pleading 2.9" 533-4 -

In actions for words not in themselves actionable special damage must be stated this is the gift Cro E 520 & 2 TA 130 - Bul 8.7 And without proving it there can be no recovery -

Slander

Ex. - Slandering of a farmer that he is insolvent - or a knave & thus depriving him of a beneficial contract -

So where the words are actionable - the Plff may state & prove special damage - but in this case he can prove no other special damage than that which is stated specially - Bull 7. Esp 520 - 8 D R 133 - 1 Rot 58.

(26) What amounts to an allegation of special damage Str 666 - Bull 7. Kirt 85 290. 8 D R 130 1 Rot 58. Sid 396 - 1 Vent 4 - Cro J 499 -

But where the words are not in themselves - actionable holden that special damage might be proved under a general averment of damage Str 666 - 1 Com 198. See by Bull 7. Kirt 290 Esp 520 - not Law. Scmb. The true rule appears to be that no special damage can be proved, in any case unless specially laid.

Immaterial what the false words were - if they are malicious & occasion special damage - calling a single woman incontinent by which she loses a match - 4 Dac 496 - 4 Co 17 - Slandering of a servant that he is dishonest - unfaithful - incompetent - or that a Lawyer is insolvent &c

In case of slandering a title (as it is called) as calling an heir apparent a bastard - it is sufficient to show remote or probable damage - Esp 501 - Cro J 213 - 4 Co 17 - 4 Dac 494 - 1 Rot 38. Or - Plff's father or ancestor had disinherited a design to disinherit - sufficient

Stander

Pleadings

also that the words tend to disinherit. 4 Co 17 a. Esp 501. So decided in favor of young-
= set son tho' not here apparent. But no
action lies if Deft claim to be next here - the
words are then only in assertion of his own
claim - 4 Co 17 - Esp 501 -

General Issue - is "Not Guilty".

The general issue is a denial
either that Deft spoke the words - or that they
are not actionable for want of malice - As
in the case of confidential communications
supra p 18. 19 R 110. Bull 8. Esp 503-517 -
1 Lev 82 i.e. - either or both these facts may be
denied under the gen'l issue -

In Conn^t. the gen'l issue includes all de-
= fences (even that the words were true or other-
= wise justifiable) except such as arise from
some act of the Plff - amounting to a discharge
But by rule of S Ct. notice of justification
must be given - (Same Rule in N Y - but
he must give notice that his defence is that the words were true or)

The gen'l character as to the species of crime
(not as to any other species of crime) charged
by the words may in Conn^t. be proved in miti-
= gation of damages - 1 Root 354-450 / no such
gen'l rule till lately at least in Eng^d. Leub
1 Phill 140 6 Map R 518. 1 John 46 - But it
seems of late that the Con^t. rule is adopted in
Eng^d. 1 Maul & Selw 284. 2 Camp 257. Peck & v
Appx 92. acc Parker & Swan 284 - C C^t U.S.
Sept 1820. perjury charged - plff's gen'l character
in point of probity & veracity unreached -

Stander.

Gen'l Issue -

But other particular acts of the same kind, cannot be proved - when the charge is of particular acts. *Atwood vs Atwood* 9 C.T. Rep 1807. See Bull. 296. Peak Ev 276. Tho' altth if the words charged are or plff general character for if called a thief any particular theft may be proved -

In Eng.^d a special justification can not even be given in evidence under the Gen'l Issue. In C.T. can always by the Stat. of Pleading 1624 518. 62. that the words were true 4 Co. 125. 16. 5th Str 1200 - Dory 373 - Inconsistent with the plea -

In Eng.^d the truth of the words cannot be given in evidence under the gen'l issue even in mitigation of damages. Str 1200 - 624 518. Bull 9. do 8. case cited contra - See - Is it not admissible on principle? See analogy "Assault & Battery 15"

27/.

One recovery of damages is a bar to another action for the same words - whether the words are actionable per se, or not - 624 519. Bull 7. No subsequent action will lie even for subsequent damages

Formerly necessary to prove the words precisely as laid - now sufficient to prove substance - Bull 5. 2 Bull 718. 624 520. 4 TA 217 8 do 150 - 62 The persons of pronouns must not be confounded as "he" for "you" -

In action of slander in gen'l, plff after proving the words stated, may give evidence of other words of a similar kind, spoken at another time even after the action brought

Slander.

Gen'l Issue.

- Said to be in aggravation of damages. Est 518. Bull 10. Case cited (It may have that effect see vide infra)

But damages cannot surely be recovered for such words I. Words not actionable may be thus proved - II. Words actionable[#] (which also may be thus proved) are a foundation for a distinct action Phill Ev 134-5. Peak C 22. 74-1 Camp 47- 2 do 73 of # The distinction formerly taken viz that the words not actionable might be thus proved - action-able words could not - is now exploded - Phill Ev 134-5. 1 Camp 49. & cases sup -

III. Words spoken after action brought may be thus proved; the wrong done by these words did not exist, when the right of action accrued -

The same rule holds as to proving other libels to show malice - Phill Ev 134- Peak 74. 100. 2 Scho 938. The real object then must be, not to recover damages for the words not laid in the declaration, but to show malice - actual malice in Deft - Bull 7. Est 520. Hi 691. Tho' they may thus consequently, have the effect of aggravating damages for the words laid -

But when words, spoken at another time, are [28] given in evidence under this rule, Deft may prove them true - to rebut the inference of malice Est 518. Bull 10-

But words not stated, & spoken at a different time must to be admissible, be similar to those charged. Est 520 (said "the same words" only

Slander.

Gen'l Place.

words

Bull 10. Esh 518.) i.e., which affect Plff's character in the same point, or in the same respect as the words said - Ex both impeaching his integrity - or his conduct in office &c -

English Statute of limitations as to slander &c two years from the time of uttering it - Stat extends in construction only to actionable words (Esh 519. 1 Sid 95) for in case of words not actionable the special damage might not accrue till after that time, yet the words of the Statute are "Within two years after the words have been spoken" - (Here within 3 years) -

(29-)

Generally a joint action of slander by or to two will not lie - 2 Burr 984 - Esh 504. Bull 5. 1 Com 195. Dy 19 a 4 Bac 511 - Yelv 120-1 - Not a tort which supposes an act: of course no joint wrong #. (Bull 5. 3 Bl 117. vide 1 Com) Exa lies not to two - And the right violated cannot be joint: Exa it lies not by two (the Husband & Wife must join) - Secus of libel (p 36) malicious prosecution 39-40)

But two parties in trade may sue jointly for words spoken of them, as such, when special damage is sustained by the firm 3 Bos 150-2. Telw 1162. 2 Samsd 117. a n. Yelv 129 n - Here a joint right or interest, & violated - damage joint -

Suppose the words actionable in themselves & no special damage alleged - & qd. it William Seargeant thinks the action would lie 2 Samsd 117 a - n - & why not? actual damage would be joint - "Damage implied or pre-

Slander

Gen'l Place.

= Slander would therefore, seem to be so -

II. Slander by writing or libel -

(30) -

As to the nature of slander by writing, or libel - Whatever words would be actionable if spoken - are clearly so when written
Esp 504. 3 Bl 126 -

But written slander is a more aggravated injury, as having a more extended circulation being more permanent & being always deliberately committed - 3 Bac 490. 3 Bl 126 - made a matter of record in popular language -

Hence the rule does not hold always & converso (post) tho' Esp 504, says it differs from slander by words in this only - that it is delivered in writing or print - See also 3 Bl 126 -

But this is incorrect words written are in many cases actionable when if spoken they would not be

Definition of a Libel -

Any malicious defamation of a person (living or dead) made public by writing &c & tending to excite resentment in the object of it, or to expose him to punishment, odium, contempt or ridicule - 4 JR 128. 1 How 193 - 352 - 4 Bl 150
3 Bl 4 - Bac 490 Definition seems to have been formed with reference chiefly to libels considered as public offences - Ex dead person - exciting resentment - (p 35) -

31

For libels in general 2 remedies - by indictment or criminal prosecution & by civil action -

Slander.

Libel -

3 BL 125. 3 Bac 492. 498. Title Libel - But when a libel is upon the memory of the dead - no civil action lies -

Said the gen'l rule relating to oral slander applied to cases of libels, considered as civil injuries: This is true so far as respects the affirmative rules, describing actionable words - As that written words falling within the description of any of the four classes of actionable - are libellous - Ex - Words charging an offense which would expose the object of them to punishment - Est 504 - 3 Wils 403 - Str 898. 3 BL 125 - But the negative rules, as to the actionable quality of words spoken, do not always apply to words written

But nothing in gen'l is construed a libel which is necessary in the regular course of legal proceeding - Ex - In a declaration, complaint, affidavit &c as in case of words spoken - Est 505. 2 Burr 807. page 21 &c -

(32) - Action lies not for publishing a true account of a trial in a court of justice - tho' p'ly character is injured by it - 10 Brox 525. 5 Est R 110 n. 1 do 456 - 8 TA 293 - Court order the reporter sometimes not to report the case before it is decided because it may influence public opinion - In a civil action, the truth of a libel as of words not written is a justification - 1 TA 748. 4 BL 150 - 4 - 3 do 125 - b - 74th 253. 2 Mod 166 - 10 do 99 - Bull 8-9 - contra 4 Bac 510 - 3 do 495. S. C -

Secus, on a criminal prosecution at Com. Law 3 BL 125 - b - 4 BL 150 - Str 498. 5 Co 125. Tho' falsity

approaches the guilt 4 Be 150. ~~5 Co 125~~
2 Mc. & 548. Nor is the bad reputation of the per-
- son libelled a justification 2 Mc. & 549. 7th 4
For its tendency to a breach of the peace is what
renders it a crime. The object of the prosecution
is not reparation for a civil injury, but punish-
- ment for endangering the public peace, when
the attack is upon private character is not the
rule reasonable (tho' an when upon a public
character) Truth of the words is a justification
under our statute Sta C 355 and in N Y -

It is essential to the constitution of a libel that
it be published - The modes of publication
are various - 2 Mc. & 543) Writing it originally
seems to be sufficient tho' dictated by a 3^d person
Esp 510. East 405. 5 Mod 163. 2 Mc. & 542 -
This being the essential part of the making of
a libel

But merely transcribing it without shewing it
is an one, is not a publication - Esp 570. 9 Co 596
but it is evidence of a publication if the libel
be made public - Tal 419 -

33/

But composing it - procuring it to be composed
reading it to others after one knows the contents
delivering or shewing it to others after one knows &
- sending it in a letter to a 3^d person - fixing it
in a public place, amount to a publication in
Law

For to be wilfully or wrongfully instrument-
- al in making it public, is to incur the
guilt of actual publication - Esp 570. 9 Co
596. 5 Co 1256 3 Bac 497. 1 Hawk 195. 2 Mc. &

Slander.

643- 2^o Raym. 341- Sal 408. 2 Bl R 1038.
 2 R 417-480- So that many may be respect-
 - ively liable for one little libel -

The sale of a libel in the shop of a book-
 - seller or other is *prima facie* evidence
 of wilful publication by him - Onus on the
 bookseller 2 Mc N 644- Burr 306 3 Bac 497 -
 12 Vince 229 - 6 Ch 510. 5 Burr 2687- So of a
 sale by bookseller's servant 2 Mc N 644-5-
 It is *prima facie* evidence of publication by
 master -

So of printing by servant is *prima facie* evi-
 - dence as above - 2 Mc N 643- 2 Bl R 1038. A
 journeyman is a servant for this purpose -

But this presumption may in all cases be
 rebutted: As that the sale or printing was by
 master's orders, or clandestinely without his know-
 - ledge - that he was delirious or sick &
 unable to attend to his business - that he was
 absent - 2 Mc N 648 - 2 Hawk 131- Imprison-
 - ment is *prima facie* & sufficient excuse
 for the master - 2 Mc N 648. Servant also liable
 - command of the master can not excuse a
libel; bound to obey only lawful commands -
 2 Mc N 647-8. Ignorance of the contents how
 far an excuse see 2 Mc N 649 -

To sending it to the press for publication is a
 publication in Law - & the person sending
 is guilty of publishing where it is printed
 Font 201- 6 Ch 510. For it is published by his pro-
 - curement or instrumentality; & "qui facit
 per alium, facit per se" -

Libel -

Writing it in the presence of others, is a pub-
- lication. - Esp 510. 5 Co 1256. 5 Barr 2660. 2 Barr
807 -

But repeating part of a libel in surrimment-
without malice has been holden no publication
Esp 510. Mo 627 - 813. 1 Hank 196. 2 Mc K 643. But
the absence of malice ought to be very clear -

Writing it to the person who is the object of it,
is sufficient publication for a public prosecution
as it tends to a breach of the peace - Esp 506 -
510. 4 Bl 150. 1 Hank 195. 3 Bac 497. Popk 139 -
Not so for a civil action Hot 82. 215. 12 Co 35 -
1 Mod 58. as thus sending it is not a communi-
- cation of it to others -

And of course no injury to the reputation
of the person to whom it relates -

If the letter was a friendly expostulation by a
person having a right to expostulate - is it suf-
- ficient for a public prosecution? Esp 506 -
Clearly not actionable - It + 2 Brownl 151. + I
should think not indictable

Are all libels which support a public prosecution
actionable? 3 Bl 125. 3 Bac 492. So it would seem
from some opinions; but it can not be universal-
- ly so - as when written of a dead person - or ad-
- dressed & communicated only to the person to whom
the words apply -

Words written are many times actionable, when
if spoken they would not be - 2 N Bl 592. arg^o.
1 Bos or 331. 1 Samd 120. 1 Show 313. 1 Mod 58. 1 Jor
752 arg^o. Str 899. 3 Bac 492. (anti 31) -

(341)

(35-)

Slander.

Libel.

Not only the classes of actionable words, already enumerated (p 2) are libellous when written & published, But writing & publishing any thing falsely, which makes a man odious, or ridiculous # is actionable 3 Bac 492. 2 Wils 403. 1 Bos & Pul 331. So (2 Wils 404) by Gould Justice "Rogue" or "Nascal" is sufficient # gn if it tends to ridicule only.

So, disturbing domestic peace &c (said by Esp 505) gn to maintain a civil action? -

Writing or printing of one that he is a swind = lar, is actionable - 1 Str 748. gn if spoken 2 H Bl 531 -

The offence or injury of a libel are considered as repeated, or rather continued in every stage of its circulation - Therefore venue not changed in Eng? 1 Str 570. 647. 1 Wils 178. If the action brought in any county, where it has circulated -

It is not indispensable to the constitution of a libel that the libellous words should be so direct & explicit that any reader will understand its application - sufficient if understood by any body -

(36) -

Tho the writing only expresses - the initials, or one or two letters of the name of the person to whom it is intended - or feigned names; it is a libel if the manner is such as clearly to identify the person 3 Bac 493 - 1 Hawk 194 - Esp 500. 2 Str 470 -

Slander.

Libel.

Action or indictment for libel will lie in several joint Defts. - for the publication is an act, in which two or more may join. But 5 Burr 984.

But for words spoken they can not.

If one writes a libel - another gets it printed - the one that prints; ~~one~~ reads it - & another ~~by~~ sings it - each of these are guilty of publication - & liable to an action, for publication is the essential part of a libel (Vide last of page 32)

On indictment for libel, if the jury find the fact of publication & the innuendos; they are bound according to the Com. Law rule to find Deft guilty. They have then nothing to do with the question of actual malice, or whether the matter is libellous - These are facts of Law arising upon the face of the Record - Whether libellous, or not appears from the jur's verdict; for as the libellous matter appears specially stated (for the libel must be stated in the very words in which it was written) upon the record; a general verdict of guilty in case of libel is equivalent to a special one, in any other -

As a special verdict on an indictment for murder - And if the matter is libellous malice is implied - 3 T 2 428. Sal 417. 5 Burr 2608 2 Mc 551.

Suppose then the Deft actually published; but that he had sufficient excuse; as insanity In such cases the jury should not find the publication - so the Court would direct: For the act is not criminal -

Slander.

Libel -

In this country a different rule prevails - the jury are at liberty to judge of the Law - as well as the fact under the direction of the court - as in all other criminal cases - So now in Eng^d by Stat. 32 Geo 3^d. 2 Mc K 651 -

(37) - III. Slander without words - or Libel without writing - Slander of this kind consists in emblematical representations. As pictures, signs, effigies &c. Ex - raising a fallow before one's door & hanging him in effigy. Esp 511 - 5 Co 125-8.

Erecting a lamp before another's house & lighting it in the day time (it means a Lewd house) 11 East 226 -

So, I conclude, painting a duck upon a physicians door -

Representing one ignominiously by painting &c. 3 Bac 491 - Ex - painting one's likeness with spo'c - or in the act of perpetrating a crime, or in any scandalous or ridiculous act or situation - in such cases the application must be made out by innuendo & averments -

In declaring for this species of slander it is said special damage must always be shown not actionable in itself - Esp 511 - 3 DL 125-8 - Otherwise it is said the import & application of it are not made sufficient - by certain - See qu. For the declarations of the spectators are evidence of the identity of the party libelled - 2 Camp 514 (p 15)

Slander.

By our Statute, common slander is punishable as a public offence (1st Conn't. 220) fine not exceeding \$34 - to county treasurers - & never inflicted -

Judge Gould has no doubt slander by words would be actionable - the Declaration should state the mode (i.e. the act) by which they convey their ideas -

The action of Trove originally lay only in cases where one found the goods of another & refused to deliver on demand but converted them to his own use. Hence called Trove & Conversion - Hence also termed "by finding" 3 Bl 152 - 5 Bac 256. It now lies in many other cases -

(49)

It is now an action on the case for strictly of trespass on the case. Derived from Stat. Westminster 2^d. Edw 1. 3 Revue H.E. 2 58 & 2 do 202. 389. 391 -

It now lies ^{by} fiction to any one who tortiously takes the goods of another - 5 Bac 257. Cro C 824 - Cr 450 (but see) Esp 589. Mod 31 - Str 128. (Formerly not so) In this case the "force & arms" are waived in point of form. Otherwise an action on the case would not lie

And in general in all cases in which one who is by any means possessed of another's personal goods sells them or wrongfully refuses to restore them on demand - 3 Bl 153. Bull 33 - Cro 8, 781 - 5 Bac 256 - 7

The first instance of this action in its present form was in the reign of Edw VI. But actions of a similar nature had been brought in the reign of Hen VIII. 4 Revue H.E. 2 526 - 585-6.

(50)

The fact of finding is now immaterial, conversion is the gist - Finding generally stated, but not always in Eng. or here - not indispensable - Esp. 587 - Bull 33 5 Bac 275. 2 Bulstr 313 - For the manner of obtaining possession is now not an inducement (Esp 587. Bull 33) "finding" not necessary of course as mere inducement now is. I.E. - It can not be specially denied by a traverse. But Deft may deny under the general

Trove.

issue, that he ever had possession, of the goods by "finding" or otherwise.

It lies in all cases in which detinue lies, in many others. But it has almost superseded detinue, in the law certainly required in describing & freedom from wayer of Law - 3 B. & 153. General Definition of Conversion - A wrongful assuming to dispose of the goods of another as if they were one's own. 6 Mod 212. 5 B. & 257. 8. 2 B. & 280. 1 Sid 264. Ex. vi. termini - therefore it is tortious, & always consists in a misfeasance. And a mere nonfeasance is never a conversion. Therefore a conversion does never admit of a justification in pleading - a conversion must be unlawful.

The debt is in the form of the action always, supposed to have gained possession lawfully. But the action lies as well (as *ut supra*), when the original possession was tortious (5 B. & 256 - 7. Cro J 50. 1 Barn 31 -) as when Lawful: the first being conversion: and this may consist either I. In an unlawful taking - II. In an unlawful use - III. In an unlawful detainer -

The evidence of conversion in these cases, is different *per* 590. 5 B. & 288. or 268. 269. *per* 655. *infra* 5 B. & 257. *Roll* 1. These acts are respectively "a wrongful assuming" &c. as above. The mode of proving conversion varies to correspond to the three kinds of conversion.

51. I. A tortious taking is itself a conversion in Law. *per* 589. 5 B. & 257. 1 Sid 264. 2 M. & 65.

original intent to destroy them, & (I conclude) renders his possession tortious - at once -
[vide trespass on things personal p 57 - In other words it renders his original possession tortious (cont) -

Drawing part of a cask of wine & filling it with water, is a conversion of the whole -
Esp 581 - 1 Com 221 - Str 576 - This is a wrongful assumption &c -

But negligent custody of a thing is not unlawful - Esp 580. 1 - 590. not a misfeasance (supra) Hob 281. 8 Co 146 - So no conversion - Ex. finder of cloth supposes it to be moth-eaten - So if perishable articles are supposed to be spoiled - for want of care - Cro & 219 - says an action will not lie for negligent keeping - wrongs 2^d Barn 919 - 1 Bac 48. See 1 Bow C 252. Jones 48. 2^d Barn 917. 5 Bac 258. 740 17. Tal 655. 143 - 1 Roll 2. 6. C 5. 5 Barn 2827 - 1 Bac 243 - 5 Bac 269 - Special action on the case lies in cases of this kind -
Esp 590. Tal 655. 2^d B 917 - 1 Bow C 252. Jones 48
Esp 581 -

If carrier loses the goods through his not - Tal 655. 143 &c at law - No misfeasance - When liable for loss by neglect - misfortune - or act of a stranger - the remedy is by special action on the case - detinue being disused -

As timber being on B's land, A asked leave to take it - B refused - B was holden not

guilty of a conversion - no interference, no
mistake - 5 Bac 259-29-2 Bull 318. 2 Mod
245. See 5 Bac 178. 4-2 H Bl 257-8. (Bating 6)
Would it have been justifiable, in entering on
the land to take the timber without B's leave?
A where A's fruit falls on B's land -
(vide Tr. q. cl. pr.)

If conversion consists in selling the property of
another: Indeb. is concurrent - Bull 131 -
2 Mod 419 - 2 H Bl 144 - 1 do 387 - 1 do 697 - 2 H Bl
= cover the money it sold for - The action is
for money had &c - If then there is an un-
lawful taking - & subsequent sale by the
wrongdoer; the owner may have trespass
trover or Ind. Ap. at his election - But
one recovery bars any subsequent action in ei-
ther of the other forms - Afsumpit lies not
before the price is received -

III. Unlawful detainer is a conversion, as if the
Deft. bailor, finds he wrongfully refuses to de-
= liver on demand; If indeed there has been an
actual conversion as by using, selling, destruction
= ing &c - a demand & refusal are not neces-
= sary to a right of action - tho' the possession was
lawful - 5 H Bl 589. go. Sid 264 -

For there is then conversion without demand, a
conversion or unlawful user, of course the cause
of action is complete - But when Deft has
been guilty of neither an unlawful taking -
nor of unlawful user - There is no right of
action till plaintiff has demanded the property
& Deft has wrongfully refused to redeliver it -

Foster.

But a refusal to deliver on demand is not of itself a conversion or unlawful detainer for it may be justifiable - Ex. Suppose not sufficient evidence of ownership - accompanying the demand - 6 Ch 590. 2 Buller 312. Corz 529 And it is for the jury under the direction of the court to decide - whether the evidence was sufficient -

So Debt may have had a lien on the property: as an Inkeeper, a carrier or 2 Show 161. 2 Ld R. 752. 6 Ch 582. Barr 936. 2221-2 So it may have been destroyed without Debt's fault - or so lost - or stolen -
Lat 155. 6 Ch 590. Barr 2827. 2 Rayn 752 -

A demand & refusal therefore are only evidence of conversion, or unlawful detainer 6 Ch 590. 1 Roll 131- 5050 3 Bl 153. 2 Show 179 - Hob 187 - & per se only prima facie evidence # - 10 Co 566 576 6 Ch 590. 3 Barr 12⁴3. 2 H Bl 135-6. # Denied in 6 Mod 112 & said to be conversion - Mod 400 See Corz 529 -

But if the refusal is not justified by Law, the presumption becomes conclusive evidence to the jury of conversion - for in such case the detainer is of course unlawful -

X

(154) - A finder of goods has no Lien on them at Com. Law. for his expense & trouble - 2 H Bl 254 - 2 Bl R 117 - & therefore cannot justify a detainer under such claim - of course liable in this action, after a demand if he detains for this cause -

* But if the jury find only that Plff was owner & kept
 in possⁿ & demand & refusal / not finding a conversion /
 Ct cannot give judgment for Plff. for the jury find only
 prima facie evidence of conversion 10 Co 566. Esp 520.
 CroEL 97. 495. Burr 1243. Hardr 48.
 This would be a special finding but a venire de novo
 would be awarded.

* If A's timber floats on B's land, A cannot maintain
 title ss B even after demand & refusal. 2 74 DL 257-9
 5 Dec 259. 12 Nov 248. 2 Oct 1-318. But A may enter &
 take the timber -

(Bailment 36). Is not the finder's case in the nature of a voluntary courtesy? — 2. Can he recover? I. G. thinks not — no decision on this point.

If one having the goods of another puts them into the hands of a third person wth the command of the owner; this is conversion.

Esq 581-452 260- Servant is liable for conversion by himself tho' to the use of his master - & even by master's orders - Esq 580-6-1701 328. Str 813. 1 Com 221- Bull 17- quod vide 2 Mod 242- For master's command justifies no other than lawful acts done by the Serv^t. (Master & Servant) - *

Who may maintain Trove.

In general any one who has an interest in goods converted by another may maintain the action. Ex - any & every bailee - (55)

It is not necessary for Off to have absolute ownership of the thing Ex. Bailor may maintain the action wth a third person wth having the general property.

5 Bac 261- 2 Roll 569- 1 Sid 438- Latch 214

("Bailment" 102-3) - (post) - But this rule does not hold unless he had the right of possession at the time of the conversion - (either the possession or the right of present possession reversionary)

It is said however he may have case in the wrong - does for injuries done while the exclusive right of possession is in bailee - 1 Ch R 167. 2 Phill 80 133-4- 3 Lev 209- 359-60- 8 John 432- 11 Co 385. 2 Ch R 329 n is a special action on the case for injury done to his reversionary interest - 7 D R 9- 4 do 489. 1 do 480- 8 John 432 "Bailment" 103. "Trove" 52- 3 Ex 140.

To bailee having special property may main -

-tain the action as a stranger - 1 Bos + Pul 44.
 Peak 40 - 3 Esp 140. 1 Com Dig 218. 1 Roll 4 - C 52
 as a common carrier - a special carrier - apud:
 -ing farmer &c 5 Bac 105-202 Mod 545 - Pal 143
 Esp 577 - 1 Mod 31 - So, I conceive of every class of
 bailors: For as against strangers they are the ow-
 ners - Special property is sufficient - "Bailm." 108

If goods are sent by A to B not to rest in B
 but to answer a particular purpose for A
 & the purpose fails - A may have Trover for them
 after demand & refusal - 5 TR 215-495 -

(56) - So a Sheriff who has taken goods in execution
 may maintain it vs any one who has wrong-
 -fully taken them away - Lev 202 - Bull 33
 2 Saund. 47 note -

So Lessee for years of a house blown down may
 have Trover for the timber as a stranger - Bull 33
 Esp 577 - "Bailm." 108. He has a special pro-
 -perty in it - from his rightful possession -

So a Lawful possession alone or possession
 acquired under the claim of right, whether
 actually rightful or not gives a right to main-
 -tain the action vs all but the owner -

Ex - When one finds goods - Esp 575. 1 Com 219
 The 505. 777 - Bull 33 - This gives him a kind
 of property which will support the action vs
 third persons - 2 Saund 47 a note - Cro E 819
 L. C. - 5 Co 245 - 3 Roll 332 - This rightful
 possession implies a special interest -

So, if on a dis, puted title to goods between

A & B. - A obtains possession of the goods, as his, he may have Trove or a stranger - even tho' the real title should appear to be in B. (9th)

But the possession must be acquired either by gift or under claim & colour of right to entitle one to this action. For if gained without colour of right it gives no special property even as to stranger. 3 Wils 398. ~~2~~ Tamm 47 & note - If one steals goods & takes them professedly as a mere wrong-doer, or without a pretended right. Vide Trop. to things personal 56 -

So, right of possession is sufficient as when (57) Debt having goods of J. S. was ^{bound} obliged to deliver them to Plff. J S's Creditor ^{but refused} - action lay Exp 575 1 Bullst 68. 1 Com 219. 1 Bac 242. 1 GR 480. 1 Roll 606. 7 GR 9 - tho' plff never had possession 2 Tamm 47 & note For a right of possⁿ implies an interest -

But a property of some kind is necessary for when Plff had sent an order for goods to be delivered to his servant ^{& they were delivered to the purveyor where sent} - action lay not lodged. as the host in favor of the purchaser - for no property vested in him for want of delivery Bull 35-b. Sal 18. 30 Com 186 Exp 576 - He had therefore within the possession in fact, nor such a property as draws after it a possessⁿ in Law or right of possession - I fear, if they had been delivered to servant of plff Bull 36 For a servant's possession is that of his master

Fundamental distinction between Trove & Trespass - The former founded on property - the latter on possession - Bull 35. Exp 576

Trovee.

12 R 9. 4 do 489. 1 do 480 -

But as is a wrongdoer, whose original possession is tortious, this distinction does not practically apply. Since either Trespass or Trover will lie. Tho' in Legal Theory the action of Trespass is founded upon plffs possession - of Trover upon his property. It holds I conclude in point of fact only, where deft's Original possⁿ was lawful - as in case of bailor, finder &c. who convert the goods bailed &c. In the latter case trover lies, as bailor or for bailor or owner on the ground of property only.

The actual legal possession at the time of conversion being in bailor &c. But trespass lies not in this case as bailor &c. by reason of his actual and Lawful possⁿ. As Trespass is founded on an injury to possession. But as, as a stranger, taking the goods from Bailor &c. trespass is concurrent with Trover, for bailor (vide Tresp. 52.) in point of form however (i.e. in declaring) plff is always supposed out of possession at the conversion -

Uncertificated Bankrupt may maintain it. as a stranger. Bosc 44. Peak 140. 3 East 1140. Corp 589. For he may hold goods, as, as all persons, except his assignees. 'Bailem.' 108.

Forcible Executor &c. could not maintain the action for conversion in testator's or lifetime. now he may, by the Equity of the Stat 4 Edw III. de bonis asportatis. 2 Bac 439. Esp 578. 1 Com 219. Cu & 377-668 589. The Co - 2 Mod 168. So of an administrator though not named in the Stat. The Com. Law rule was founded upon the maxim -

"Actio personalis moritur cum persona."

Said to have been holden that an averment of (58.)
conversion in intestate's lifetime, is supported by proof
of taking in his lifetime & conversion afterwards.

For the time of using lay in the knowledge of the debt?
1 Com 221. Esp 589. 5th 60. But the court considered
the conversion complete in intestate's lifetime.

The taking was tortious, Esp 589. 1 Vent 266, 2u?

Bailor's right to this action is said to be founded
on his own liability to bailor - i.e. (if so at all)
I conceive, on the possibility of his being liable - or
his being accountable - and this always exists -
1 Bac 249. 5th 164-5. 262. 13 Co 69. F. N. B. 89-92
Co Lit 89 - 1 Sid 438. But this special property
is the foundation of his right - (see Bailor's rights)

Doubted in the case of Depository. 5 Bac 165th pl 22.
Is not the special property sufficient, which he has?
Jones, 112) Case of finder Supra - possession alone is
sufficient - Besides, he may be liable as bailor
liable in all events - see Bailor's 106-7-

If one delivers to A the goods of J. S. the bailor
by delivering them back to the bailor - exonerates
himself from J. S.'s claim - & such a claim
is effectual to bar an action by J. S. even if the
delivery back is pending the action # 1 Bac 257. 242
1 Roll 606-7. F. N. B. 137. see Bailor's 90 1-

Suppose the debt knowing the property to be J. S.'s
has refused to deliver to him. Is not this evidence
of unlawful detainer? The rule is not accom-
panied by any such qualification -

Recovery by bailor, ousted bailor of his action (59)

Trove.

for the full value *vice versa*. 13 Co 69. 5 Dec 156
263. 2 Roll 569. Bailm^t. 111-12.

To bailee by doing the wrong done first, ousts the
bailor of his action (semt) commencing the ac-
tion attaches a right of recovery.

So, if bailor does first, bailee is ousted of his
action of *trover* for the full value - But he
may have an action for his special damage.
"Bailm^t" 112. Analogous to appeal of Robbery
by Master or Servant he who begins first se
13 Bac 559 - Latch 227 - (part) case of escape vs
Shiff vs "Bailment" 107.

Bailor by doing wrong done, discharges bailee;
he elects his remedy. (semt) If bailor does
first he makes himself bailee to bailor
"Bailment" 113-14 -

107). Said (13 Co 69) that he who has the special prop-
erty shall have trespass, or this action vs him who
has the general property see 7 SA #12. Qu: The
bailee may doubtless have special action on
the case, to recover special damages, 5 Bac 185
5+266. Why trespass: or trover vs the bailor? The action
is not for the loss of the property - but for the use of
it - of the special interest. The value of the
property is not even *prima facie* the value of
the damages -

Generally retaining the goods (after conversion) to
plff does not oust his right of recovery - miti-
fats damages only - 627 581. 5 Bac 266. 6 Mod 282
Cr 9. 48. 1 Com 221 - 11 Roll 50. 201 R 902 - 6 SA 696 -

But when the conversion consists in a tortious taking of debt delivery it on demand - there can be no recovery in this action - & that is, the only conversion complained of; of course there being no damages for the taking - there can be none at all - Actions of trespass were brought - Vid 1 Burr 31.

Recovery in trover vests the property converted in debt - except when it has been returned - Est 593 1 Stark 141 - Str 1078. 5 Bac 257. Otherwise the plff would be entitled both to his property and also the value of it in damages - Indeed he might be repeating his demand maintain any number of successive actions - Satisfaction of judgment is unnecessary.

A former recovery ^(+ satisfaction?) by a stranger is a good bar to the action - Est 593 - Cro 773 - Yelo 678. There can be but one recovery - Est 593 - Str 1078. L^d R 1214. That is, supposed to restore the plff to his rights - Ex - Suppose conversion by A D & C - Plff recovers in an action vs A alone - This bar, his remedy vs D & C & the rule holds, tho' the judgment vs A has not been satisfied (But vide contra in the case of Co-Trespassers - Yelo 684. Hol 116. Brokist judgment. pl. 98 & vide 3 East 258. Cro E 30. & also in 3 Con^t 214 sed q^{ue} Whether the test is not correct on principle & by the policy of the law? Vide Tref 59 - The damages which were before uncertain are by the recovery of judgment converted into a debt of record. So, a recovery in Ind: Assumpsit: (The property having been sold) is a bar to trover for the same cause - 5 Bac 280 - L^d R 1217 - (Where the debt is the same in both actions, a recovery without satisfaction unquestionably bars a second action. And a recovery in trespass, when concurrent with trover has the same effect (16) For a

Trove.

recovery on one of two or more concurrent actions, bar the other or others, for the same cause. - Esp 593.

Suppose A finds the goods of B but they are claimed by C - & that C sues A for them & recovers. Does this "recovery bar B's right in A? I think clearly that it does - Note the analogy to the case of payment or under administration repeated in 3 TR 125. 2 Bosc 11- 124 DC 669 - 682. arg. 2 Wall 54- "Bailment" 37 -

Against whom Trove may be maintained -

It may be the wrongful taker - bailee, finder or General rule: -

The owner of goods may maintain Trove, not only vs the first wrongful taker - but any subsequent holder - even a bona fide purchaser * 1 Str 1087 102. Bailee or finder sells the goods) 1 Wm 8, 284 579 - Tal 282. 1 Leon 158. 1 Bosc 237. 3 Bosc 260. 6 Bosc 44 - Provided the sale was, not in market overt - So if sale in market overt was, in coin between seller & purchaser - 2 DC 430. 6 Bosc 579. 1 Leon 158. "Bailment" - The maxim under the general rule is "Caveat Emptor" -

* - He who is prior in right is prior in Law -

(82) - Exceptions to this general rule (so far as relates to other than first takers) in case of money - Bank notes, Bills of Exchange - transmissible by delivery - Trove for these can be brought only by first taker by reason of their currency: When they have been placed over to a third person, on a bona fide consideration, ergo he may hold - Reason of policy 1 Wm 452-7 or Tal 126. 2 Bosc 738. Ex - Case of a bank note stolen & paid away for valuable consideration. 6 Bosc 580. 39 -

3 Jan 1810. 1 Bl R 455. Wray 611 - "Bailment" 98 Chit B.

When goods are pawned, pawnor may maintain trover
as pawnor, after tender of the money on the day of
payment - 5 Bar 264 - Co J 244 - 6 Rep 590 - Bull 72 - 4 Co 836
2^d R 916 - Co J 244 - 4 Com 258. Sal 522. 1 Com 220 -
"Bailment" 29 -

If pawned on a usurious contract pawnor cannot
maintain trover till he has tendered the money
advanced & (repaid) the lawful interest - 17 R 153 -

The action being not to enforce - but to be relieved
in the contract - & trover being an equitable action
(Bailment 30) - his claim to recover the pledge de-
livered by himself, is considered as standing upon the
same footing, as would a claim to recover back
a payment voluntarily made on a usurious con-
tract - He must do Equity - "Wray" 23 -

A parcel left of goods without some act of delivery
does not transfer the property - The donee of course
cannot maintain trover (& the action will lie
in such case on donee if he takes possession
without delivery) 6 Rep 577 - 1 Bar 239 - 2 Leon 30-1 -
2^d R. Without demand as the case may be? Would
not the gift by parcel be a licence, under many
circumstances? -

But delivering the key of the room, where the
goods are kept, to donee, is sufficient - Str 955 -
See East 192 - This is virtually giving possession
called a symbolical delivery - It is not strictly
symbolical however - Vidi Donatus mortis causa
(tit. Exr. & Admr. -)

Towers.

One tenant in Common or joint tenants, of a chattel
 can not maintain this action wth his companions' ad-
 vantage taken of it on 'not guilty' (Est 586. Sal 290
 5. Dec 280. 152 188. Corp 450 - 1 Day 301 -) prop^r of
 one being the prop^r of both or for both. Tens of it
 is destroyed by one of them. This shows the interest -
 for such a waiver act by one can not be deemed
 to have been done for or in behalf of the other - nor
 of course the act of both - Est 586 - Co Lit 200. a
 168-303 - 368. Bull 34-9 - If brought by one only
 on a stranger plea in abatement is necessary)
 Sal 290. 120 113 - Co 6 544. Est 411 - Litt 323 - Sal 4
 12 520. Corp 450.

For what does Tower lie? -

Personal chattels in general -

This action lies for
 choses in action of any kind - the only evidence
 of property - The date need not be alleged - In-
 -strument being gone plff is unable to recollect
 the date - Est 585. Cr 190. 5202 - 1 Com 219 -
 Cr 1 637 - Roll 5 C 20. 1 Root 125. Corp 117. Est
 543 - Sal 130. 283 - 654 - 272 708. (Co 6 723. that it
 lies not) -

So for title deeds & q Mod Est 543. 272 708.
 (Nelson 19) It now lies -

It lies not in general for an animal ferae
nature - unless confined & valuable if not con-
 -fined no one has a property in them. And if
 no value the loss of them would be of no damage
 (4 DC 235) - Tho' for such reclaimed animals
 of any value it does. Co 1 Hawk
 110. 219. Roll 5. 4 DC 235. 5 Dec 263. 3 KB. 86.

Hot 283. Cro E. 125.

When wild there can be no property in them
Ex. A wild bird or beast upon my land -

It lies for tame animals as horses oxen dogs (63)
Hot 283. So in some cases for animals not tamed
if confined - viz being merchandise & valuable.
Ex monkeys - Parrots &c. Cro 262. 5 Bar 264. 1 Com 219

It does not lie for a negro slave in Eng^d or Conn^t.
5 Bar 263. 2^d R 146. Carth 397. 2^d R 1274. 3 Ld 336.
2 Ld 201. (Conn^t 3 Feb 785) - not a subject of
property in his person. tho' there may be a prop-
erty in his services - The action for taking away
or enticing away one's slave is a special ac-
tion on the case; laying - a per quod servitium
amissit

It lies not for the conversion of a Record: because
it is not private property. this is a public office.
It does lie for copy of Record - (Ex 542. 5 Bar
264. Hard 111-) being private property.

It has been holden that it lies not for money
unless in a bag &c. - that it might be identified
as in detinue - Cro E 638. 661 - S.C. This is not
now considered as law - For in latter cases, it is
holden, that as the object is not to recover the
property in specie but damages only, it does lie
for money not thus circumstanced - 5 Bar 264
1 Com 219. 1 Roll 5 C 15. 10. Cr C. 89. Cro E 818. 844
not necessary that the specific money be re-
covered upon the execution but only the same
amount of money -

Trove.

141. If I own a horse, and my husband is at play? Trove lies on Husband - 5 Dac 264. Tit 122 - Rule 23 - Trove: App: appears to be the more appropriate remedy - So of servant -

(5) - The action lies for the conversion of personal chattels only: converting a thing from another's possession is not a conversion for which Trove will lie. (5 Dac 257) as taking a door from its place & carrying it away. Co 1129. So if any fixtures as rails & boards pulled down from a fence - (But if the argument is justified as of his own goods - a prior severance will be presumed after verdict - Co 1129. & in the action for a door) -

So, if cutting and carrying away, to one continuing and not a tree, or fruit growing upon it - pruning hedges - a standing crop &c. (B) The rule in all cases, implies the severing & carrying away to be one continued act - or to be done in continuity

But not tortiously taking a thing already severed (tho' it was before a fixture) Trove lies - No 125. 5 Dac 257. Ex - taking away a door or window already removed from its place - fruit found lying upon the ground or previously gathered to the owner - For in this case the property is strictly a personal chattel at the time of the taking -

So, if I sever another's fruit on one day & carry it away the next day (tho' in larceny) Trove would lie for the severance - and Trove for the carrying away -

146 - Severance good ground from meadows to save a

Trove

ship is no conversion - 5 Dac 258. 2 Bulw. 288.
 the necessity is a justification (In such a case
 there is a contribution by the maxim of law
 see "Insurance & Bailment" - If the goods of
 one are hoisted overboard - (to save the ship) all
 interested in the ship or cargo must contribute
 pro rata "Law Merchant".

Pleadings -

Declaration must state a place of conversion
 or it is said to be ill in substance - 6 Ch 588.
 Cr 6. 78. Ec. In substance at this time? 2 M. 30)
 It cannot be law (see 'Pleadings' venue It is but-
 form - But time being transitory the venue need
 not be truly laid

Declaration in Trove ought to show property
 in plff. but stating prop^r "as of his own goods"
 is sufficient. For that implies a property
 And 891. Hard 111 - 1 Com 222 5 Dac 271 -
 and see 1 Tamm 379. 12 1023. Demand & refusal
 not even necessary to be stated - more evidence
 But it usually is stated because originally ne-
 cessary.

Time of conversion must be averred - Formally
 for the omission of this fact was arrested -
 6 Ch 588. 1 Vent 135. Cr 428. 1 Com. 224. Cr 697 -
 Aliter now - Where the time of conversion was
 laid before the time - the "afterwards converted"
 holds sufficient & the defect void.

But this would have been ill on special de-
 -murrer: It cannot therefore be matter of sub-

Trove.

- Stance - it seems now to be more form - & reached by special demurrer only. See Title "Pleading" - 308 & 398. Calk 389. Cro J 428. 5 Bac 310.

671.

The subject must be described with some -
- must certainty. formerly with great accuracy
"divers books" insufficient - 2 Vent 114. 317. 1 Lev
301. 6 Ch 587. & 2^d R 588. 2 Lev 176. 2 R 99. Bull
37. Str 809. As to the necessity of alleging the
value of the goods - (5 Bac 275. Cro J 130. 1478.
F & B. 88. not necessary according to 6 Ch 588/
& Cro J 148). See 6 Ch 407. 2 Lev 430. 5 Bac 245.
Is it not necessary on special demurrer
at least? Doubtless it is cured by verdict; but
seems necessary as matter of form & to furnish
prima facie case of ~~damages~~ damages -
(vide Trop: 57-) de Formis - "Trove" -

Said that there are only two good pleas in trover
general issue & release - 6 Ch 592. 1 Hbl 305.
105 Bac 276 - But many have been allowed
Yels 198. 1 Show 148. Cro J 73. Str 1078. Sal 654 vide
Str 60 - But justification is not pleadable - for
conversion is alleged in the declaration, is
not justifiable being ex vi termini - tortious
(Bac Ab Trover F. 2. Cro 6 146) Justification
amounts to Gen'l Issue. I trust however
any thing similar in effect to a release
may be pleaded specially - ex accords and
satisfaction. former recovery &c -

But a justification (or rather a defence
which justifies the seizer taking when or detainer)
may be given in evidence under the gen'l
issue - 6 Ch 593. Bull 48. For such a de:
- fence & disproves the alleged conversion -

Trover.

the latter implying a wrong. So in Con't under
our Stat.) saying that a conversion may be
justified, would be a legal holocaust —

Holden that the Stat of Limitation in Con't
does not run vs Trover — even when conversion
— went with Trespass. & when trespass if it
had been brought would have been barred;
See. therefore whether Trover is not barred,
in such cases —

Assault & Battery.

147

Assault is an attempt or offer to do a corporal hurt to another by force - but without touching -

Ex. Lifting a weapon or fist in a threatening manner - see - line Battery C. C. 10 Dec 154 - 30 C 120 - Esp 312. Dec 15.

Is presenting a gun, drawing & waving a sword pointing a pitch-fork at one within the reach of it - 2 Roll 545. 1 Vent 256 - 1 Hawk 133 - "An unlawful sitting upon the person or by an offer to beat - (French Law 202) This is an inchoate violence, & amounts to an injury - 30 C 120. 1 Brev's Hist. Eng 285. tho' no actual personal hurt is sustained -

But a gesture otherwise amounting to an assault may be explained by words, so as to fall short of an assault - 1 Dec 154 - Ex - A says his hand on his sword & says "if it were not a piece of time or for the intention must co-operate with the act - to constitute an assault - 1 Mod 3. Esp 312 - 10 Mod 187. 2 Roll 545. (not so of battery -

Words alone then, cannot amount to an assault - ancient opinions contra - 1 Dec 154 - 1 Hawk 133 - 4 2 Roll 545. 1 Com 590.

Battery consists in the actual commission of violence upon the person of another (Esp 312)

The least degree of it done in an angry, spiteful insolent, or rude manner * is battery - 1 Dec 154 1 Mod 149. 12. 1 Com 589 - 1 Hawk 134 - Ex spitting in the face - treading on the toe - (* Where the violence is only nominal the manner is regarded Aliter if there is actual serious hurt inflicted Ex post 5)

"The unlawful beating of another" (30 C 120) Qu - Is a battery of course unlawful? For it may be

Assault & Battery -

justified (3 Br 120. Pal 407) tho' it is often justified as a moderate means, imperfect

Every Battery includes an assault. proof of battery therefore will support a charge of Assault & Battery - try 1 Bac 154. 1 Hawk 134 - Pal 384 -

Menaces of bodily hurt tho' not amounting to an assault (for words alone can not constitute an assault) are in some cases, actionable injuries. When they occasion damages or inconveniences they are actionable. otherwise not - 3 Br 120 Finch L 202. Am. Battery C D 590. 2 Roll 345. Ex Interrupting one's business - The action is trespass vi & armis. (3 Br 120. 2 Roll 345) for it is inchoate violence - Special damage is the gist (remedy) Should not the form be trespass in the case according to principle?

To entitle one to recover in trespass for a battery the injury must be immediate; i.e. the immediate effect or consequence of the force employed - But not necessary to battery that the injury should be the instantaneous effect of the direct act of the wrongdoer; Sufficient if produced by a connected train of effects -

(3) In general any wanton act by which one causes a battery supports the action (2 Br 1000 295) - Lett throw a squib into the market place which after various discharges, & impulses, eventually put out Plff's eye - 3 Br 403. 2 Br 892. Str 634 - So of an elastic ball striking a person after it had bounded 10 times or 100 - A ball glancing - For the particular distinction between trespass and

Case see "Trespass on the Case"

To, if one punishes another wantonly or carelessly, & the latter punishes a third - the action lies on the first -
 822 33 - Bull 11 -

If a horse taking sudden fright runs or a person the rider is not liable unless he was in some fault! - not his act - But if a third person unlawfully struck the horse, he would be liable for all consequential mischief - 608 313 - 4 Med 405 - 100 24 - 100 589 - Sal 637 - Bull (16) says "that he is liable in an action upon the case" - (2d Sal 637 aq. & 100 589 in case 2. 5. Is not the wrong done liable in trespass for a battery - the horse being considered only as an instrument employed by him - suppose that instead of an animal he had put in motion an inanimate body - as a moveable machine - or a rock rolled down a descent - would not trespass clearly lie? 100 24, 310, 304 - 100 523 - It is like turning out a wild bull or tiger -

When a person receives bodily hurt from an ^{act} ~~act~~ (4) to which he consented he may sometimes (it is said) have an action, in other ~~but~~ - (608 313 - Rule 2) the act consented to was legal - he has no remedy - Volenti non fit injuria 62 - Hurt by playing at cudgels (lawful) if hurt by boxing to which he consented - he has action (for boxing is unlawful) Bull 16 - 100 174 - & consent could not make it lawful, & volenti he does not apply - consent void -

This rule holds undoubtedly upon an indictment for battery, but how can the party beaten recover in a civil action? For tho' the license is a, such

Assault & Battery.

And yet does it not make him participi criminis? & in pari delicto potior est conditio delinquentis? That the parties are both liable to an indictment there is no doubt.

So consenting to be lawfully beaten, does not justify the beating. 6 Ed 313 - Comb 218. Bull 17. 2a. In the civil action? Would not the above objection defeat it?

But that the injury accidentally happened in an amicable contest, as, wrestling is a good excuse - *actent good*. Law, Head 125.

If one in doing a lawful act as, in defending himself accidentally hurts another, behind him he is liable to the action. 2 Bl R 896. Ray 468³

51. Malicious intent* is clearly not necessary in general to subject to the action of trespass vi armis - Hence a Lunatic is liable to it civili but not criminaliter.

It of an infant of any age (in parent & child) Latch 13. 110. Long 640. 6 Ed 399. Hob 134. 1 Bond 81 - Tho' it is a general rule that in case arising ex delicto innocence of intention excuses, - Long 644.

Not universal (see 204 Cro 614) For the object of the civil suit is, not punishment but reparation for damage sustained; & he who caused it however innocently ought to bear the loss, rather than another. If intent however is of importance in the assessment of damages.

But how far accident will excuse an involuntary trespass - has been a question of some difficulty.

Assault & Battery.

155

According to Fonblanque it is sufficient to make one liable, that he has been the "physical cause of the damage to another" - (1 Hunt 81) - This is too broad a rule - For it would not admit of even inevitable accident, as an excuse - Ex. One's falling on another - Not 134.

It is said that inevitable accident or "inevitable necessity" only should excuse a battery, as being involuntary. Not 134. 1 Com 589. All 35. 2 Roll 548. 3 Roll 377. 2 Bl R 896 - S.C. 3 Roll 410. Str 596 - 1 Hunt 81. In such case the injury done is not the act of the party excused - He is, not in any sense the agent -

Meaning of "inevitable" That to which human care or strength can not guard - i.e. the act should be physically unavoidable. Yet if one defending himself accidentally strike another behind he is liable - 2 Bl R 896 - Ray 467. So if one firing at a mark accidentally hit another - So if his gun should burst in firing and hit another.

(6)

Buller (1 P 16) supposes that if a horse used to run away, with the rider, takes a fright & in running injures another; the rider would be liable on the ground of neglect - But here the remedy would be case for neglect - not the rider's act. 1 Vent 245 -

Rule is clearly that where injury is inevitable - the deft is excused. Not 134 - 2 Bl R 896 - 3 Roll 377 - Ex. one taken with the applesauce falls on another -

True distinction I conceive is, that if the act

Assault & Battery.

causing the injury, is voluntary, *viz.*: if lies - tho' the injury itself was not intended - Ex. I am defending myself, I hurt one behind me -

But where one without acting becomes the involuntary instrument of damage to another - it is not - Ex. A in walking accidentally falls on B.

(7) - According to *6th* a trespass to be actionable must be voluntary. *6th* 383 - cites 4 Burr 2092 Proposition too broad - In the case of 4 Burr 2092. neglect said to be necessary - but that was the case of a deer killed by *Wylde*'s dog.

The dog could not be considered as the agent nor the act his, unless the injury was voluntary on his part - *Secus*, if had accidentally killed a deer -

When the act causing the damage is itself unlawful - the author is, in some way, either in trespass or case liable at all events for the consequences. - 2 BL R 893 - 2 R 1574 - 480. 12 Mod 639 1 Vent 295. Ex. case of a dyer (ante) A sets fire to D's building & the fire is communicated to others, - A liable for the whole -

The above rules, as to accident do apply to trespass in general -

Defences - Three kinds of defence Denial or Infringement - Excuse - Justification - Bull 17.

(8) Assault & Battery are justifiable in many cases. *1 Com.* 589. 3 BL 120.
Ex. The Officer having legal process to arrest one

may use violence in case of opposition so far as is necessary to effect the arrest. 624 314. 1 Bac 155. 1 How P.C. 130. to any extent.

But a battery is not justifiable in this case unless there is actual resistance - (L^d Raym 229.) or an attempt to escape - 2 Str 1049. Bull 18. 19 624 314. 3 Lev 403 - Cro 6. 93 - 2 Ch D 523 - 85 R 78. 299. 1 Samsd 296-7 in an arrest simply will justify an assault only - i.e. if to an action of Assault & Battery the Deft justifies both, by a mere authority to arrest (without more) that justification is all. If resistance is alleged - he may justify the battery also -

But a milder manner in making the arrest justified tho' no resistance &c 2 Str 1049 2 Roll 546. 1 Bac 155. Bull 19. 5 Com 355. (This is in strictness no battery) i.e. Deft may plead a milder &c as the justification of the alleged assault - but he must in this case deny the force & arms by the plea of not guilty. Thus as to the force &c not guilty" as to the residue milder &c" stating the special facts which justify it. Pl Abt. 447 - 2 Ch D 519. 526-9 Com Pl 3 in 18 - 1 Mod 36 (post 16) -

Plea of "milder &c" for it is said in justification of the battery, alleged (said Com. 1 Samsd 296 in post 9 - as well as of the assault, 624 314 - 5 Com 355. Skin 387. Cro 6 93-4 - 2 Vent 193 - Com 3 Lev 404 & 624 314 - 2 Ch D 523

The battery alleged can in this form of pleading be justified by mere authority to arrest; Tho' the court, on this sole ground justifies the battery as such (Rule not Law Sem.)

Assault & Battery.

We must as to the battery plead Not Guilty -

But charge of manhood, wounding, or bruising he also alleges - where the justification is a mere authority to arrest; Deft must as to these also plead not guilty - as well as to the force & arms - The justification unnecessary - 5 T R 78. 299. 1 Samd 290 - 297 n

149 -

The modern opinions are that Deft must plead not guilty, as to the battery also, justifying only the assault, as a privilege &c - 1 Samd 290 n 1
 12 1049 - 2^d 231 - 2 Tent 193 - Hardw 298. 6th 314 -
 3d 404 - It is said at any rate to traverse the battery -

Battery is justifiable on the ground of self defence if in defence of the Deft's person - he may justify a battery as a battery 5 T R 120. If one strikes me first. I may strike him in return as an assault or Blf is sufficient to justify a battery by Deft as if Blf left a weapon &c 1 Sam 589 - Bull 17 - 18. 6th 315. (But guard the force & arms Deft should plead not guilty according to Pleader 4th 449) 2d. Sent clearly not so. For he may justify the force &c & even a wound - 1 Samd 79 - 296 n 1 11 6. 268. 1 How 136. 1 Sid 240 -

But there must be some reasonable proportion the assault or battery by Blf - & that by Deft - For even assault or however small will not justify even battery, however great - 11 Mod 43 Bull 18. & the proportion is a question of fact, in every case - A small blow will not justify

a manum. But if Plff strikes Deft - a scuffle immediately ensues & Plff is mayhemed Deft is just-
-ified. Sal 642. 1. L. 240. Esh 315. Secus if Plff
gives slight blow & Deft in return wantonly strikes
so as to mayhem -

The plea in the case of self defence is non assault
demens. i.e. that first assault proceeded from
Plff. & that Deft struck in self defence - Plea
Esh 447 - Esh 315. Sal 642. 2 Ch Pl 523-4 -

But mayhem it seems is not justified by Plff's
aggression - unless the Plff's act might be
- danger Deft's life or member - L^d R 177. Esh 315.
Sal 642. L. 240 43 - Com 590.

As to the application de injuria se, (see Doro 76.
8 Co 60-) de injuria sua propria absque tali
causa is the technical traverse of the whole plea
of non assault de vi et armis - Vide form 2 Ch O 642
"That Deft at the time when &c of his own wrong
& without the cause, by him in his said plea
alleged assault, beat &c (concluding to the
country)" See Starkies Ev. Title "Trespass" -

If the Plff was the blameable cause of the battery
(tho he did not strike or threaten to strike)
Deft is justified in some cases - as, according to
one statement of the case, when Plff tilted the
seat on which Deft was sitting, & Deft bit off
Plff's finger L^d R 177 - Sal 642. But the mayhem in
this case seems to have been justified by Plff's at-
-tempting to gouge Deft - according to 11 Mod 43
L^d R 177 -

So, where Deft throws his money into Plff's heap

Assault & Battery.

& a scuffle ensued - self justified Ech 315.
Cro J. 366-

Parents are justified in giving children reason-
able correction - master his servants: & ser-
vants under his domestic government - school-
master his scholars - padre his prisoners -

Ech 315. 1 Sid 176-7. 1 Hawk 130. Bull 18. So ac-
-cording to some a husband his wife - but this
now seems not law - 1 Hawk 130. F N D 80 -

1 Bac 155. These relations constitute special
justification. The act is justified by the ne-
-cessity of personal government in the several
cases -

A man may justify a battery in defence
of his wife - & c converso - so of parent & child
Ech 314. Bull 18. L^d Ray 62. Considered a self-
-defence -

(1) Clearly a servant may justify in defence
of his master. But c converso quare. By
the better opinion I conceive the justification
is good - 3 Bac 568. Ech 314. Bull 18-19 L^d Ray 62
2 Rolle 546- 1 Hale 484. Sal 407. 1 Bl 429 -

The battery in the case of Husband, Parent &c
must have been actually in defence of the
wife &c to prevent her &c from actual in-
-jury - & must be so alleged in the plea -
not vindictive - Ech 318 L^d Ray 62. in
Str 953 -

So one may justify battery in defence of his
property forcibly invaded, as by breaking a
door, gate &c. But if there is nothing more

Affault & Battery.

167

than a mere entry on another's close (which implies force in law only.) the owner is not justified in a battery without a previous request in the wrong doer to depart. 6 Ch 314 - Pick 19 Sal 641. 1 Hawk 130 -

In case of mere entry on lands, also the battery must in pleading, it is said, be justified, not as a battery but as a molestation &c -

Bull 18. 19. 6 Ch 314-15. 2 Ray 82 - 1 Sal 407 - 5 Com 355. (Can Plead 3 m 15-) 1 Mod 36 - 2 Ch R. 224 n. The necessity of violent resistance is not deemed so great as in prior cases of self defence &c - See vide 8 TA 78 entries

The last two rules contemplate the owner of property in possession, & are founded upon his right of defending his possession. But when he is dispossessed or dispossessed, a different rule now prevails, which as to real property was not known to Com. Law.

At Com Law one who had a right of possession (12) or entry on lands was allowed to gain possession by force from the dispossessor 2 Br 555. 3 Bl 179 & do 148.

But now by several Eng. Stat. (The first of which is 5 of Rich II.) one may not enter on the lands &c of which another is in possession (as by holding over after a term has expired, or taking a vacant possession) except in a peaceable manner (16) same law by Stat of Ct. (St Ct 209) Entry & holding by violence in such cases is called "forcible entry & detainer" which by Stat is made penal.

Assault & Battery -

But these Statutes contemplate only possession which is in some way & in some degree abandoned by owner, as in case of lease, when the original possession is given to Lessee & in case of lands of which the possession is neglected by owner & vacant.

A casual temporary absence from one's property, as by merely taking a journey is not an abandonment - so as to exclude the owner, right to use force of Title Forceful Entry &c -

In case of personal property owner is not allowed at com. Law, to regain possession by force - unless feloniously taken - 3 Bl. 4. 5. 3 Inst. 134 2 Roll's Rep 55-6 - 2 Roll 565-6 -

(131) Provocation by bare words never justify a battery but may mitigate damages - 1 Will. 6. 624 817 -

A servant cannot justify a battery in defence of his master's goods - 5 Cin 354. Co G. 242 - In - Suppose them to be in his special keeping may he then not justify? Or carrying them from one place to another - The rule seems to mean only, that the servant cannot justify merely because the goods are his master's he not being in possession.

Assault & Battery at different times cannot be laid with a contumendo - nor diversis diebus et vicibus &c 622 316 For an assault is one entire indivisible act - Camp 828. See 3 Bl. 212. Sal 130-9. 6 East 345. Phil & 134 Bull 85 (as to contumendo part -)

And each battery is in its nature distinct but

168 170

(131)

Assault & Battery -

171

doubtless Plff may allege one battery on one day & another on another in the same declaration - in different counts. Suppose batteries committed on several successive days, by the same person or plff. He can not allege them as a continued or a connected trespass. Aliter in some kind of trespass -

For battery of wife Husband & Wife should join and the injury should be laid ad damnum ipsorum. For Husband is damaged by expense & cost of living - & the wife is personally injured & the damage would survive to her. 624 316. 1 Sid 387. 1 Roll 782 L^d Ray 1208.

If laid ad damnum of the Husband only; declaration is ill; judg^t may be arrested. 624 316. L^d Raym. 1208. For he alone has no cause of action for the battery. He is a stranger to the right of action, except for the relation in which he stands to his wife. Not therefore like the case of one of two joint tenants, &c. suing alone for a trespass on the joint property.

If Plff's being as Husband & Wife, are not such (14)
it must be pleaded in abatement - 624 321 -
114 480 -

If battery has been committed on Husband & Wife he alone must sue for the injury to himself 624 316 L^d Ray 1208. 1 Roll 782 pl 2 Cro J 655.

If both join in this case for both battering & several damages, writ abates quoad Husband after verdict. 624 316. Cro J 658. If joint da:

Assault + Battery -

= mafs judgment arrested in toto -

Plff may lay in aggravation of damages it is said many facts for which he could not himself recover
Ex. Assaulting servants, without laying a her
quod 62p 317 Sal 642 2 Ch 374 or 2er? Is it to
aggravate damages directly - or to show how enor-
= mous the trespass was? If or rather the circumstances
= as of enormity under which it -

At Com. Law a justification must be specially
pleaded in case of battery; as son of assault - R
So in other cases of trespass 62p 317 - Co Lit 2. 826
It can not be proved under the general issue
Defence is inconsistent with the issue -

(15)

But circumstances which attend the transaction
may be proved in mitigation of damages - tho'
if pleaded would have been a justification
(See analogy contra &c) 62p 317 - Ex word spoken
by Plff at the time tending to excite mutiny
in Deft's ship - So I trust of any other jus-
= tification &c. - Slender p 26 Last
Section -

If deft justifies he must confess the battery or the
plea is ill &c. 62p 318. Sal 642; Ex. - Then that
Deft's horse ran away with him & his will be
for there is no battery by deft - It is in effect
the general issue - Meaning of the rule - He
can not plead as a justification - what - virtually
denies the battery - Replegant - See Precedents
2 S Ex p 523- 545 &c. (Rather the ground of mor-
= tality to disallow the plea)

The present ground objection to a plea of son-

Assault + Battery.

175

assault re, is - de injuria sua propria absque tali causa. 6 Ch 357. 10 Bac 155. 5 Com 354 -

If Deft pleads non assault re + Plff can justify that assault; he must reply it specially for he can not give his justification in evidence under the general replication de injuria re 6 Ch 37. Com 288. *

* The evidence would be repugnant to that replication. As such a replication denies that first assault was, by Plff; but a justification of it admits it.

Matter of excuse (it is said) may be either pleaded ^{specially} or given in evidence ^{under the genl issue}. 6 Ch 357. Bull 17. Tal 637. 4 Mod 404. As inevitable accident Ex. That the injury was accidental in an amicable contest (ante 4) vide 2 Ch 21 579 (22) that matter of excuse must be pleaded And as it admits the battery this seems on principle to be correct rule -

To the plea of molliter manus re with a justification the plff may reply 'de son tort de maine'. absque tali causa (or as the case may be) instead of the absque re specially traversing any one material point or fact in the plea (see the distinction) Pleading 84. 8 Co 67. Laws 155-b. Com Pl 720 10 Bac 320) Ex. If Deft justifies under process of arrest: plff may specially traverse the process; instead of using the general traverse - 'absque tali causa' which includes a denial of the justification for an out =

(16)

Assault & Battery.

= Ransom battery - abeyance hoc, molitor de
 5 Com 356. Skin 381 - Leese 1436 - Com. Sig 83 -
 In 16 - (Hence the inducement is necessary to
 prevent a negative judgment in the traverse
 Law 118. Hob 321 - Com ^{Pleader} 20 3 Mod 16 -

Plff not confined in the proof to the time
 laid in the declaration - may prove any
 battery (not barred in Con. by Stat of Lim-
 itation) In Eng. the Statute does not then
 confine his proof Stat must be pleaded -
 even in Con. So special plea must cover
 all the time - must be as broad as the de-
 claration - See 5 Bac 206-7 - 1 Bulstr 138. 2 Samd
 295. Cro E 228. Hob 104 L^d Ray 229-31 - Ex 407
 321. 319. 415. 282. Sal 222. Co Lit 283. Cro E
 32. Bull 17. 4 Bac 79. Pleadings - Ex. If
 justification is pleaded on a particular day
 there must generally be a traverse of the
 time before & after -

Need not traverse as to prior & subsequent
 time when he pleads son assault be. Remt
 not - Bull 17. Plead Abst 447. For proof of
 plff's assault on any day is sufficient to
 support the plea: And plff is driven to a
 novel assumpsit (if it was at a different
 time) of the battery complained of - What is
 the principle of the general rule supra? -

(As to the averment quia est cadem de re
 2 Ch D. 530 in 2 Str 694. 2 Samd 5. in 3.
 100 82 in 3. 85. 298. 100 31 -

So the plea should be as broad as the de-
 =claration as to the subject matter i.e. it

Assault & Battery.

179

must be an answer in law to the whole
gravamen alleged. & the plea (or pleas) must
import to answer the whole (see Pleading 80.)
Esp 318. 62. if plff charges assault battery
& wounding a plea reaching the battery & not
the wounding is ill. - Cro E 268. Son assault
or cover the whole gravamen Esp 318. For the
words are "that the plff made an assault or
that" &c - thus & there defended himself, & if
any damage or "hurt it happened". & Plead
Ass: 447-

Scus of molliter &c (ante - that does not in law
answer the allegation of wounding or mayhem:
It justifies only the assault & battery, according
to the best opinion the assault only ante 6. 9) -
For as a justification of wounding & mayhem
- here it would be incongruous & absurd.

In justification founded on the relations of (17)
Husband & Wife, servant &c the assault or
must be averred to have been made to pre-
- vent injury to Wife Husband or party af-
- fected - but by way of revenge or chos-
- timent or retaliation Esp 318. 2 Ray 62 n
2 Roll 546 - 12 958 -

A former recovery of damages for the same
battery as the deft or another is a good plea in
bar Cr E 30. Esp 319. 416. Sal 11 - Cro J 73-4 -
Dull 20 Feb 68. 5 Dec 185. 1 Com 11-12. for
the uncertain damages are reduced in rem
judicatum is the original damages are
changed into a judgment debt, & are of course
merged in it - (Mr Seymour, lecturing on

Assault & Battery.

this title in during Judge Gould's illness, says
 { it is not law according to late American de-
 -cisions - he cited 4 Mass 419. 1 Johns R 26. Stark
 Cr. note by Yelv. 88 (n 1) - }

The rule holds even if further damage ac-
 -crued after first recovery 6 Ch 319. Pal 11 - For
 the battery is the gist (Chittenden vs Bledwin
 1 C^t) -

So in trespass general, a former recovery
 is a bar as to all continued trespasses
 committed before the date of the first writ
 2 Root 320.

(18).

In this action as in all trespasses - if the
 injury is done by several the plff may
 sue all or any 6 Ch 317. 5 YR 651 - For
 in general all causes of action arising ex
delicto - whether sounding in trespass or
case are several - (5 YR 651) as well
 as joint - & may be prosecuted as joint or
 several at the election of the Plff (Aliter
 in case of conspiracy) -

Release to one, is release to all 6 Ch 415. Davids.

As to several damages the authorities are some-
 -what contradictory - If two are charged joint-
 -ly & are found jointly guilty i.e. each guilty
 of all (as they are of course by a general
 verdict by both) Jury can not sever the
 damages - 6 Ch 321. 420 - 5 Burr 2790. Cartt 19
 11 Co 5. Stark 317 pl 10. Cro 118.

For the act of both or all is the act of each, so

Assault & Battery.

183

for as the injury is joint -

So if jury goes vs both by default, the damages can not be severed (Esp 420. Str 422) for same reason. The Defendant being an admiser that they are jointly guilty of the wrong alleged - for the charge vs them is joint & the default confesses it - -

But according to Esp 420. & 2 Str 1140. If depts sever in their pleas (Ex one pleading the general issue, another a justification) jury may sever tho' the several depts are supposed to be equally guilty - Ex. \$100 against A \$50 vs B. Esp 420. 2 Str 1140. 79 But this seems not Law. Cases contra 11 Co 6. 7

Bull 20. S.C. Cro J 348. or 350. Cart 19. So Co E 860. Hob 66 9 Co 79 6 Str 910 Cro J 348. 118. Contra Esp 321. Cro J 118. see 1 Lamm 207 (a. n.) That the damage can not be severed 5 Burr 2792. Now can severance in pleading vary the rule? Can it even be proper to sever when it is ascertained by the jury, that the whole injury was the joint act of the depts the act of all - being in Law, then, the act of each? -

But it is said that jury may find one dept. guilty as to one part, & another as to another, and assess damages severally, & the finding will be good without remittitur, or not pro is Esp. the jury may take judgment for both assessments Esp 420. Co E 860 11 Co 5. 7. 2. - can't - unless the different depts are found guilty of different parts at different times - Now that case they are not found jointly guilty but in the other they are necessarily so - The

Assault & Battery -

act of all in one and the same transaction
 & at the same time, being the act of each
 & the injury is in law indivisible. This qual-
 -ification seems on principle correct. Sub-
 -join I commences a battery alone & B
 afterwards joins & assists him. Cro 9 54 & Bull 20
 accord with 11 Co 5. 7. in this qualification

These rules as to severing damages hold of
 actions for joint torts ^{generally} ~~generally~~ -

But in case of severance, when the damages
 ought not to be severed, plff may prevent
 the court from arresting judgment or reversing
 it in error, by remitting on the record one
 assessment & taking judgment for one only
 vs both defts. Bull 20. Carth 19 11 Co 7 a -
 or execution may go only vs the one of whom
 its amount was assessed Carth 20, Bull 20
 1 Samd 207 a & b - 5 R 199. 200. Cro C 239-
 243. Or if plff will enter a not pro act
 the other

But in all these cases in which the damage
 ought to be entire, there can be but one ex-
 -ception 11 Co 7 a Carth 19. Bull 20. & that if
 - judgment for one assessment only, & if judgment
 is entered for both, it is error - 5 Burr 2790
 11 Co 5. Carth 19. Cro 9 118. 6 R 321 - 420 -

Plff may also arrest judgment in these cases
 if he so elects; & demand a reversal de novo
 Bull 20. Cro 8 173 - 176 - Carth 19. 7 R 70 -
 For when the law requires that the damages should
 be entire, he has a right to claim that they
 should be found so -

Assault & Battery.

187

First rule is adopted in this state viz that if (20)
two or more are jointly charged & found jointly guilty
- by it each of the whole; damages can not
be severed. Lardon & Wheeler & C. Nov. 1868
ay. Term 98. These Depts plead severally "Not Guilty".

If one of several Co-Depts is compelled to pay the
whole, no contributions in Law or Equity. Dist.
116. 850 186. So in other cases of tort. Assump.
sit 17. Trespass to things personal "58. Ex delo" &c

In Eng? it has been holden, that a not
pross or non suit as to one of several Depts
before jury. is the others, discharges the action
as to all - that operates as a release to the
one - Nov 70. 180. This is not now considered
as law in Eng? 1 Samd 207 n 62 350 511-
1 Wils 90. 306. L^d Ray 597. Carth 19 - Bull 20. Crif
173

The court will give the plff leave to strike the
name of one of several Depts out of the Dec:
- laration & then to proceed to call him as a
witness - Whenever one Dept wishes for the
evidence of Co-Dept. Rule - If there is no
evidence as Co-Dept he may be sworn - If
any at all he must be tried, before he can tes-
- tify - but the court may let a verdict as to
him be first taken - (Bull 285. 2 Bac 287
1 Sid 441. vide Evidence 119-20) and if acquit-
- ted he may be sworn, He is then not in-
- terested (See 2 Ph Ev & Starkis Ev contra
last clause of this rule given by Mr Seymour)

Assault & Battery.

(21).

The jury if they please may vary from the declaration & find only a part - Rule common to actions of trespass in general - 621 421 - 2 Roll 184 - Cro E. 34. 54 - Ex^o guilty of the battery not of the wounding - Finding more than is in issue is idle -

By the English practice if there has been mayhem - how the court may in view increase the damages found, at their discretion: and so tho' no mayhem is expressly laid in the declaration, if the judge certifies or reports it - That the injury would amount to mayhem might not be known, at the time of bringing the action - But it must be done in bank: & jsts must be present when the motion to increase is made (For it must be decided by inspection) Last acquisition is derived from the rule that in appeal of mayhem "mayhem vel non" is to be tried by inspection 621 322. L^o Ray 176 Latch 223 - 3 BL 332-3. 1 Sid 108 1 Wils 5 -

It must be proved to be part of the same trespass for which the damages were given by jury - Bull 21 - 621 322 -

(22).

To damages may be increased at law in case of wounding 621 322 - L^o Ray 176 - So of atrocious battery 3 BL 333 - Manner of wounding must be laid in the declaration For whether there is a wounding or not must always be known when the action is brought - damages are more than increased in it -

Assault & Battery.

191

Damages not increased in these cases, if the judge who tried the cause, declares himself satisfied with the verdict - 6 Ch 322. 1 Wils 5.

The jury can not give more damages than are laid 6 Ch 420. Cr. 9 297. But if they do J. may have judg. on admitting the excess - Carth 21 - 10 Co 1156 1 HBL 643 - 4 Bac 256 - Rule common to other actions
[Judg. for the whole assent erroneous!]

Every assault & battery it is said is a pub =
= lie as well as a private wrong (1 Bac 156 - 1 Haw 134 - 3 Bl 121 - 4 Bl 45) & punishable by fine & imprisonment (p 5)
But this rule can not apply to an involuntary battery (4 Bl 216) St of C. 336 - 7
Title "Public Wrongs" -

194

False Imprisonment

195

Every unlawful restraint of one's liberty - or violation of one's right of locomotion, is False Imprisonment 3 Bl 127. 6th 321. Ex Illegal confine-
ment in a private house - strict de 2 Inst-589.
5 Bac 169. Finch L 202.

(Assault & Battery & False Imprisonment may be put in the same declaration - or even in the same count. - (O. Seymour))

Two requisites I. Detention of the person II. Unlawfulness of the detention. 3 Bl 127. 2 Inst 529. 5 Bac 169 Finch L 202.

The unlawfulness consists in the want of lawful authority to detain. Authority may arise first from legal process 6th 333 - Sal 408. or 2^d from special cause, amounting from the necessity of the case to a justification. 3 Bl 227 - as in the case of arresting a felon by a private person 6th 334. It lies not for the crew of a ship captured as a prize; tho' she prove to be no prize. - Bay 572 Such cases belong to admiralty jurisdiction under the law of nations. "Post. Trepass 49"

But every original & arrest of a person for a civil cause, without legal process is unlawful restraint. 5 Bac 169. 2 Inst-57-2. A custom to imprison without legal process is not good. 5 Bac 169. 2 Inst 147. In derogation of the rights of the subject - (i.e. case of bail arresting his principal falls not within this rule; not an original arrest - So also an arrest to prevent an escape (p 7. 8) -

For the cases which justify arrests, without process in criminal cases, see "Hipp & Gadsen" -

False Imprisonment.

(2).

A private person is not guilty of false imprisonment by confining a person arrested by a proper officer - at the Officer's request - He is even bound to assist the officer, on demand, if necessary - 5 Bac 167 - pl 24 - 2 Roll 511 -

But an officer having made an arrest on final process can not delegate his authority (or right of custody) in his own absence 1 Bos & Pul 24 - see "Pliff" - This rule seems to be founded on the right of the pliff in the execution -

The most common cases of false imprisonment are those of arrests under void process -

How far Judges & other officers of the Law - are liable for their official acts.

General Rules

I. If any court of Record is guilty of corrupt practices (as imprisoning through malice) the judge is not liable to an action if he acts judicially & within his proper jurisdiction & does not transgress his authority & does not go beyond the Law Esp 326 - Sal 396 - Corp 172 - (malicious prosecution page 32) Esp 635 - 17 R 502 - 573-14 - 534-5 - 2 Bl R 1141 Ex - A court having cognizance of a criminal offence, sentences one to punishment for it without or vs evidence; & even from proposed malice -

II. A Judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction, it seems is not liable to any action, or indictment, for any judicial act whether done through mistake or malice

False Imprisonment.

199

if he confines himself to his proper jurisdiction -
-tion 6th 320. 12 Co 234. Sal 396 2nd Mag 467 -
Coup 472. 17 R 503-534-5. 537-8. 513-14 -
2 Bl R 1141 (where all the cases are cited)

No proof in this case is admitted as the
"vehement & violent presumption" in favor
of the judge's integrity - He is answerable only
to the sovereign or government - He may
be removed from office in the mode prescri-
-bed for by the constitution, or laws of the
state - To any ordinary prosecutions by him
civil or criminal for abusing his authority
it is a decisive answer that he acted as
a judge (or court) of record -

Reason -

- 1st Such an exemption from liability must
exist somewhere - in every regular govern-
-ment - There must be some rank of office
in which the Law reposes a confidence -
than which there can be none higher - There
is the same confidence & presumption of
integrity in the court or judge complained
of as in any court applied to for redress -
- 2nd Impolicy of holding such Ct. answerable
to individuals -

III. But it seems, if a court of record or (3)
even general jurisdiction has not jurisdiction
of the subject matter of the process on which
an arrest is made, the judge is liable
For here they do not & can not act judicial-
-ly - 10 Co 366. 1 Haw 16-59 - It is all "ex
non judice" - Ex - English Court of C. D.
awards a criminal capias or an indict-
-ment or sentence to imprisonment upon
such a prosecution - or Court of C. D. awards

False Imp^t.

execution for recovery of land, in a Real action - In the last case the Judges would be liable as for disfranchising the Deft in the execution - But if they have jurisdiction of the subject & in their proceedings ~~th~~ transgress their authority - they are not liable - Sent - 10 Co 766 - 2 Bl R 1145 - Sal 396 - Ex. awarding a capias or a peer in a civil case - Inflicting a higher punishment for a crime cognizable by them, than the Law warrants -

IV. Judges of courts of limited jurisdiction (tho' of record sent) are liable if they transgress their authority - even by mistake - see 6 D R 412 - 2 Bl R 1145 - 2^o Ray 454 - 1 Sal 396 - Str 993 624 831 - 8 Co 114 - Ex. - Issuing in a civil action a capias or a peer - Inflicting a higher punishment &c as above - ~~Altho'~~ Altho' if they do not exceed their authority - tho' they act illegally & unjustly - For the uncontrollable or vehement presumption of rectitude (ante) does not exist in favor of all courts. Not necessary except in favor of the highest courts known to the law - 2 Bl R 1145 - If they wrongfully decide a question of Law, through mistake - or ignorance, when the question is properly before them & they have authority to decide -

Judges of record not liable even for malicious acts if they do not exceed their authority - 624 326 - Sal 396 -

By a court exceeding its jurisdiction (as to the subject matter) I mean its deciding or

acting upon a case or question, on which it has no legal right, to decide or to act - at all (Ex C^t of H^B - deciding a real action or C^D trying an indictment) - By exercising its authority merely, I mean its exercising some power which the Law does not-authorize upon a case. or which is cognizable by it - Ex C^D - awarding a capias on a peer, in an action of debt, covenant broken &c of which they have cognizance -

V. Courts not of record (as Justices of the peace in Eng^d) - are liable at Com. Law not only for malicious wrongs but for any mistake in judg^t. - (Str 740 - Cro E 286 & 344 - 10C 334 17R 536 - Esp 339 - 1Burr 595) by which a party is injured See 2 BL R 1145. (part 14) And whether they transgress their authority or not -

But this rigor is mitigated by several Stat^s Esp 338. (4)

The Court of H^B. will not grant an injor-
-mation vs a justice who appears to have acted uprightly. 17R 635 -

In Com^t Justices of the peace are Courts of Re-
-cord - (In New-York they are not -)

Courts which can fine & imprison are said to be courts of record - L^d Ray 467 - Sal 200 - Carth 491 - 3 BL 24-5. 12 Mod 386 - 3 Les 205 - Denied to be universally true - 2 BL R 1146 - (A power to issue process of arrest is a power to imprison See 3 BL 25) -

False Imprisonment.

(5)-

As to arrest of persons, not liable to arrest -
 Arresting Executor or Administrator for the
 debts of Testator is unlawful, except on a
 suggestion of devastavit - * 62p 326-320 & 368.
 2 Bl R 1192. False imprisonment lies in these
 cases vs the Atty as well as the original pff
 (26). & the rule is general that an attorney
 who is instrumental in causing an illegal
 arrest is liable as well as his principal -
 3 Wils 345. 377- & 2 Bl R 1192 (*). A devastavit
 subjects him personally - i.e. in his individual
 capacity -)

Exemptions from arrest are sometimes connec-
 -ted with the character of the individuals as
 Ex - Supra - Sometimes it arises from tem-
 -porary circumstances or particular privileges
 (4 Com 475 - 4 Bac 222 - 2 Roll 273 - 270 Bl 636)
 as attendance on court - as a suitor or witnes*
 exempts from arrest on civil process - in the
 latter case the arrest is not illegal in the first
 instance; but a supersedeas if any (4 Bac 222
 & 70 R 534 - 2 Bl R 1142 - 1113 47 R 337. 5 Bac 171
 Cr J 379 - Doug 649 - 652 - after which detention
 is illegal & action lies - (The privilege of a
 suitor or witness, extends to his horse, money
 & necessaries - (4 Bac 222 - 2 Roll 273 - Doug
 652 - Cr J 379 - 5 Bac 171 - 4 Bac 684-5. F.N.B. 236-
 & Co 526. Comp 9 - (* - going to & from Court. O.S.)

3 Bulw 97 - What is said by Buller J (Doug
 652) must relate to an action after the su-
 -persedeas or for the prior detention in case
 of a peer -

In Con^t: a writ of protection is commonly obtained in these cases - before the time of attendance - This operates as a supersedeas does in Eng^d - Arresting one therefore thus protected is false imprisonment - but not till the protection is shown -

The writ in these cases however is good, & the suit continues - 1 Kelt 220. 2 BL R 1193 - The only effect of the privilege is that the person (as senior, witness &c) must be discharged - Decisions in NY accord

Privilege of suites is disallowed in case of collusion - So as to Plff in vexatious actions 2 BL R 1193 - 11 Mod 79 - Corp g. 174 BL 636 - It being discretionary with the court to allow it or not (So the bringing of several successive ejectments, for the same subject an example of vexatious suit?) So when party attends court as a volunteer upon the pretence of answering process, when there is none - Sal 544 -

Party attending arbitration under rule of court comes within the exemption - 3 East 89 - Peak Ev 193-4 - For the arbitration acts under an order of the court - & in some measure represents it - Indeed the arbitration is a species of court, recognized & regulated by Law.

For arresting a peer - or certificated bankrupt - (when the court has jurisdiction) the officer is not liable, he is bound to obey the writ - the party may be liable in case -

False Imprisonment.

Doug 646-650. 10 Co 766-2. 5 Or 231-8. 2d 530-
 Malicious prosecution p 31 (For if the act of
 arresting is not a trespass the party can not
 be liable in that form (i.e. in trespass) but
 for making a wrongful use of lawful power.)

So members of congress are privileged in order -
 - any civil cases - in going - attending &c -
 So members of our state legislature (In none
 of these cases I trust is the arrest actionable
 unless the party has the evidence of his pri-
 -vilege with him at the time.) So one
 electing in going to a meeting of the electors
 appointed by Law? -

(7)- Gaoler detaining prisoner for prison fees (the
 otherwise entitled to a discharge) is not false
 imprisonment - 5 Bac 171- 1 Dow C 173- Pow 88
 2 Inst 53- Albin as to board Root-15th. This is a
 matter of private contract between the gaoler
 & prisoner - Gaoler trust to the personal care
 - dit of the prisoner, if he has no other security
 At any rate there is no lien for board on the
 person of the prisoner 10 Cent-237- 1 Dow C 173
 Plow? '68. 1 Mod 132 -

If the order of court is to confine one in a cer-
 -tain prison - confining him in any other
 is false imprisonment - 5 Bac 171- Salt 408.
 5 Mod 295- 3 Sal 219- Nob 202- 1 Sid 318. Latch
 16- It is confinement without lawful authority
 ("Shipp 12 p 4" -)

A peace officer is justified in arresting without
 warrant on a reasonable charge of felony,

False Imprisonment -

211

tho' no felony is committed. Doug 334. 345.
4 Bac 577. 1 Bl 73. 1 Roll 43. It is his duty to
arrest on reasonable suspicion -

Alibi of a private person: But if a felony
has been actually committed - a private per-
-son suspecting another to be guilty - on rea-
-sonable ground & without malice, is not liable
for arresting without warrant - to carry before a
magistrate - 6 Ch 334. 5. Bac 171. Doug 345.
Post 66. Secus if no felony has been com-
-mitted 6 Ch 334. Doug 345. For he is not like
a peace officer, bound to act - ergo not justifi-
-fied to the same extent -

So to prevent a breach of peace or an
escape 1 Bulst 152. 2 Hawk 82. Any person
may arrest for such a purpose without
warrant - Secus after a breach of the peace is
committed -

Any original arrest on Sunday in civil (8)
cases being void (by 29 Car II. & 1st of
Con^t. 370.) is false imprisonment 6 Ch 327.
605. 5 Mod 95. Sal 78. 2 Swift 111. 4 Bac 456.
17 R 265. 2 B & R 1195. Such an arrest good
at Com. - Law. 2 B & R 1195. 2 Dales 72 -

But special bail may take their principal
on Sunday (alibi is to bail to the Sheriff -)
2 B & R 1273. The right is not deemed necessary
I suppose, constant custody on original process
not being required) for he is in the nature of
a Gaoler -

+ taking by bail is as retaking on an escape -
(Such an arrest in case of an escape is lawful

False Imprisonment.

Sal 626 3 Sal 148. 2 L 2 Bl R 1273- (* no escape warrant can be necessary if the arrest is by the person who had the previous custody of the escapee)

Arrest in civil cases by the breaking open door of Deft's house is false imprisonment - 5 Co 93 - Cow 1 Nov 62. 2 Mac 367 - Secus of inner door 2 M & A 489

It has been questioned whether if an arrest has been made by illegal breaking of the house the execution of the process is good - & the only remedy by action: So ruled 5 Co 92 b - 5 Maf 155) or whether the execution of the process is itself void & may be set aside in a summary way, by discharging the person arrested Cow 19 - 6 M 604 - 5. Cr 6908 Kirk 383 -

9).

Now decided that the execution of the process is void & the officer a trespasser. 2 Bl R 823 in case of property taken by breaking a door & execution set aside - 2 Mac 367 - 4 do 454 - 2 Lev 285 - 6. Con. 5 Co. 93 -

In these cases of arrest by breaking the house, false imprisonment lies - It is the privilege of the party & the arrest is at once illegal - Cow 1.9 Nov 62 -

It has also been questioned whether if an illegal arrest has been made, & in consequence of which another arrest is made which would otherwise be good, the latter is valid - It is valid unless some collusion - 2 Bl R 823 - Esp 685. Aliter if there is collusion Sembl 26 - ("Shipp" or 4. 11) -

False Imprisonment.

215

Decided in *Con.* that an Officer by Escape -
- warrant may retake his prisoner in another
state 1 Root 107. Practice 8.4 - (The warrant is
of no use except as convenient evidence of a
right to retake - Process can not run out of
the State where issued) As to bail piece from an-
- other state 5 Esh 172 or 7 Johns 145 -

If an Officer by mistake arrests B instead of (10)
A on a process vs A he is liable for false
imprisonment. So even if B declared himself to
be A 2d? Doug 42 2 Roll 552 pl 5. Esh 328.
3 Com 490. 493. Moore 457. Hard 323.
Damages mitigated - Esh 328. But can the last
rule be Law? Is not B the procuring & faulty
cause of his own arrest? "Battery" 10. See also
L^d Ray 177. Sal 642 -

Any person has a right to arrest another
who is fighting (5 Bac 171. 1 Han 136 2 do 81 -
& to restrain him till his passion is over.
Femes covert tho' liable in some cases to be sued
with their husbands, cannot in general be hold-
- en under arrest on mesne process 2 Str 1272
15 R 484. 10 R 720. 1193 -

But they are liable to arrest in such cases
for the purpose of having Com. Bail entered
or till the Husband gives bail for both - They
are then entitled to be discharged. 20 R 1193-4
Doug 648. 2 R 17 -

Arresting & confining one for a short time, (11)
under a parol warrant from a justice, for
examination is not illegal - 5 Bac 172. Root
166. Mo 408 See Cro & 829 -

False Impr^t.

A private person may without warrant con-
-fine a person disordered in mind & who ap-
-pears disposed to mischief 5 Bac 172 -

As to liability of Officers executing process: -
If an Officer (under the authority of a court
of limited jurisdiction) makes an arrest
on a process, from the face of which it ap-
-pears, that the court issuing it, had not
complete jurisdiction, he is liable according
to some of the authorities (624 391 - Bull 12-3
Hard 481) from whatever cause the defect
of jurisdiction arises - i.e. Whether the want
of jurisdiction goes to the subject-matter - or
arises out of some personal privilege of the
def^t - not to be sued in the court to which
he: or from the cause of action arising
out of the court's limits - see L^d Ray 230-1 -
Con^t. (But the rule applies (to this extent)
only to courts of limited jurisdiction) post
12 - 10 Co 766. 6 do 54 a 3 Wils 345. Aliter in two
last cases, if the Court is of Record & of general
jurisdiction p 12 -

But the rule has been extended much further
Thus in the Marshallen case it was holden
obiter (without any regard to def^ts appearing
on the face of the ~~process~~ process, or not -)
that in a case where the court had not com-
-plete jurisdiction (ut supra) the Officer would
be liable 10 Co 76-7 - Cro J 314 - 624 337 - See
decision & reasoning in "Marshallen case"
Reasoning contradicted in L^d Ray 230 - Str 710. 993
509. Coke supported in 2 Wils 385 - S. C. - 624 398
399 - Ex - City Sheriff executing a City court's process

219

False Imprisonment.

when the cause of action did not arise within the city - but this fact not appearing from the process - But this rule appears not to be Law.

Decision in the Marshalsea case was merely

That when the Court issuing the process, has no jurisdiction of the subject matter, every thing done under it is absolutely void - whether it appears or not, on the face *622* 391. Bull 82-3. 653-4. Cowp 172. Hard 480. Str 710. 2 D.R. 653-4. and Officer liable - (12)

This seems still to be considered as Law -

But (by other opinions) when the Court (tho' of limited jurisdiction) has jurisdiction of the subject matter & the defect of jurisdiction is from something local or personal, the officer is justified unless the defect appears upon the face of the process - This appears to me the correct opinion tho' opposed to the last rule in p 11 - Cowp 20. 5 Bac 170. 2 Mod 196. 1 Vent 369. Bull 82-3. Carth 274. 2 Mod 29. 3 Bac 233. 522 329. 391. Hard 480. Str 710. (But or Dat 83 cont.) 10 Co 766. 6 Co 54 a as a case of Common Pleas) 3 Wils 345. 2 Tidd 705. 544. 3 do 213. 622 54a. *Aliter* if so appears, ex - City courts or issue process upon the face of which the cause of action appears to have arisen out of its jurisdiction -

According to L^d Ray 230-1 - he is not liable tho' the defect does appear on the face of the process; and that original debt is sufficiently protected as an officer, by pleading the defect. L

False Imp.

if he does not he waives it - See ga? wheate-
-er this is Law in Eng? not - p 13.) -

Officer may justify under process of the Courts of Westminster tho' the writ be void - Except where the court has not jurisdiction of the subject mat-
-ter 10 Co 766 6 Co 54 a 3 Wils 345. (Ex Returnable to a remote term (p 14) Yet in this case it is void upon the face of it - & Offr liable for false imprisonment - or other irregularity) the high authority of those courts justifies him - So if he arrests a peer under a civil capias from such a court - or an attorney of another superior Court -

Rule in Cont. an officer is justified by his process in all cases unless the process is void upon the face of it. Keil 110, 182 2 Lev on Surgt 387 even tho' there is a defect of jurisdiction as to the subject matter -

13) -

But tho' the process justifies the officer according to the foregoing distinctions (tho' the jurisdiction be not complete as to person or place) it does not; the original Offr - He is bound to know the extent of the Courts jurisdiction & to show it where the cause of action arose - Cro 9314

And the original Offr (now Offr) is not bound by having pleaded to the first action Esp 830 - Wile 83 - 5 Bac 170 - 1 Vent 369 2 East 260. 2 Mod 146-7 -

L^d Ray 230. ^{decided} ~~decided~~ that the original Offr is liable in this case Lutw 937. 156. 1 Vent 236 - see cited - see Cong 20. L^d Ray approved in

False Imprisonment.

this point in Con: by Law Ellsworth Kirk III -

In some cases process is void, and the party (14)
as the case may be the court liable for an ar-
rest under it - where the jurisdiction of the
court ^{over the cause} is complete as to the subject matter -
person & place.

I. In cases of limited jurisdiction, when an
authority given by Statute, is not strictly pursued
6 Ch 331 - 337 - 8 Co 114 - Sal 408. 1 Str 710. see these
authorities for examples. As when a justice
committed a man for killing game, tho' he
had sufficient effects to answer the penalty -
justice holden liable - He exceeded his au-
thority (ante 3) Officer exceeded but the illegali-
ty of the warrant was not patent & the
justification was complete. 1 Wils 153 - 6 Ch 332
J. C. -

So ~~as~~ against commissioners of bankrupt for
any commitment not warranted by their stat
powers. 6 Ch 331 - 2 Bl R 1035. 1141 -

II. In other cases the process of any court
even the Court of Westminster, may be void
independantly of any question of jurisdiction
for irregularity renders any process void (h12)
& the p^lff in the process is liable to this action
* 62 - A capias returnable to the next term
but one to that of the teste 6 Ch 328 - 9 - 3 Lem 491
3 Wils 341. 345. 2 Bl R 485. Sal 700 - 10 Mod - 315 -

Officer not liable in this case if the process is
from the Court of Westminster, & tho' the ir-
regularity appeared on the face 3 Wils 345 -

* Is he liable before process set aside? See infra

False Imprisonment.

But if Officer executes irregular process of any court after it has been set aside for irregularity he is liable in trespass. *Sent 2^d Ray. 73-2 BR 2 845. 3 East 128. 15 do 612. 615 n 2 Sid 125-1 Str 509. Esp 391- 1 Wils 345.* For he then does not act under the authority of the court. (So of process of inferior court before setting aside & suppen) -

(15) So tho' the original arrest were lawful - yet for any subsequent oppression this action lies vs the Officer - or the magistrate - if he is in fault. *Ex Wanton cruelly in confining in a dungeon without air &c 6 Ch 332 & cited 17 R 536.*

General Rule - an arrest under an irregular process is void - tho' the jurisdiction was complete. So under process of arrest, founded on an irregular proceeding. *Ex - an arrest on an Execution issued on a judgment set aside for irregularity - Esp 329 391- 3 East 128. 1 Str 509. 7 Ray 73- 1 Lev 95. 1 Sid 272. 1 Wils 345. 155. 2 Str 993-4 -*

But the officer executing irregular process (of a Sub Ct I conclude) before it is set aside is not liable tho' it be afterwards set aside (2^d. if issued by an Inferior Ct & irregular upon the face of it?) *6 Ch 391- Ray 73-* After it is set aside the plff in it is liable, & *Sent in trespass It. sed qu. as to the form of action - 1 Sid 271-2 - 1 Lev 95. 15 East 615*

But an arrest on an erroneous process (the jurisdiction being complete) is good - *4 Bac 450*

It 509 - 710 - 320ib 345. Esh 391 - Therefore the
 party as well as the Officer may justify under
 erroneous process "till it be reversed" - 320ib 345.
 LE he may justify in trespass all acts done under
 it, before reversed - Good till reversed - 2 M 231 -
 7 do 455 - 3 Bac 333 - 2 M N 488 - 9 -

Recapitulation of the general distinctions
 (as to the Officers liability) which appear most
 reasonable: - Rule seems to be that in Eng.
 according to all the authorities 1st That when
 the subject matter is out of the courts jurisdicⁿ Thpp. 1.
 - tion (where the jurisdiction is general or limit-
 ed) officer is liable - tho' the defect does not
 appear from the face of the process - Aliter
 when the want of jurisdiction is only to the
 person or place; then officer not liable un-
 - less it appear upon the face of the process
 (But as to this the opinions are contradictory)
 3rd Nor then in case of process of courts of
 Westminster? 4th But the second rule tho' true
 of mesne process, applies not, it is said, to
 final process issued by inferior courts LE
 when arrest is under final process of inferior
 Ct. Officers justification must show that the
 cause arose within the jurisdiction, or at least
 that it was so laid; not enough that the defect
 did not appear from the process Bull 83 -
 Corp 20. (Qu de reason?) Because the record
 will furnish the means of knowing? Is this a
 sufficient reason? -) p 18.
 5th If process of a court of limited juris-
 - diction is complete in all respects; officer
 liable if the defect is apparent, otherwise

False Imprisonment.

not I conceive. Process of Sub. Ct of Worcester?
justifies Officer in both cases - (aliter as to
the plff in the process) process merely erroneous
always justifies all acts done under it, before
reversal -

(16).

Process has been holden irregular & void
when filled up without proper authority -
62 - When in Eng^d the under Sheriff left a
blank for the Atty to fill up with a name
of a bailiff - 62 329 - 2 Wils 47 (The person
said here was the person receiving the process
It does not appear that he knew the irregu-
-larity - However the process here was without
any legal authority - the same in Law as if
forged - Hence Officer would be liable, I trust,
whether the defect was apparent or not -

So when the process "has issued informally"
Process out of the Vice Chancellor's Court of
Oxford. Custom: Original plff making oath
of his cause of action, & that "believes" &c -
he swore that he "suspected" &c (62 329. Str 993.)
Party & court, Officer & gaoler - holden liable
all joining in one plea (Strange adds
that Officer & Gaoler might have justified
(Str 994. (Denied 2 Wils 385.) & the whole said
to be "coram vno iudice") As the court had only
conditional jurisdiction of the subject matter;
& the contingency conferring this jurisdiction
had not happened -

(17).

So, where on mesne process the writ is not re-
-turnable on a day certain: it is irregular
62 330. Cro J 314 - Dy 262 b n 33 - 2 Bulst 36 -
Mod 81 - 62 - At the next court of Marshallen

in this case the irregularity would appear - crys
 Officer as well as party liable in principle. X-
 Secs, if issued by a court of Westminster? their terms
 are known as part of the Law of the Land (ante
 12) But the case has been denied & 'next Court
 held sufficient' - Cowp 21-2 - 2 Mod 58. The rule
 however is clearly law. For if no day were ap-
 - pointed in any manner the process would
 clearly be irregular (X. Centin L^d Ray 230-1-

But this last rule applies only to mesne pro-
 - cess Cowp 21. For the time of returning
 final process does not concern the Deft-
 The proceedings in the suit are at an end
 The execution does not - (like mesne process)
 require the appearance of Deft in a court -
 nor any other act of him -

Arrest under general search warrants - are
 illegal - So are general warrants of any
 kind - As a warrant to arrest "the authors
 of a libel" whoever they are 6th 399. 1 Hale
 CP 150. 2 Wils 275. Hist 213 -

Requisites to a Search Warrant.

1st Granted on oath - 2^d The grounds of suspi-
 - cion declared - 3^d Executed in the day time
 by a known officer - & in the presence of the
 informer 4th Directed to a particular place
 (or to the particular person in whose pos-
 - session &c -)

When these requisites are observed, the informer (18)
 is justified, or not by the court - 6th 399 -

False Imprisonment

2 Toib 291-2 - When not observed he is of course liable, in any event - The Officer, I trust is not liable in any event if then requisites are observed - whatever the event may be -

When an officer justifies, proof that he acted as an officer, is sufficient, as to the fact of his being one that is prima facie so - He is not bound to show his appointment - *Sti* 1005 - 3 *MR* 632 - 4 *do* 366 2 *McN* 485. This may be rebutted (So of a Lawyer suing in Slander for words injurious to him in his profession - Note the analogy (*Vide* Slander 8) -

When the Officer serving process justifies under it, he need show only the writ, or process itself (*pl* 13 - *Est* 333 - 337 - 6 *Co* 52 - 2 *Roll* 563 -) that it is returned if mesne process *Est* 337 - *Sti* 1184 - See *Cowh* 20 -

But the necessity of Officer shewing a return obtaining only in case of mesne process *Cowh* 20 5 *Co* 90 *L* - 4 *Co* 67 a 1 *Toib* 17 - Nor is he bound to shew any part of the original record -

And an under Sheriff is not bound to show it in any case - not in his power - Sees in *Ct*. here he is a known public officer & makes return in his own name -

But if original *plff* is sued for an arrest on final process: he must show a *judgt*. as well as Execution - (*Est* 337-4 *Sal* 408 - 9) for *judgt*. may have been reversed be-

= From the arrest & plff (original) ought to take notice of it -

Same rule when the action is vs a third person (as an Atty) who procures the service of process for another: Secus - if he acts in aid of the Officer & at his request - Sal 408-9 - In the former case he takes the place of plff, in the process; in the latter he is protected by official authority - (19)

If a Shff having made an arrest does not return the writ, when he ought to do it, he may be treated as a trespasser ab initio - 5 Cow 581 - 2 Roll 563 5 Bac 162 Sal 409 L^d Ray 632 - tho' this is mere omission - For without the return the writ is not evidence, the justification can not then appear. * Trespass to Real property p 20 (* It seems not correct then to apply the doctrine of relation - As the result itself can not appear to have been lawful) A mere omission can not make one a trespasser by relation

If original Plff & Officer are sued together, they may sever in defending, & if they join, & the plea of justification is insufficient - For original plff it is so for officer Est 336 - Plt 993 - 1184 - 509 - So e converso, if plea is not good for officer & would be for original plff, he has his defence by joining Est 396 - Plt 1184 - 12 Wils 17 - Ex Officer does not show the return of the process when he ought to do it -

False Imprisonment.

Procuring, commanding, aiding or assisting in a trespass - makes one a trespasser - a principal Co Lit 57a - 1 Sal 409
 2 Hawk 512 - (servant keeping the key of a room, knowing that one is imprisoned unlawfully in it, is guilty of false imprisonment - 3 Wils 377 - 5 Cw 579 - Co Lit 57a -

(20) Procuring even a sovereign prince thro' fear, unlawfully to imprison one, is false imprisonment in the procure - 2 Bl R 983 - 1055 -

This action lies to recover damages by one, who has preferred an indictment, or other prosecution or brought an action as plff maliciously, or without any ground or "probable cause" J.N.B. 116. Esp 525. 527-8. 1 Bac 61. Any wicked or unlawful motive is malice.

Analogous to the old action of conspiracy, which is now much out of use - Conspiracy lies only by two or more, for having falsely & maliciously prosecuted the plff: for treason or felony & thus endangering his life. 1 Samd 230 n.d. Finch L 305. 3 BL 126. 2 Bulst 271. Esp 530. 1 Com 158. L^d? Ray 374 -

Another analogous action, is the action on the case in nature of conspiracy. It lies where two or more conspire to persecute another, maliciously & without cause: or otherwise conspire to injure him, in person, fame or property - Finch L 305. Sal 14 Esp 530 1 Bac 61 - Samd 230 a

The gravamen in the action for malicious prosecution - resembles in some measure that of slander. It is not necessarily or generally the personal danger, to which the plff has been exposed, but the vexation, expense & scandal, to which he has been exposed & subjugated by the former groundless prosecution. 3 BL 127. 18 Mod 219-20 Str 691 - Sal 13-14 -

Action of conspiracy lies not, unless plff (20) has been actually prosecuted. Esp 527-8 - & acquitted. 12 Co 23 - Cro J 8. 1 Roll 112. For so are words of the writ J.N.B. 114. 116. 260. 1206, 211. Esp 530. 1 Com 161 - Indictment for conspiracy

Malicious prosecution

lies, when there has been an unlawful conspiracy, as above tho' nothing is executed -
 2 Lev 51-9 Co 566 624 530. So action on the case in nature of conspiracy lies, tho' no indictment or has been actually exhibited -
 1 Bar 61- 1 Roll 112- 1 Com 158. or 225. L E for charging a crime by conspiracy - such charge being injurious to plff's reputation -

Further difference between action of conspiracy & action on the case in nature of conspiracy

In the former if all but one are acquitted judgt^r can not go vs him - in the latter it may go vs one only -
 624 530 - 2^o Ray 346 - 1 Com 159 - Bull 14 - b do 169 - Cro C 239 - The first is a founded writ in the Register - (1 Roll 211 - 3 N B 260) the latter a special action on the case - In the former the gist is in the personal danger to which the conspiracy exposed the plff. In the latter it is the consequential damage scandal &c. - Carth 416 - 3 Bl 126-7 - Bull 14 - 10 Mod 219 Str 691 - 1 Saund 230 a -

In case for malicious prosecution the gist is the same as in the latter action -

291

Action on the case in nature of a conspiracy, is substantially an action for malicious prosecution with this difference - That the latter may be brought vs one no other being concerned - i.e. for a wrong committed by one - The former must be bro't vs two or more, or vs one charging that he with another, or with others had conspired

Malicious prosecution -

247

So that to found this action the wrong must have been committed by two or more 1 Com 159.

The grounds of the two actions are therefore the same Esp 531 - 2 Lev 52 - Cro C 173 - or 239 - Mite v Mills 170 it 210 - 1 Samd 230. a Ray 170 5 Mod 408. And tho' two are said judg^t - may be as one only in both cases (It) -

Action of conspiracy - on the case in nature & for malicious prosecution, are all unknown it is said to the Com - Law - X. (3 Revis. H. E. L. 239. 328. 3 do 12) - The latter two are derived from the Eg. of the Stat of Westminster 2^d (13 Edw 1) (2 Lev 20) (X. As to writ of conspiracy see Con^t Rule 14 Carth 416) -

It is essential to the support of the action (for malicious prosecution) that malice & want of probable cause in the former prosecution should have concurred - Falsity alone not sufficient - Bull 14. Esp 529. 4 Barr 1971 - 1 JR 544 - 5. It lies therefore in any one who maliciously promotes a false prosecution in another, knowing the charges to be false, or having no reasonable ground to believe them true - But it is always sufficient for deft, to shew probable cause whether he acted with malice or not. Bull 14 Esp 533. Cro E 900 - Probable cause is a complete justification - Otherwise every unsuccessful Plff or prosecutor might be subjected to this action -

On C^t when the action is for a false & malicious civil suit - it is called an action for avexation Law suit - (30)

Malicious prosecution -

I. Of criminal prosecution false & malicious, &c.
 1. If a man is falsely or indictedly for a crime that would injure his reputation he may have this action. 1 Sid 15. Yelv 46. Sal 14 -
 2. So if the charge exposes to danger, his life or liberty - Sal 15. 3. So an indictment false & subjecting to expense only is sufficient to support the action - 2^d Ray 278. Sal 15. arg^o Str 379 - Est 258. Str 977 - Ex Husband sued alone for expense incurred in a malicious prosecution of his wife - action lies -

Danger to the life or liberty of Piff is not necessary then - to found the action - Thus the indictments having been ill, so that Piff was in danger of conviction, & in answer to the action, if the charge & injures his reputation or property, ut supra - Est 528. 7 TR 248. 3 BR 129 Sal 15. 1 Bos 61 - Scandal alone sufficient - the vexation & expense are also regularly sufficient in such a case -

So, if the indictment (in the last case) has been not found by grand jury, yet the action lies, vexation, scandal & expense &c. ensuing arising from its presentment Est 528. Cro 490 Sal 14 - Ex - where grand jury have found "not a true bill" -

31) -

So expense alone caused by insufficient indictment will support the action - Ex - Indictment (false and malicious) for exercising a trade without license - tho' the reputation of the party is not injured - nor his personal security endangered - Sal 15 in

may. 30th 127- 10 Nov 148. 6 Nov 25-73- 137- 1 Bac 61- 6th 528. 2nd 977- 1st 1415. Cont.

Public officers however commencing prosecution on false information are not liable; but the person giving the false information knowing it to be false, or without malice & without probable cause, is liable - 1 Leon 187. Cro E 130. 2 TR 231- 1 Bac 61- It is the duty of such officers to prosecute on information apparently creditable - the Law of course justifies them in such cases -

But a public officer without information, of his own mere notion, maliciously to prosecute another, he is liable - 1 Bac 61- 2 TR 231- 225. Cro E 130. 1 Com 158 - Corp 161- For tho the Law protects him in misjudging, it does not excuse his wilful abuse of official power -

But if the public officer in the last case is the magistrate, granting the warrant; the grievance is that plff. was arrested under it - trespass not case is the proper remedy; And in this respect the case in Cro E 130 - is denied 2 TR 231- 6th 530 - see Doug 650 - (False Imprisonment h 6) For he is regarded as the immediate & not the remote cause of the arrest (as informers are)

The constable or Sheriff being but an instrument he is bound to execute the process -

This action lies not till the malicious prosecution is at an end - 9 Co 56- 2 Hob 267 -

Case 205. 10 Mod 209. 1 Str 114 2 Str 231 - Estlin -
 - will the Plff might recover, as for a malicious
 & groundless prosecution - & afterwards be compe-
 - ted upon it -

(32)

Hence it must always appear from the de-
 - clamation that the prosecution for which re is
 in some way at an end - In conspiracy -
 "Legitimo modo acquitatus" necessary - not so
 in this action - 9 Co 56 & 10 Mod 209
 2 Str 231 - 1 Str 267 - 1 Str 114 - That - "Plff was
 discharged from prison" not sufficient -

But the omission to shew that the prosecu-
 - tion is at an end is cured by verdict - 1 Samd
 228. 8 Ch 532 -

h 2. No civil action lies vs Judges of Record, jurors
 or grandjurors, for even malicious acts done
 in the regular exercise of their judicial power
 1 Com 158. 6 Ch 635 - 1 Str 573 - 573-14 - 534-5 -
 537-8. Comp 161 - 172 - 17 How 191 - 2 New 74, & 2
 328. 2 Bl 1141 - 12 Co 23-4 - 12 Mod 219. See Ch E 130.
 "False Imprisonment" - 2 - a rule of public
 policy to guard their independence in judging
 & to protect them vs vexation -

The legal presumption of their integrity can
 not be questioned in a court of justice - It is
 as strong as that of the integrity of any other
 tribunal - Ex A judge of record awards
 punishment on an insufficient indictment -
 A jury convicts on insufficient evidence
 no civil remedy either -

(33)

Malice must be & generally is inferred from the want of probable cause 4 Oae 1974 - But want of probable cause can not be inferred from the most express malice - 15 R 544 - Oct 529 - If no probable cause appears in proof; it must be presumed that the prosecutor had none - & of course he acted maliciously - But contra - probable or even actual guilt may be prosecuted from a malicious motive; & the Law justifies the prosecution in both cases - For where the act is right the Law never enquires into motives

But Off. is at liberty to prove actual malice Always advantageous - To prove malice plff may give in evidence - collateral circumstances - as an advertisement by Deft; that the indictment was found - Malicious declaration &c - Oct 535 Str 691 - in short any coincidence of malice is any thing which conduces to prove it -

Conviction of the Plff in the original prosecution, by a competent jurisdiction is not only evidence but conclusive evidence of probable cause - Oct 529 - 12 Wils 232 - 7d 267 - 5 Moe 262 -
 Latter part of page 33 & page 34 being omitted by mistake is inserted after page 40.
 Exception - Where the facts upon which the original prosecution was founded necessarily lie in the knowledge of the Deft himself, he must show probable cause: tho' grand jury found the indictment &c Bull 14 - Oct 536 -
 Ex. prosecution for robbing Deft Contra Stock Ex. part 4 - p 914 - 2 - 9 East 362 -

And proof of the evidence given before the grand jury (When the former prosecution was

Malicious Prosecution -

by indictment) is good evidence of probable cause - Bull 14 - Eek 535. 6. 534. 6 Mod 216 - & Deft's oath at the original trial, as to the existence of the crime charged is admitted if no other person was present at the time i.e. if there is no other evidence of the fact. Ex. supra, of prosecution for robbing Deft -

This rule is necessary to the protection of prosecutors: as Deft may have been the only witness of the fact which constitute probable cause admitted ex necessitate - See Starkie supra -

35)

The existence of probable cause in any given case is a mixed question; partly fact & partly Law. But what amounts to probable cause is a question of Law merely - I.E. Whether the circumstances alleged to prove probable cause exist, is a question of fact; but whether or not these circumstances amount in Law to a probable cause, is a question of Law - So that the fact being given, the inference is a conclusion of Law - 15 R 545. Bull 14 - Eek 539 - 4 Starkie 914 -

The defence of probable cause being inconsistent with the general issue, must be pleaded specially & from last rule it follows, regularly, that Deft's plea should show the circumstances & facts (i.e. the grounds of suspicion) on which he acted - Cro E 134 - Eek 533 - See ("Pleading" division "duplicitly") For what amounts to probable cause being matter of Law, the particular facts which

Malicious Prosecution

constitute it in any given case must appear in the plea (note) how admissible under gen' l issue - 2 Phil Ev 115 - 12 Sal 111 - as disproving malice -

So it seems necessary for Def^t to show that the crime for which he prosecuted was committed by some one (recus, sent, there can be no probable cause) 6 Ch 534 - 6 Mod 216 - 2 Nov 120 - Ex Def^t believes his property to be stolen when it is not - Clinton vs Hopkins C^t of Ex - 2 Root 25 - 225 (Long 359 & Starkie 916 - contra sent, old rule not Law) -

So what amounts to malice is a question of Law - 2 L^d Ray 1493 - 15 R 519 - cases cited 1 Will 233 - i.e. - what in Law constitutes malice is a question of Law, but whether malice exists in any given case is in the first instance a mixed question - distinction the same as above -

When the action is for a malicious prosecution (36) - continuation for felony - a copy of the original record granted by the court - i.e. in which the trial was, is necessary to enable the Plff to recover - & the granting is discretionary 6 Ch 534 - 10 R 385 - 1 Bac 61 - Where the crime charged is a misdemeanor only, such copy is not necessary (36) (X) 2 Cairns 202 contra - held copy sufficient - see 14 East 302 - & Starkie 907 -

Original production by clerk sufficient - then appear to be rules of mere practice - Qu - the reason of the distinction? -

Malicious Prosecution -

In the former case it is usual to deny the copy if it appears to the court in which or that there was probable ground for the prosecution -
 Carth 421 - 308 126 - Esp 534 -

II. When the action lies for a groundless civil suit or a vexatious Law suit -

Gen'l rule as laid down is that the action does not lie, for bringing a civil suit - even tho' there is no right of action - because it is a claim of right - Plff is amerciable, pro falso clamore, at Com. Law, & is now liable for costs (Bull 11 - Sal 13. 14 - Esp 525. 1 Bos & P 205 - 10 John 106 - 2 Phil Ex 116 n) which are recovered by original Deft. - So no damage presumed (seen, for criminal prosecution) Like the case of words not in themselves actionable in Slander) The rule means only that in such cases, there is *prima facie* no cause of action -

Exception 1st When there is good cause of action in favor of one, & another having no authority sues & arrests the party liable the action lies - Esp 526 - Bull 12 - Sal 14 - The third person is a wrongdoer abusing the process of Law, to the (now) Plffs injury.

371 -

When plff in the original suit - having good cause of action, sues in a court not having cognizance, the action lies - But it is necessary that the deff. (the original Plff) should have known that the court had no cognizance - Esp 526 - 2 Wils 302 -

Malicious prosecution.

Shew no malice - For then no cost can be taxed

But if the wrong consists in arresting the Deft- in the first action, is not his remedy an action of Trepass for False Imprisonment - The process being void? See False Imp^t. 11. 12 & 13. 15. ? or is the distinction that action for malicious prosecution may be brought if malice can be proved & Trepass whether it can or not? -)

3^d. If a person having no right or claim of right, & knowing it to be so, sues another, for the purpose of vexation, he is liable 2 Wils 305 - 1 Bos & P. 388. 2 do 129 - 3 East 314 - No such case in the old books - Said that the action lies not in such cases - unless Deft in it is held to bail 2 Phil Ev. 116 n - Peters R 207 - If he is not liable to bail, the costs he recovers are considered it seems a sufficient compensation - Qu - Is this agreeable to principle? (vide *infra* &c.)

4th. If for such purpose he sues & holds to bail for a much greater sum than is due 1 Saunders 228. Ech 525 - b. 1 Sid 424 - But the action will not lie in this case unless the plff has been arrested & holden to exonerate bail is compelled to procure such bail, or imprisoned for the want of it - Ech 326 - Bull 12 - Seems no damage accruing from that cause & the original plff had a right to sue for his demand - holding to reasonable bail is no injury, when there is a cause of action -

Malicious Prosecution.

5. When the malicious proceeding complained of, is on final process & utterly groundless, & known to be so, by the original plff, tho' no arrest of the person, but merely property taken action clearly lies - Esp 527 - Ex - Dept - Since out a second fi: fa: & sold plffs goods under it, after having taken other goods under former fi: fa: Action lay for vexation & damage Hob 205. 266 - Good life Bull 12 - Here the proceeding supposed being on final process no costs could be recovered upon it by the party injured.

(38)

The particular grievance, or injury, must in general be stated, when founded on former civil prosecution - & that it was done "maliciously" & with intent to injure & oppress the plff - 2 Wils 205 - Esp 532. 1 Sal 14 1 Sid 424. 1 Ray 380 - so on purpose "to hold plff to bail" if that is the injury - Sal 15 - Bull 12 - No damage being presumed (ante) Hence in all cases in general. When the original prosecution was civil, it is necessary that special damage be laid & proved - 1 Sal 14. 15. 1 Ray 374 - When the original prosecution was criminal (it being malicious & without probable cause) damage is presumed, especially as no costs are recoverable, in such cases, by the party prosecuted.

Seem if a stranger incites A to bring a groundless action vs B - No special damage necessary as vs him - not a claim of right by him - he not answerable Sal 14 1 Ray 380 - Nor liable to costs -

26 266

(38)

Malicious Prosecution -

Two requisites in all cases to support this action - for a civil suit - 1st Former action determined & ended, for it cannot otherwise appear to have been groundless - or unjust doing 205. Sal 15.

(39)

2. Damage (ie actual) already incurred or inevitable Esp 527- 531- Str 114- Bull 13- Therefore if one forge a bond in my name I can have no action till sued upon it - So if Plff in a judgment after having obtained satisfaction on a fi: fa: wrongfully obtains another execution, but has not proceeded with it -

But not necessary that the vexatious suit should have been decided in favor of the present Plff. That it is in any way ended, is sufficient, as regards the first requisite, above stated - Ex non-suit suffered on the original action - yet this lies - Esp 527- Bull 13- Any groundless proceeding by action when ended, is on this point sufficient - Esp 527

Our Stat gives an action to all who "wrongfully" & willingly wrong others by prosecuting any suit or with intent to trouble & vex & trouble damages - St. Com. 429 - It also subjects to fine of \$7 - & for third offence to be proceeded on as a common barrister - (96)

The mode in which the original prosecution was terminated must also be stated in the declaration - & correctly stated: If wrongfully alleged there will be a variance Ex. An allegation that Plff was 'acquitted' on the original prosecution is not suf-

Malicious Prosecution.

= proved by evidence of a non: pros: for
this is not an acquittal Bull 14- 6th 536.
Sal 21- 8 Mod 261-

The declaration states all the proceedings
in the original prosecution: & any mis-
= acquittal in a material part of the in-
= dictment & is fatal 6th 532-3. 4th
590. Or A variance between the origin-
= al record & declaration, as to the day
of acquittal &c 8 Mod 216. Seem if it is
in an immaterial part 6th 532. 2 Bl
R 1058-

Two can not join in an action for a
vexatious suit - the injuries being separate
& personal Kirk 145. Qu. Might not
two joint-merchants, or other partners
who had been sued in a groundless
malicious action, to their joint in-
= jury in their trade? ("Slander" - 29)

(40). But there may be two or more steps
Bull 5 1st 79 2 do 910 6th 537- It is a
positive tort implying an act in which
two or more may join -

Whether damages may be severed in this
action is several two cases contradictory
How can they be severed? The wrong is
indivisible each guilty of the whole -
(vide Affants & Battery 18) 6th 537-
1st 79 - 910 - Not severable by our practice
Hartie 918.

Malice is a most material ingredient

Malicious Prosecution

271

in the damages recoverable in this
action 4 Burr 1971 - Esp 537 - *Finnis* -

The following rules should have been inserted on page
33. immediately after this rule. "Conviction of the
Plff in the original prosecution by a competent [See page]
jurisdiction is not only evidence but conclusion ev-
-idence of probable cause. Esp 529. 17 Wils 232. Rob 267
1 Mod 262

It is of course a decisive bar of the action
for to deny probable cause here, would be to
impugn the record of conviction -

Acquittal is in most cases (but not always) pre-
-sumptive, tho' never more than presumptive of
the want of probable cause; not conclusive because
it may have been obtained from the absence of
proof, in a case of actual guilt, or from a want
of proof sufficient for a conviction, tho' there was
sufficient to show probable cause - or from false
testimony or other causes. But being in general
presumptive evidence, it throws the ^{probans} on Def to
prove probable cause in most cases - Esp 520. 17 Wils
232. 2u. Starkie Ex part 4. p 913. "Tit Mal. Pros
9 East p 361. 1 Mod 12 2 Johns 203 -

So acquittal on a defect in original process, is
generally presumptive evidence of want of proba-
-ble cause 4 TA 247. Sal 15 pl 5. 2u. Whether
ignoramus found is *prima facie* evidence of want-
of probable cause?

(34)

Acquittal not always *prima facie* evidence of want-
of probable cause, Ex - If the Plff was bound over by a

Malicious Prosecution.

court of enquiry, or a bill of indictment on him was found, by a grand jury - this is *prima facie* evidence of probable cause. & the onus probandi lies on plff, the acquitted on the trial - 624 536. Bull 14. Sal 15. So if it appears (i.e. if it is inferable) from the report of the judge that there was probable cause Bull 14. 624 529 301. But plff is at liberty to rebut the presumption in these cases - See 1 Esh Cases -

Exception. When the facts upon which the original prosecution was founded, necessarily lie in the knowledge &c &c See page 33 -

Trespass to Things Personal.

291

Trespass in its most extensive acceptation, at (47)
Com. Law. is any transgression of Law, short of
Treason, Felony or Misdemeanor of Treason or Felony.
When not considered as a word of technical im-
port, it is any violation of any Law. 3 Bl 208
Jacob Dickinson - 5 Dec 157.

The word used in Law, in its comprehensive
sense, denotes any wrong committed with force
to the injury of another person or property.
Esp 380. 5 Com 574. In this sense I am now
about to treat of it.

The class of Trespases now about to be con-
sidered, comprise all practicable injuries
to the personal property of another. Esp 380
(i.e. Trespass to: see Batten to ante) To Real
Property see Tr. qui cl. fr.)

The rights of Personal Property in possession
are liable to two species of injury.

1st. Abuse or damage, while the possession of
the owner continues 2. An action or Deprivation
of possession - 3 Bl 145.

I. Of abuse or of personal property, without
altering the possession - Ex. poisoning one's
cattle, killing his beasts - destroying his goods
or doing any act in general, which takes
away from the value of a chattel, falls un-
der this description of injury - 3 Bl 153.

The remedy in these cases, where the act is
accompanied with force & is immediately
injurious, is by the action of Trespass vi &
dominus 3 Bl 153 - 5 Com 582 - 3 Roll 556. c 17.

Trespass to Personal Property.

Sec 598.

But this action lies for such immediate injuries - where a remedy is sought for remote, or consequential damage, occasioned by a tortious act, the proper form of action is Trespass on the Case - Ex. A cast a rock into the highway & in doing it wounded B or his horse - Trespass lies - But if after it is so cast - B drive, his horse, or carriage over it, & injures the one or the other, Case lies.

If case is brought when trespass is the proper remedy, the declaration is radically ill judgment arrested, & vice versa. 6 T.R. 125 cro Ch 141 - or 198 - 12 Mod 131 - Reason - the difference of judgment required at Com. Law in the case of an injury committed, with or without force (Trespass & on case).

II. Of Amotion or Deprivation of Possession
This species of injury so far as it is remediable by the action of trespass (vi & armis) consists chiefly in an unlawful taking (an unlawful detainer & being generally remedied by detinue or trover (which see) 3 Bl 152. Mere detainer of property being only a continuance of one's possession & therefore not a forcible act -

The action of trespass vi & armis gives damages not a restitution of in specie - 3 Bl 151 - It lies not for wrongfully taking a ship or goods as prize tho' the property has been adjudged to be no prize: For the question depends upon the

Trespass to Personal Property.

295

Law of Nations. And is triable in admiralty Courts only. Doug 572 - 598. (see False Imprison^{ment}.)

But in some instances where the original taking is lawful - trespass lies for subsequent injuries. Esp 381. 62. If a beast is taken as an estray & afterwards lawfully: Trespass for the original taking - as an illegal & forcible act. Slept is a trespasser ab initio - Cro J 147 - 150 12 - 8 Co 146 - 5 Co 580-1. 3 Wils 20. In most cases trespass lies not (where the Slept original possession is lawful) for a subsequent abuse of the property.

Rule. When the authority to do the original act (as to take possⁿ of another's goods) is given by Law, a subsequent forcible abuse of the authority makes one a trespasser ab initio. Esp 383-405. 5 Co 581-2. Bull 81. 2 Bl R 1281 - 5 Bac 161 - 8 Co 146 - a - b - 2 Roll 561 - Yelo 96-7 1 Bac 36 - 3 Wils 20 - 10 Ann 20. So if a traveller enters a barn & afterwards steals it, he is a trespasser (by relation) in entering 8 Co 146 - So if a Sheriff having seized goods on execution should destroy them, or use them wrongfully in such cases the subsequent wrong, operates retroactively & renders the original act a trespass.

Principle. The subsequent wrong extinguishes the licence of the Law; & the wrongdoer is deemed to have done the original act, not for the purpose for which the law permits it; but for the purpose of committing the subsequent wrong.

But the subsequent abuse of the authority (50)

Trespass to Personal Property.

thus given by Law, must, to make one a trespasser *by relation*) be positive - a *vi et contra iuram* - not a nonfeasance. Ex. case of a tavern keeper - where *Reyk* stole - But he would not have been a trespasser *ab initio* - for refusing to pay the Tavern-keeper for entertainment! 6 Rep 383. 5 Dac 101 - 8 Co 146 b 2 Bull 312. nor for a wrong *not forcible*. The act which makes one a trespasser by *relation* must itself be a trespass.

Hence if one having taken a distress lawfully refuses to deliver it up, on tender of sufficient *amends*, this does not make him a trespasser *ab initio*, the wrong being only a nonfeasance 5 Com 581. 2 Roll 1550. Hence the injury is remedied by case. 1 Roll 12 130 -

But if a Sheriff having taken one's goods or persons in lawful process does not make return of the writ, when by Law he ought to do it (Ex in case of *replevin* process) he is liable in trespass: tho' he does no subsequent unlawful act 5 Com 581. 2 Roll 563. C15. 20 5 Dac 102. (Paul 19 for the reason) The doctrine of *relation*, however does not apply. As the act cannot appear to have been originally lawful - The process not returned can not be given in evidence: So that the Sheriff's right to take cannot be proved. This therefore is no exception to the general rule - See 1st Raym. 632. Dal 409.

But where the owner of property gives the licence under which the original act was done, the other can never in general be made a trespasser by

relation - Perkins [191 - 2 Roll 561 - 8 Co 146 b yds 96 - 7.
For tho' the Law will punish in case of abuse, the
very act which was authorized by itself; yet it will
not allow a party to treat that as unlawful which
he himself made originally lawful. 5 Bac 162 pl 22
Et. Unlawful detention or abuse by baillee &
5 Com 581 - cont. Rule in C. denied 5 Bac 162 pl 20)

If indeed the bailor destroys the thing bailed; Tres-
pass lies: For he extinguishes the bailment -
But is he trespasser ab initio? Litt § 71 - Co L 57 a
5 Co 136 - Mo 248. 5 Bac 266 - 28: is he liable for
the original taking? or only for the act of de-
struction? It seems to be according to the theo-
ry of the rule, that the original contract
of bailment is extinguished, & its original
possession rendered unlawful, & if so he is
made a trespasser by relation "From 52"

Who can have the action? To maintain
this action Plff must have possⁿ at the time
of the injury done - property alone is not
sufficient - For trespass is founded on possⁿ
possession 6th 383. 4 do 489. 1 do 480. 7 do 9 -
(See "Bailm." & "Tres.")
Therefore if Bailor converts the goods bailed, tres-
pass will not regularly lie -

But constructive possession as in a stranger (52)
is sufficient 5 Com 577 - 8. 5 Bac 164 - 2 Roll
569 & 1 do 480 4 do 489 - 7 do 9 - 62 - goods in
possession of one's servant, or de, venting, or ear-
ner, wrongfully taken or destroyed by a stran-
ger.

So generally any person having the general posⁿ

Trespass to Things Personal.

erty & the right of present possession may, as
as a stranger maintain trespass. For it draws
to itself a poss.ⁿ in Law; as a stranger (not
as a bailor; as he has actual & rightful poss.
solum) 5 Bac 104. 5 Com 578. Latch 214 2 Bulst
268. 1 Sid 438. 2 Roll 569 is a constructive
poss.ⁿ which consists in a right of present
poss.ⁿ "Trove 55" "Bailor".

The general property contemplated by this
rule must be accompanied with a right
of present poss.ⁿ as in case of bailor to
keep finding &c. But it is held that case
lies for Bailor. Tho' the exclusive right of
possession is in Bailor, at the time of the
injury 2 Ch & 107. 3 Lev 259. 359. 2 Phil
66. 433-4. 8 Lohm 432. 11 do 385. 47 R 489
1 do 480 7 do 9. 6 Ch 383 "Trove 55".

Trespass is said to be founded on pliff's poss.ⁿ
(at the time of the wrong done) and Trover
upon property or interest in 7 TR 9.
6ep 576. Bull 55. But this distinction holds
in point of fact only when deft original
poss.ⁿ is lawful as between bailor & bailor,
owner & finder &c 7 TR 487. 1 do 480. 7 do 9.
(vid. explanation Trover 57) - Aliter where
def't original poss.ⁿ is unlawful. There
owner may have Trespass or Trover. (Ex 0)
in point of form pliff in Trover, is supposed
out of poss.ⁿ at the time of injury: Aliter
in trespass "Replevin" 19.

(53)

So he who has special property in goods
with the actual poss.ⁿ may bring trespass
as stranger 5 Bac 104. 3 Ld R. 84. 92. Co Lit

Trespass to Personal Property.

89. 4 Co 84. 2 Roll 551. 569 *Aggle re* (Same generally as in *Trover*) Bailor or Bailee may either maintain the action 2 *Saund* 47

If Bailee delivers the goods to a stranger the bailor cannot maintain trespass vs the latter for receiving them; tho' he may *trover* 5 *Bac* 164 pl 18 175 pl 30 - i.e. after demand, for the original receipt of the property was not tortious.

If property is sold or given to one, he may maintain trespass vs strangers before he has taken actual possⁿ. 5 *Bac* 164 - *Latel* 214 - pl 10. for property draws a possⁿ in Law, where there is no interfering right (i.e. constructive possⁿ as vs strangers) But as vs vendor or donor's detaining it the remedy would be *Trover* founded on property, their original possⁿ being lawful

If goods of Testator are taken away before will is proved Executor may maintain trespass after proving the Will. 5 *Bac* 164. 2 *Bulet* 268. 1 *Roll* 488 He has by relation a constructive possⁿ from Testator's death - his right is from the will not the probate. The latter is only evidence of his right -

So Legatee of Specific goods may maintain trespass for taking after Ex^r's assent tho' it be before delivery to him by Ex^r. 5 *Bac* 164. (Altho' of the legacy had been of "a third part" of Testator's goods - not

Tresp: to Personal Property.

Specific for no particular goods, as his) and in the first case perhaps would not lie, I conclude, if the taking was before "Case" assent to the Legacy. 15 R 480. As without such assent he has not the Legal title in fact: nor does the assent transfer it by relation - For the "Case" assent is not evidence of prior legal title but confers & creates it.

So if trespass is brought for goods taken belonging to two - both should join but the non joinder of one is pleadable in abatement only. 1 Com 12. Sal 4. 32 3 Lev 354. 10 Roll 31. Esh 411. 586. Litt f 323 - Str 820. The objection does not support the general issue - nor go at all to the action - but only to the manner of bringing it i.e. the writ. It is good evidence under the issue (general) to mitigate damages.

At Com. Law. Trespass does not lie for an act amounting to Felony: as robbery, grand larceny &c by reason of merger of the civil injury in the public offence. 5 Com 582. 5 R 176. 1 And 21. 47. 1 Com 130. Yelv 90. 1 Sid 375. 2 Roll 537. 1 And 283. 1 Bond 148. Latet 144. May 82. No such principle here merger founded in forfeiture. Semb 2d. Str 873. 2 Rayn 1572 3 R 176 arg. Com - Bull 131 -

If Plff or under Plff takes the goods of one on execution or another, both

are liable to this action in the latter case - as the Plff is in the former Dong 40.

In declaring the goods must be described with convenient certainty Est 405. b.

"divers goods" or "Plff's goods" not sufficient nor cured by verdict - for one recovery would not be a bar to another. & Deft could not justify - 2 L^d Raym 1410. 4 Bur 2455. Str 137. 5 Co 35. Besides Deft should have notice, for what goods he is sued. "Seven pieces of Linen" "2 sheaves of corn" held insufficient "Ship & sails" a "library of books" held sufficient. 5 Dac 273. 4 do 24 - "Pleatridge" 11 -

But this applies only when the action is founded on the taking of, or injury to the goods themselves but whether the injury is laid by way of apprehension that "Plff's goods" generally is sufficient or "Trespass for breaking & entering Plff's house & spoiling his goods" is sufficient. Est 406. 3 Roib 292.

Good even on special demurrer. Injury to the goods being only apprehension. Neither of the reasons in the last case apply to this -

Trespass for breaking & entering a house destroying goods & expelling Plff. "Expelling" & destroying only apprehension, unless Plff make a new assignment of it as a substantial trespass (case of novel assignment). Bos & Pul 230. 3 TR 292

Trespas to Personal Property.

1 KBL 555. 1 Vent 211-217. 2 Wils 313. 3 do 20
4 Bac 12. Without such new assignment
a justification of the entering answers the
whole wrong. See Pleading (Special Pleas)

(56)- To, a general description is sufficient
if it is made particular by reference to
other things in the declaration Esp 406.
Ex "Several Keys for opening the door
of the house aforesaid". Sal 643. 1 Vent 114

Plff must state possⁿ or a property
showing a right of possⁿ at the time
of the injury done i.e. either an actual
or constructive possⁿ. Esp 406. 383. Sal 640
Cro J 46-456 490. 1 do 480 2 Lev 156.

Taking "hay from Plff's land" not suff^y
- Taking a "horse from Plff's
person" held not sufficient - "Plff's horse"
instead of "a horse" would have been
sufficient - The latter would have been
stating in effect a lawful possession
the former is not. The horse might
have been stolen "From" 56. Declara-
tion in these cases not good even after
verdict -

(57) Value must be stated Esp 407. 5 Bac
196. 1 Sid 39 2 Lev 230. Cro J 129. 5 Com 349.
2 Vent 176 (Esp 587-8. that value need not
be alleged in Trover not correct. In Trover
17. 1 Vent 114. 317-

Limiting amount of value found by
verdict Esp 407. 5 Bac 196. 1 Sid 39 -
4 Barr 2455. arg^o. But Cro J 129-

Trespas to Personal Property.

34

Pendency of another action by the same party or parties, for the same trespass is a good plea in abatement. 5 Co 61-1 Con 49. 50. 110. 10 Bar 13. Carth 96. Scum of the other action for the same trespass is as a stranger - Con 50. Hob 138. 4 Bar 48-9. 5 do 192. pl 15. Str 420.

But the jury^t first recovered in either will bar the other. Cro J 73 - Str 1178. 6 Cr 593 - (vid Grove 60) - where the opinion is on this rule as referred to -)

Day laid not material. Plff may prove the trespass at any time. 6 Cr 407 415. 319-21. Bull 17. L^d Ray 231. Cro 6283a Cro 632. Hob 104. Therefore if a release is pleaded, deft must traverse as to the subsequent time to 6 Cr 415. See 5 Bar 116-7. Balot 38. Hob 114.

#. According to Court practice at any time, not within the Stat of Limitation As the Stat. is a good defence under the general issue, by the provision of our Stat of Pleading. In Eng^d the Stat of Limit^{on} must always be pleaded - See Pleadings 18-9. & (Plea to Assumpsit)

Plff by way of aggravating damages (58. may lay in his declaration, things for which he could not have an action. 6 Cr 407. F N B. 196 Sal 119-1 Str 61. 1 Hob 787. See "Plead" 19. 2nd Is it to aggravate damages? C^t Assumpsit & Battery - 6 Cr 317. Sal 142. L^d Ray 1032 6 Cr Beating his servants &c It is really only

Trespass to Personal Property.

Showing the manner & circumstances of the act.

If trespass is committed by several, plff may declare on one or more, or all. So he may on each one separately. 5 Bar 192-3. Str 420 (As to recovering damages see "Battery" 18).

But it is said that at Com: Law, if it appears from the declarations, that the deft with another person certain i.e. (known) committed the trespass the declaration is ill, for not joining the latter 5 Bar 192-3 S C 1 Leon 41 - Hob 199 - [2^d as to the principle (It is aided however by Stat. 18 Eliz.) Torts being several - and defts' pleading & showing the fact, it is agreed, does not hurt the cause. Str 420 - Hob 199 -

If on a Indyt. in Trespass or several one is compelled to pay the whole; he can not oblige the others to contribute unless common to all torts. Hard 164 & 180. Hirt 116. The Law will not raise a promise out of an illegal transaction between the parties to it. "Assumpsit" 17. "Battery" 20 -

59. Justification must be pleaded specifically - 6 Ch 411 - Co L 282. Str 61 - Such defence being inconsistent with the par'l issue. If justification pleaded by one of several Co-Defts, shows that upon the whole Plff had no cause

Trespass to Personal Property.

of action - judg^t cannot go in either even if one is defaulting or found guilty.

6 Ch 421 - 15th 610. Nov 54. 2^d Ray 1372

Is a license - Gift Release & pleaded by one deft & the other found guilty or defaulting, or demurs to a good declaration or pleads a false plea found to him.

By the Com: Law "vi & armis" are words of substance - For at Com: Law the judg^t is deft in case of forcible injuries was a Capias pro fine - in other cases the Judg^t was Misericordia. 4 Bac 11 -

In one a fine - in the other amercement. 8 Co 39a. Amersin alters the judg^t. 6 Ch 408. 5 Bac 191. J N B 196. Sal 636. Cro E 407 Cro J 443 - 526 - 536 - (Treat on case 2)

Now the writ of capias pro fine is taken away by Stat. 5 Geo 4th - But the J^{ff} keeps a substitute in signing judg^t in actions for injuries with force; & recovers it back in his judg^t from the deft (ord 1. 8). Therefore a reason for this rule continues 5 Bac 191. Sal 636. 2^d Ray 985. Com: & the distinction must still be preserved to let in the provisions of the Stat -

So "contra pacem" are words of substance at Com: Law 5 Bac 192. 6 Ch 408. J N B 93. Carth 60. Sal 636. Cro J 426 - 443 - for same reason as in last rule

The Defects are both now aided by

Trespass to Personal Property.

verdict & shall be amended (6th 408
 1st 640) by Stat of 16 & 17 Car II. 10th 93-4

In Con^t they always have been regarded
 as matters of form - The Com: Law
 reason for considering vi & armis, as
 substance, never existed here - No such
 diversity of judgments - Neither capitum
 nor miseria cordia -

At Com Law. a joinder, in the
 same declaration of trespass on the
case, would be ill, because different
 judg^t. would be necessary on the
 two counts 8th 39. Once held dif-
 ferent in Con^t but not now con-
 sidered as Law here - It would
 destroy all distinction between different
 forms & kind of actions -

Replevin.

Replevin has been defined to be a redelivery to the owner by legal process of his cattle or goods distrained. 4 Bar 372. 6 Ch 346. Co Lit 145 b. for any cause on his giving security to try the right of the distrife & to redeliver if judg^t be in him. Action of Replevin then is one by which such redelivery is effected.

"Distrife is the taking of a personal chattel out of the possession of a wrongdoer # (or person in default) into the custody of the party injured to procure satisfaction of the wrong."

It is the act of the party injured 3 Bl 6. Sometimes signifies the thing taken by distrife -

Wrongdoer here does not mean merely a tort-feasor but includes several descriptions of persons who are in fault for not discharging debts or duties.

Replevin lies not it is said for goods so taken by men trespassing act. 6 Hen 522 Bull 53. 3 Bl 14 b. Str 484. 17 Wils 672. But for such only as have been taken by distrife i.e. it lies not for any taking which is not in form or professedly an act of distraining. Tho' the latter in point of fact be utterly tortious (p 18) This is laid down as a Common Law Rule. But by Stat. the action may lie in other cases, than that of distrife (as in this state it does) And by other Com. Law authorities, it appears that Replevin will lie for any tortious taking. 7 Johns 140. Bull 52. Cow Rep a 1 Schat & Lafroy 320-1. 327. Roll. Replevin B Cro E 824. 1 Mead Ch 20. Com. Action in 6.

The latter opinions seem to be the better & more reasonable. Suppose an heir-love family portrait or tortiously taken or withheld - Can there be no specific remedy? That by the action of detinue is precarious & inadequate.

Writ not granted but upon security given by Plff to try the right of the distrainer & in Eng? to redeliver the property if judgt is for distrainer. 3 Bl 13. 147. Co Lit 145 Esh 347 8.

In Conn^t the security upon a writ of Replevin is a substitute for the property Replevied - It obliges the Bondman to re-spond in damages merely & the property is not redelivered to the distrainer in any event. Stat Conn^t. 365.

In Eng^d if Plff in Replevin does not try the right (i.e. does not pursue his action) or fails in it; the property is to be returned to distrainer who may have a writ de retorno habendo Co Lit 145 - 4 Dac 382. 372-3 h b. It being returned to distrainer he may keep it till tender of sufficient amends: no longer - 3 Bl 147 158. 8 Co 147 a Esh 377

Tender of sufficient amends before distress - makes the distress tortious - For distress is but the means of obtaining security for some debt, duty or satisfaction of damage done - If before impounding - it makes the impounding

Replevin

or detaining tortious - but not the taking
 & Co 147 a Bull 60. If after judgment for
 distrainer it makes the further distress:
 -er by him unlawful et supra 62307
 2 Sid 40. 5 Co 76a 2 Roll 561. & in the last
 two cases, plff may have detinue or I
 suppose Trover - 8 Co 147 a.

When distress is taken it is to be in:
 -pounded - in animate chattels in a
 pound covert - animals generally in a
 pound overt - 3 Bl 12 - Co Lit 47. We have
 no pound covert -

(3) At Com. Law a distress being in re:
 -tinue of a pledge, it could not generally
 be sold - the distrainer could only
 keep it, as a punishment to the owner
 if he was stubborn - 3 Bl 10. 19. 10 Rule 588
 Statutes have in a great measure re:
 -minded this inconvenience - especially
 in case of distress for rent - by allow:
 -ing a sale in certain cases - but not
 in case of cattle taken damage hea:
 -tant 3 Bl 10. 13. 14. & some other cases
 There were always some exceptions to
 the general Com. Law Rule - 3 Bl 14.
 & Co 41. 12 Mod 330.

Writ of Replevin is demandable, as a
 matter of right - & even tho' rent is
 granted with right of distress it is imple:
 -vable 4 B ac 373 - Co Lit 145. This rule
 is designed to guard us oppression -

Replevin.

The principal cases by which distrufs may be taken by Com: Law are two -
 1. In case of cattle damage feasant
 2. For non payment of rent (The second not in use here 2 Lev 89! 3 BL 6. 7. Co L 46 Eek 364 & 355. In Eng? there are certain other cases, &c. - neglecting suit - or service under certain feudal tenures - for amercements, tolls, poor rates &c 3 BL 6. 7. Co Lit 46. Eek ut supra -

In Eng? Replevin may be at Com: Law (4) by a writ out of Chancery or under the Stat of Marlbridge 52 Hen 3. by plaint (Eek 346) i.e. Shff's own precept on com: - plaint made - So Shff may order his Bailiff to Replevy Eek 247. F. N. B. 169 -

In Eng? writ of Replevin lies in all cases, I believe, in which distruf is taken except when distruf is founded on a capias in withernam - This is a distruf by the owner of the original distruf, when the latter is carried out of the county or concealed - In which case the Shff has: - ing returned the goods are cloigend - i.e. carried to a distance - to a place unknown, the owner may distrain the goods of the distrainer, by way of reprisal, & these are not repleviable

It obtains also when the original distrainer having retained the goods, the writ of replevin, on a claim that they are his own (which claim is decided by) conceals them &c ut supra: so if there is

Replevin

no claim, but the property is concealed
 re 3 Bl 149 F.N.B. 69. 73. 75 & 475. In
 these cases there can be no replevin of
 the 2^d distress - till the original distress
 is forthcoming

When a writ de returno re is awarded
 & the distress can not be found Sci: fa:
 lies in the pleadings in the writ of replev-
 in - 4 Bac 382. F.N.B. 172. Eccl 347. Cro C
 322 See Eccl 371. 2 Wils 41-

(5) I. In case of Replevin of cattle damaged fear-
 sant. II. In case of goods attached

I. Of Replevin of cattle distrained, dam-
 = age peasant. In this case the owner
 of the land has his election to bring tres-
 = pass, or to distrain & impound the cattle.
 But if he distrains & the distress escapes
 his action of trespass is gone - unless the
 escape was without his fault. 2 Lev 91-2
 Same rule in case the cattle's owner
 5 Bac 179. Sal 248. 12 Mod 658. 663. 2^d Bl 720
 For he is bound by his election & must
 abide by the remedy he has chosen

At Com: Law. the proceedings in replevin
 were tedious - the writ must issue out
 of chancery - the goods were thus long
 detained from the owner. By stat-
 of Marlbridge (52 Hen 3^d) The Just
 is enabled to replevy immediately - 4 Bac
 373 - 3 Bl 147. F.N.B. 68-9. 13 C 131-

taking pledges, that the party replevying
 will prosecute his action of distress,

& return the goods if the right is decided for distrainer. If he fails to prosecute, pledges liable to distrainer; Sci. fa. lies on the pledges on their recognizance Esh 347. 4 Bac 382. Cro C 322 2 Will 4.

Analogy between taking body of debtor. & in -
- impounding cattle. Both are pledges. 2 Bac 354
Demand not satisfied by death - or by escape
unless the party impounding is in fault -
for the escape, or consent to it. In both
pledges being broken no other remedy - 5 Bac
179 - 12 Mod 103.

In Eng. owner of cattle distrained must
provide for them unless they are put into
a pound covert - then distrainer must do it.
2 Bl 13. Co Lit 47.

If the owner replevies in this state. & judgment
is given for Deft in replevin - he recovers in
the action, for damage done by the cattle
(2 Sw 91) & his execution for the amount of
damages found instead of the writ de re-
- iundo or at Com: Law (ante 2) Co Lit 145
2 Bac 372-3 382.

If the execution is not satisfied by plff
in replevin his pledges are liable.

The pound keeper has a lien on the cat-
- tle impounded for his fees, in case of
settlement between the parties -

Generally when cattle enter through the
insufficiency of the fence of the owner

Replevin

of the Land no damages are recoverable. But if they pass a good part of a fence partly good & partly bad damages are recoverable - & they may be impounded. So if the cattle are unruly Stat of Con 311 -

So if they enter from the highway, immaterial at Com: Law whether the fence is good or bad (2 N BL 527) because it is unlawful to permit them to go at large in the highway -

But a Stat in Con: enables towns to make any cattle commonable (Stat of Con: 4/4.408) - then it is said no difference between entering from highway & from an adjoining field is no damages recoverable, if the fence was insufficient. (2u. Whether such town regulation has any other effect than to prevent horses &c from being impounded for running at large on highways? -

[91] - For mischief done by an animal from a disposition common to the species, owner is liable without notice or knowledge. As for a bear biting cattle, trespassing - For that committed from a disposition not common owner not liable without science - Ex N's dog's biting - Fresh on Case 8.9) By 25-29-Eph 611 P Ray 606. (In declaring for damage done by a dog, by biting. Science must be alleged. - Cr Ch 350.

If the owner of land chase a beast damage resultant on to the land of the owner of

the beast; he is not liable for chasing -
If a stranger chases he is liable to both.
Litch 120. 5 Bar 179.

Distraint not allowed to use a beast
distrainted 3 Bl 13. Cro J 148. He becomes a
trespasser at initio if he does "Tresp: to
Pers: Prop: 50)

An title to land may come in question
in this action, it has been called (when
this is the case) a real action. now
holders to be personal as trespass or debt
for land can not be recovered in it -
This title may come collaterally, in ques-
- tion 4 Bar 373. Finch L 316 Comb 476. 47-
2. 27 -

(12)

Rule that all distresp must be taken by
day except in case of beasts damage fer-
- tant - In this latter case distresp may
be made by night lest they should es-
- cape - 3 Bl 11. 6 Bar 360 - Co Lit 142. 161 -

To prevent further damage, I suppose would
be a sufficient reason for the exception
The general rule is intended to guard us
the abuse of the license of the law, by
fraud, or violence -

distresp of cattle damage ferant must (13)
be made while the beasts are on the
land - 6 Bar 360 - Co Lit 142 - 9 Co 22. So at
Com: Law in case of distresp for rent -
except it might be taken on fresh suit
Now remedied by Stat 3 Bl 11 - (It is a
general rule where one has a lien on

Replevin -

goods & voluntarily lets it go - he loses all
him)

II. As to distress for Rent. Formerly the
landlord might take as large a distress as
he pleased. Tenant had no remedy - He
now has by Stat of Marlbridge (52 Hen 3^d)
a special action on the case for causing
distress - 3 Bl 12 - 3 Lev 48. 1 Vent 104. Str 857.
But this is not maintainable for this
injury (1 Burr 595) it being no injury at
Com. Law. except when gold or silver
(being of a certain known value) are
distressed (11) In other cases a special ac-
-tion on the case founded on the Stat. is
the proper remedy - (Exception 8) -

Distress for rent is incident of Com. right
(according to the Com. Law) to those cases
only in which the owner of the rent has
the reversion - not when he has no fur-
-ther interest: as in case of Rent charge
62. Where the owner of land conveys his
whole interest - reserving a rent - Litt. f
215. 218. Co Litt 140. 3 - 6 Ch 355. 6 - 2 Bl 42 -
But he may in this case have the right
by clause of distress -

(14). Now the right of distraining is by Stat
of 4 Geo I) extended to all rents - 2 Bl 43
3 do 6. 6 Ch 355. 6 -

In some cases the writ de returno &c is ta-
ken away & damages to be left in Replevin
substituted in Eng. by Stat. - Thus in case
of distress for rent by Stat of 17 Car II -

If the debt in replevin prevails, he recovers his costs + so much in damages as is equal to the value of the distress; if that is less than the rent due, he recovers in damages the amount of the rent with costs. In the first case distrainer may have a further distress 3 BL 150. Bull 58. 3 T R 349. 2 N B L 36 - See Cox 377 - 2 Wils 114 - The damages in this case are a substitute for the return of the goods -

2. In case of personal property attached on mere process -

The action when brought for goods attached is given by stat in this state - unknown to the Com: Law.

It is called a "mandatory precept" requiring the officer who has attached goods on mere process to redeliver them See Kirk 276 -

Magistrate taking the bonds, acts ministerial (15)
by, hence he is liable if bonds are insufficient (but not if the bondman is responsible at the time) and the action may be brought vs him - tho' no previous suit has been brought vs the pledger if they can be proved to be insolvent. (Bull 60)

The action is Case as vs Shff in Engl? when he takes the pledger - Bull 60 -

He becomes liable in this case for the whole debt I conceive (infra) as in Engl? Shff does - even over the amount of the

Replevin.

bond taken as the case may be.
 See 650 28. 174 Bl 76 - Comp 71 - (2 N Bl 54)
 cont) 2 N Bl 36 - see case in N Bl stronger
 than similar case here - Bond in Bay?
 being for the return of the goods - See 348.
 Bond 336 - 450 433 - (cont 2 N Bl 54)
 The action is case Ball 60.

17) Bond in Bay? is double the value of the goods
 Ball 60. 2 N Bl 36 -

It has been a question in Con^t whether
 plff's bond (i.e. the plff's in Replevin)
 might be taken by the magistrate -
 decided in the Court of Errors that it
 cannot) At least that magistrate is
 liable on plff's failure tho' responsible
 when the bond was taken - Root 165.

It has also been questioned whether
 when property to a small amount
 is attached & replevied the bondsman
 is liable for more than the value of
 the property - No decision in C^t But
 the words of the Stat. are explicit
 to subject him to the amount of the
 recovery - on the attachment. And
 - copy to the case of receiptman -
 who is always liable for the whole un-
 less he delivers the property - or limits
 the extent of his liability by the terms
 of the receipt.

118) It seems in Con^t bondsman cannot
 discharge himself by surrendering the
 goods after judg^t for debt in replevin
 The delivery of the goods is no part of

the condition of the bond. His undertaking is only to answer such damages demanded, &c. 1 Stat. Con! Replevin. Not like the case of receipt man - he is only bound to deliver the goods on the execution. Not like bondsmen in English replevin - who engages only for the return of the property.

It has been held here if property of one is attached for the debt &c of another, replevin does not lie - But trespass does - For replevin on attachment is not an adversary suit - & no one can replevy goods attached unless he is a party to the suit. Hist 276-2 Sw 93 - i.e. to the writ of attachment - See 90. Since by many opinions the action lies for a taking unlawfully tortious.

If cattle of a feme sole are distrained & she marries - husband alone may replevy - for the property becomes his - bands by intermarriage - For as the distress gives a mere lien not altering the property - It must be considered as the property in possession - as distinguished from property in action.

She has a right to possession on paying the debt. Est 375. 1 Sid 81-2. Bull 53. But if wife joins it is good after verdict; for the presumption will be that they were joint tenants -

Executor may replevy distress taken from ¹⁹¹ testator. Est 375. 1 Sid 81-2. Bull 53. For

Replevin

the property & the right to it are presumed -

If the several goods of several persons, are dis-
-trained together they can not join in replevin
- in the inquiry being several Ex Lit 145 b
- Sec 274 - Dill 53. For their interests & rights
are several

Goods distrained in a foreign country, tho'
brought here, while under the distress can
- not be replevied here - Ex 272 - 2 Snow 91 -
as the caption might be lawful there - It
not the reason that the cause of action or
claim, for which distresses are allowed at
Com: Law are local? as, trespass on land
debt for rent &c (see p. 3)

Replevin lies of things personal only, & there-
-fore it is said not of deeds of Land. It is
a sufficient reason that deeds of any kind
are not distrainable provides replevin
lies not for taking merely tortious. But as
as to the rule if replevin lies for such a
taking (p. 1) and trover lies for such deeds
- Trover 62/ Ex 272 4 Bac 385.

Replevin is founded on the right i.e. on the
property in the piff. Therefore it is a good
plea in abatement - or in bar, that the
property is in a stranger - Ex 352 -
4 Bac 373 - Lev 92. Carth 74 - 243. Sal 94 -
Different from action of trespass (Dill 53)
where piff's possession is sufficient -
trespass being founded on possession.
Tro. & Tresp. 52 & Trov. 57 -

Replevin.

Pleadings.

Declaration charges the taking & detaining of the goods &c & demands damages 2 Ch R. 384 - Com Pleas? 34 10
2 Saund 194 & 292 - 310. 320 u. 1 -

From
p. 9.

In Replevin Deft may either deny the taking or show his right to take - 4 Bac 388. But on our Stat replevin of goods taken by attachment there is no trial (p 14 & ult)

The gen'l issue is - non cepit - 1 D. cut 249. 4 Bac 388. Bull 54 - Upon this issue a claim of property in Deft can not be given in evidence - it should be pleaded - Bull 54 - Sal 5 - 2 Lev 92 - 6 Mod 81 - Such claims being inconsistent with the gen'l issue -

From
p. 10

If Deft justifies the taking - as because the beasts were damage feasant &c! he is called the avowant (Ex 360. 3 Bl 150. 2 Saund 195) if he justifies in his own right, or in that of his wife - If he justifies in the right of another (as servant &c) he is said to make cognizance - 3 Bl 150 -

These terms are derived from the words of the justification in two cases - Ex 1 - "Deft will avow the taking" &c 2. Deft is, or is not or will acknowledge the taking

Avowry is in the nature of a plea to the action of replevin, & also of a declaration or plea in replevin - The replication is in the nature of a plea to the avowry & is usually so called -

Replevin.

In this case (ie of avowry re) both par-
 ties are actors ie pffs. The owner of
 the cattle suing for damages & the avow-
 er - ant-claiming at Com: Law generally on
 return of the cattle re. in some cases (p14)
 damages. 4 Bac 373. 2 Mod 149. Cro E 798.
 Bull N- 306 150-1. So that both parties claim
 a right of recovery. a peculiarity in
 this action -

rem-

11. In C^t both claim damages only: The cat-
 tle being here not returned in any count
 to the distrainer -

Avowry is in the nature of a declaration
 in several respects. 1 Avowant right to
 jury^t for the return of the distress & in some
 cases for damages. In other words Dept prays
 a jury^t in chief 4 Bac 373. Esh 376-7. 2 Wils
 117 - Sal 95. 2. Pff may plead in abate-
 ment of the avowry 4 Bac 373. 3. Avowant
 need not close with a verification. Cro E
 530. 798. Cases 122. 4 Bac 373. 6 Mod 183. Plead
 263 - Yelv 148. In these particulars the a-
 vowry is like a declaration -

But the avowry is in nature of an action
 one tenant in common may it is said
 avow without his fellow. (Cro E 530. 4 Bac
 373. Esh 374-) For taking cattle damage
 feasant. But this is overruled. He must
 make cognizance as bailiff of the other.
 70th Jany 253. 2 W Bl 386. 1 Roll 220 pl 14
 as well as avow for himself -

Tenants in Com man have several a-

= vovris (i.e. above severally) for rent.
 because it is in the reality & their interests
 are several. 2 N DL 387 arg^t. Carth 340 -
 Sal 389. L Ray 422 -

Trespass on the Case ex delicto.

369

This action lies.

I. For wrongful acts not accompanied with force -

II. For culpable neglect or omission, Bull 74

III. For consequential injuries occasioned by acts which are forcible.

Examples of the first kind of wrongs - Conversion in Trover, Malicious prosecution, Voluntary Escape, Slander, Fraud, False Return, Mala praxis &c -

Examples of the second kind of wrongs. Neglect of duty in a Bailor, Servant, Officer or when injuries to another -

Examples of the third kind of wrongs - which consist in consequential damage, occasioned by forcible acts & are laid in declaring under the per quod is an allegation of special damage - 3 BL 122-3. Esp 598. 11 Mod 180 L Ray 1399. 1402. 2 BL 2895. 3 BL 153-4. 208-9 Esp 645. 2 TR 167. As. throwing a log into the road over which one falls, digging a pit there &c - Str 630. Loss of service &c in consequence of beating one's servant: tho' the action of trespass with a per quod has by confounding the forms of declaring obtained very generally in the English practice. Not in ours - (part)

Actions of trespass on the case are generally founded on the Equity of the Stat of Westm. 2. 13 Edw 1st. 3 Acers. H & L 89. 243. 3 BL 51-2 - tho' case was in a few instances known at Com: Law 3 BL 123. 2 TR 129. 3 BL 445. 2 Lev 20. vid remedy for escape part 9 -

Tresp: on Case ex delicto -

{ Assumpsit is the most comprehensive of all actions on contract & Trespaf on the case ex delicto is the most comprehensive of all actions - }

In Con^t the forms of declaring & common parlance often make a distinction between actions on the case & actions of trespass on the case - Assumpsit we call an action on the case, Trover an action of Trespaf on the case. The first class arises ex contractu the second ex delicto - The English Law knows no such distinction 3 Reeves H & L. 245 or 394 or 3 BL 208. But the action denominated Trespaf on the case whether founded on contract or tort.

2. If Case is brought when Trespaf is the proper remedy (action) judg^t is arrested & do c converso 6 TQ 125. 2 Mod 131 - Cro C 141 & 196 - Difference of the judg^t at Com: Law is the reason 5 Bac 191 - 3 4 do 11 - 2 do 506 - "Tresp 59"

It has been a subject of much controversy in particular instances whether Trespaf or Case is the proper Remedy. Where there is no force in the transaction complained of there is no difficulty to determine; it is always Case - When the original act causing the injury is with force Trespaf vi & armis lies in some cases, & in others tresp: on the case.

Rule. If the forcible act is immediately injurious, & the redress is sought for the immediate injury, Tresp: vi & armis is the proper remedy, as beating of one's self, false imprisonment, & destroying property with actual force &c -
But if the injury for which redress is sought

* The
... ..
... ..
... ..

Trespass on Case or delict.

is consequential, Tresp: on case seems to be the proper remedy or action - as for throwing a log into the way, over which one falls - Lof of service from the battery of one's servant or child re - (3 BL 208-9. 2 JR 123-5. 153-4 - 5 do 648. 2 BL 1055. 1 Com 204. - 3 BL 24 EL 244¹) 2 Wils 313. Dal 26-79. L^o Ray 1399. Str 634 - 2 Burr 1114 2 JR 23 L^o Ray 407 - 2 BL 892 In the last case the action is usually called trespass - & trespass is holden to be the proper action - (2 JR 476) L^o Ray 1032. 1117. Sal 380. 3 Bar 567 2 JR 117. Master & Servant 63 -

There has been much difficulty in applying the rule of discrimination i.e. in distinguishing between immediate & consequential damage - The injury or damage to be immediate with - in the rule need not be of course the instantaneous effect of the original force, tho' when it is so it is of course immediate - 2 BL 899-900

But injuries which are not the instantaneous effect of the original force are sometimes regarded as immediate, sometimes as consequential & of course they are in some cases, remedied by trespass and in others by case. (3)

Rules.

1. When the immediate or proximate cause of the injury is but the continuance of the original force the injury is immediate & the author of the original force is liable in trespass for in this case he is the author of the whole force, the ultimate violence is his, & the injury is considered in Law as the immediate effect of the original force -

Trespass on the Case or delict.

II. But when the original force ceases, before the injury commences, as is always the case when the injury is produced by the voluntary intervening act of another rational agent - & in many other instances, the injury is consequential & the author of the original force is liable (when liable at all) in Case only. For the proximate cause of the injury is not a continuance of the original force, hence the injury is not considered in Law as the immediate effect of the original force.

Examples of Rule I. A ball shot by A. plances ten times or more or less - & hits B. B's remedy vs A is, by the first rule, Trespass - A strikes a football & B kicks it against C. C has no remedy against A, but trespass against B - by Rule I.

So one shoots a ball which after plancing a number of times hurts A's servant. The bodily hurt is in law the immediate effect of the original force, for the proximate cause or ultimate force is but a continuance of the original force. The original force being the *causa causans* - & the force proximate the *causa causata*. The servant has therefore Trespass by the First Rule.

But by the Second Rule A's injury is not the immediate effect of the original force. The immediate cause of the injury to A is the *causa causata* viz the physical hurt done to the servant - A's proper remedy is therefore - Case - 2 JR 167-8. Esp 845. Tul 206 tho it has been called trespass - L^d Ray 274

Tresp: on Case ex delicto

377

831- 320b 18. 2 NR 167. 2 NR 446-476. 38a 599
(p 217) And it is now settled in 2 NR 476-
that the Master may have trespass - this is
plainly contrary to principle - tho upon precedent
Further Examples.

But if A puts an instrument of mischief
in motion & another rational agent B vol- (4)
-untarily gives it a new impulse & it wounds
C the injury is not the immediate effect
of A's act - but of B's. B therefore is liable in
Trespass and A if at all is liable in Case -
2 BL R 892. * depends upon whether his act was in the
1st instance lawful

Suppose a ball shot at a mark places &
wounds - trespass lies - Cutting thorns - lop-
-ping trees - 1 Ray 467 - 1 Mod 24 38a 523 -
In these cases the injury is the immediate phy-
-sical effect of the force continued, & is not
aided by an intervening free agent - But if
a log is thrown into the road & A falls over
it case lies - for the injury is not the effect
of the original force continued, the original
force ceased before the injury began -
Cro J 446 - 1 Com 204 - 6th 599 - Cro E 10 -

So if A erects a spout which throws water in
time of rain on B's Land - case lies - 1 Str 636.
(p 217 6.20) Same reason - A lites in cutting down a
head of water & thus flooding B's land (p 6)
for here the injury is the immediate effect
of cutting down the dam, & Trespass lies -
So in Shepherd v Scott 2 BL R 892 - Squit case
So of turning out a mad ox - (p 6 & anth. supra)

Case lay 1 Vent 295. for riding a wild horse
to which ran over plaintiff 1 Com 208. here I

Paraphrase on the case in 21st.

conclude defendant was not considered as an agent - so far as related to the force. 2 Lev 172 2 R 2 899. he was regarded as passive being unable to govern the horse, but guilty of imprudence & want of care in riding him 2 R 2 117.

Def's cart (he driving negligently) ran with force against plff's horse & case was adjudged to be ^{2 R 2 117} Not-alleged as the act of the def. see 3 R 593 - the declaration did not describe the force as the personal act of def. 8 R 188. If Declaration had charged the def with negligently driving against plff's horse there would have been the proper form of action, for if an injury is the immediate effect of force, its being negligent or wilful is immaterial as respects the form of action.

Let if A ^{lightly} carelessly discharges a gun & the fire of the wadding is communicated to B's property & burns it - Case lies for D - Cro 6 10. for force ends before injury begins burning is not A's act. The burning is a new distinct act or cause. If wilful - trespass would lie - in this case it seems the mischief being wilful or not decides the immediate cause of injury - i.e. the burning to be A's immediate act or not - If not wilful - the burning would not be deemed his act - but only the consequence of it -

5)

If I dig a trench on my own land & direct a water course from my neigh-

Tresp. on Case or Del.

= boats, the injury is not immediate - & Case not Trespas lies - Here the proximate cause of the damage is negative viz the failure of the stream - therefore it is not a continuance of the original force - 2 Wils 174 - 6th 638. Str 5. 638-9-

If a servant in performing his Master's business negligently commits a direct injury with force, the remedy is the servant is the trespas. 2 Camp 464. Master & Serv^t 36. 39. Is Trespas on case the proper remedy against the Master? 1 Bos & Pul 472. 6 TR 125. Sal 441- 5 TR 849. 1 Ea 100 2 TR 442. Case I think clearly. Str 1083- 7 TR 279. 4 Barr 2093-

Deft's ship ran over Plff's boat with force & by negligence, of Deft's pilot - Case is the proper action - it is not the personal act of Deft but of his agent. 2 N R 446-(pb)

This distinction has been taken - If A willfully runs his vessel against B's trespas lies - if negligently case - but it was A's act in the former case - not so considered in the latter - 8 TR 188. 3 Ea 523 - in the latter case the court did not consider the act as A's act - See 9th. If A steers his own vessel at the time of the injury -

In case put supra of cutting trees, lopping thorns &c (4) the force is continued, it is one conjoined act of force therefore trespas lies - Case of Spout (at ante, aliter - for erecting the spout does not cause the falling of the rain - not conjoined acts - Then the force

Tresp. on the Case ex Del.

ended before the injury took place - Another sufficient cause is needed - viz Rain to produce the injury - hence case is the proper remedy.

But for cutting down a head of water or the remedy is Trespas - for this is like pouring water on the Plff's land, it is one continued act of force the cutting down causes the flowing of the water.

But the first general rule (or the first branch of the distinction) holds only as against the immediate agent, or actual author of the injury - As against his principal or employer the remedy is case, even where the injury is the immediate effect of force - Ex N's servant negligently driving his master's carriage against another's carriage or person - remedy against servant is Trespas: by the first general rule - but against the Master it is Case: for in Law the act is not his - he is liable only on the score of negligence - 5 GR 649 - 6 do 125 - 2 H BL 442 - 1 Bos & P. 472 - 2 N R 446 - Str 1083 - 7 GR 279 - In Master & Serv. 37-8. 9-82 -

Where case lies for an injury accruing in consequence of an act with force the original act may be said to have been done vi & armis, tho' the action is Case - 3 Reeves H & L 244 - it is but matter of inducement or a description of the manner in which the consequential damage was occasioned

occasioned - Ex Throwing a log into the highway & Plff's horse or carriage injured by going over it.

Whether the original act was lawful or not - not the criterion as to the form of action, 2 Bl 1192 &c. The injury being the immediate effect of the force or not, decides the form of action. The unlawfulness of an act may render the author of it liable when he would not otherwise be so. but cannot affect the form of action -

This action lies for a great variety of misfeasances, & non misfeasances - 1 Bac 44. 3 Bl 52 122. 1 Com 132. 224. Many of them form distinct titles - Tress. Stancer. Malicious prosecution &c

A mere neglect for which this action lies, on the ground of delictum must be a neglect of duty imposed or recognized by Law. Esp 599. 2^d Ray 917 1st Com 252. Cro & 219.

Thus for negligence in his office, to the damage of another, a Shff is liable, so are other officers & private persons in other cases 1 Com 205-7. 964 503. 1 Roll 93. 2 Bac 366. Sal 323. 1 Bos & Pul 360.

It lies on an agent for not effecting insurance according to instruction, if a loss happens. on this ground it lies in three cases - 1st Where a agent has effect of the principle (who is abroad) in his hands 7 M 157. Park 303. 2^d When one has been in the practice of insuring for another who is abroad & has given no notice to discontinue it - 3. When one accepts bills of lading, sent on condition of

2^d ex. 2^d ex. on the case of delict.

insuring. Marsh Ins 74. 205-b. 2^d ex 188.

It is a voluntary agent for one who receives no reward, if he proceeds to execute the trust, & commits a mistake by negligence. Marsh Ins 206-7-9. 188th Ca 74. 2^d ex 182. See Bail? 1882.

(18).

A person performing business for another, in the line of his profession, & doing it carelessly or unskillfully, is liable in this action. But if the business was out of the scope of his profession, he is not liable for want of skill - unless by a special agreement - tho' for negligence he is. 2^d ex 214. 2^d ex 359. 8th ex 601. Bail? Thus for negligence or gross ignorance in a surgeon, by which a patient is injured this action lies. 8th ex 601. 2^d ex 213 - 2^d ex 359. 8th ex 348.

But in case of an undertaking in physic or surgery, unless the person undertaking makes the practice of Physic or a common profession, he is not liable it is said by (8th ex 601) even for neglect, without a special undertaking - 3^d ex 122. 188th ex 601. 2^d ex 214. 1st ex 185. 235. Holly of the patient. See also In case of neglect. Espinasse's authorities do not at this point support him. For ignorance or unskillfulness they are not liable, except by an express undertaking. For negligence they are surely liable, tho'

not regular practitioners -

It lies in parol as every one by whose act or culpable neglect, the health of another is impaired (p 20) It lies as a seller of bad wine, or food which has injured another's health - Indeed the Law implies a warranty that provisions sold are good. 1 Fon 110. 3 BL 166. So for exercising an unwise trade. producing the same effect (viz) impairing health. 6 Rep 601. 1 Roll 90-5. 3 BL 166-122. 1 Com 166-170 - 9 Co 52. Nut 135. 3 Bac 182. 2 Roll 5.

For mischief done by a dog (as biting) if addicted to such mischief, owner is liable having notice - Not without such notice. Cro & 350. 1 Com 208. Judgment arrested if notice is not alleged. Sal 662 3 Sal 12. Lutw 90. 6 Rep 601. 2. It is of the first - 4 Inst. ga. cl. fr. 4 - ff. Under Stat. of Con^t. he is liable without notice. See St. of C^t. 238. So in N. Y. in case of biting sheep) -

So tho' the injury be different as to the subject of it, from what the owner had notice of - ex. Notice of a dog's biting a sheep & he afterwards bit an ox. 1 Ray 209. Sal 602. 3 Sal 13-

Scientia not traversable. it is not distinctly traversable "Scientia" not being a direct allegation - 4 Co 186. 1 Roll 4. 1 Com 208. General Issue, involves a denial of it -

9)

For injuries done by animal, per se = trespass, the owner is liable without notice, all such animals are supposed to be addicted to mischief - Ex Bears, Foxes &c. Replevin 9. 2 Ray 606. Cro C 254. 1 Com 208.

The owner's liability in all such cases is on the ground of negligence, and of course the action is Trespass on the case. 1 Com 208.

It lies for disturbance i.e. for unlawful hindering one from the free enjoyment of an incorporeal right p 20. 3 BL 236-241. 1 Com 199. 9 Co 112. 3 Lev 266. Cro E 845. 1 Vent 275. 2 do 186. 2 Roll 134. 6 Co 62. Obstructing a right of way. Diverting a water course &c (ante) Sta 5. 638.

For an escape on mesne or final process this action lies on the Stat 2 Bac 245. 1 Show. 176. Anciently the only action on the Stat & in either case, was Trespass on the case (St) Now by the Stat of 1 Rich 2^d. debt lies on him for escape under final process - both still lie in both instances - Exh 609. Cro E 17. Per 873. When debt is brought the jury cannot give less than the whole amount of the judgment. 3 BL 2 1038. Aliter in case Exh 609. 10. 2 St 126. See Shipp & 20. For the remaining unless for the action of Escape see 'Shipp & 20'.

10)

For nonfeasance of under Shipp, Shipp himself is only liable & for misfeasance or tort, both he & under Shipp are liable.

Ex. voluntary escape embuzzling a writ or
 Exh 103- Cro & 175. Sal 18. Dong 40. Corp 402.
 2 Mod 32. For the reason of the distinction
 See Shiffs & 5.6- (In Ct. Under Shiff is also
 liable) -

If a Shiff having arrested on a meane pro-
 - cess. refuses to take sufficient bail, when
 tendered he is liable in case, but not in
 trespass: He is not a trespasser at initio -
 The absence of the authority of the Law being
 negative Cro & 141- or 196- Str 23- 7d 6. 10d 6
 2d 6- 2 Roll 313- 2 Mod 31- 8 Co 104 b- 1 Lev 189
 1 Com 489. 5 do 582. 2 Roll 561-2-

The action lies also in rescue of one taken
 on meane process, in favor of the original
~~process~~ plff - 1 Bull 62. 6 Mod 211- Peck 311-
 83 R 127. 1 Com 204- Cro & 414. 486- Exh 610- 657
 Cro & 77. Nut 180. Treach: or t amir - Jurys
 may give the whole debt if or less - Exh 610-
 - didn't for plff to prove the original debt
 insolvent or out of reach - Bull 62. Exh 657.
 Shiffs & 21-

So it lies for rescue of one taken by final proz (11)
 in favor of the original plff - Exh 610. Cro &
 77. or 109. Nut 98. 5 Com 438. So it lies in this
 case in favor of the Shiff (Nut 98. 4 Dec 299-)
 that not in the last for rescue on meane
 process excuse him - Shiffs & 22-

Plff by proceeding in rescue, discharges the
 Shiff seem Exh 610.

It lies for Shiff or person escaping either on

Traverse on Case Ex Del.

means or final process (Esp 612) & that tho' the Sheriff himself has not been sued Esp 613. Cro 652. So as the under Sheriff - when the escape is from him, in favor of the Sheriff (sent Esp 613-) but not in favor of the party or an under Sheriff. unless the escape be voluntary. (supra Cro 6234-5. 53. 3 Co 526 - 'Sherr' 23-

But the sheriff & bailiff cannot maintain the action or the party escaping, even tho' the Sheriff has recovered on him - for he is not liable to the Sheriff by Law, but by contract - Esp 603- & Cro 6349 - The injury is to Sheriff & party not to bailiff - Sheriff 23-4.

So it lies on the Sheriff for a false return 120ils 336. Esp 615. Sta 650. Cro 6729 - 'Sherr' 27-8.

So for omitting to execute legal process - as to make an arrest - 2 Bac 236 n. 2 Mod 234 - 2^d Ray 331 - 'Sherr' 16-

12) Attorneys are liable to this action for neglect or misconduct, injuring their clients Esp 617. 220ils 325. 4 Bac 2060. Martin & Bent. 57. Assumps 16- If he neglect to appear for his client

Attorneys are sometimes liable to the adverse party for dishonest practices - Esp 618. An attorney fraudulently takes a judgment on the debt after the Plaintiff had been non-prosecuted - debt had been on the Attorney Hut 125. 520ils 377. 3 DC 165. 1 Mod 209. Martin &

Trespass on Case Ex Delictis.

397

Scot. 55-6.

So if A personates B & acknowledges judg^t vs him, the action lies vs A. 12 All 100. pl 1-

It lies vs Justices of the Peace who refuse to do their duty - Ex denying bail - refusing to authenticate instruments, which require their signature - as writs - depositions &c. Esp 618. 1 Leon 323 - 1 Hawk 90. 1 Hal 97.

It lies not vs a person who has sued out a writ, for not countermanding it on settlement unless malice is proved. 1 Bosse 388. 2 Roil 302. No legal duty requires it - If afterward, maliciously prosecuted action lies for malicious prosecution -

It lies vs an officer, corporation or for a false return, to a mandamus. (See mandamus 7 p 22) Esp 648. 12 Cent 111 - Sal 32. Doug 134 - 4 Maul & Schw. 486 -

It lies for a breach of trust in bailers (13)
Esp 618. 2 L^d Ray 909 -

This action lies on the ground of negligence for the bailor in all cases of bailments - where the property is injured for the want of that degree of care, which (according to the nature of the bailment) the law requires, or which is expressly stipulated for. 1 Com 208. 209. Co Lit 89. 4 Co 83 - Sal 26. Com 2 133. 2 L^d Ray 909. Esp 618. See Trover & Bail^t. p. 8. The action when thus laid is founded

Trespass on the Case or Del.

on tort 3 Esh 62. Pleas to 48.

It lies on owners or masters of vessels, for goods lost or injured thro' the latter's negligence 6 Esh 623. Sal 440.

But the owners if sued it is said must all be joined - as the right of action is ex quasi contractu - Sal 440. 3 Sal 203 - 5 T R 451 - contra. The true rule is when the action is founded on negligence all need not be joined - the first being tort - 5 T R 649 - 51 - 3 East 62 - 70. Albeit if the action is on the contract of bailment - express or implied - Pleas to 48. Bailmt. 15-6- (Contra 3 Cont.

And if one is sued alone upon the contract; he must plead it in abatement - 6 Esh 623 - 5 T R 657 - 5 Barn 2611 - (Contra 3 Sal 203. S. C 1 do 440) In the last case cited (Sal to) the action was treated ex quasi contractu - (5 T R 451) But it was the non joinder as the rule now is, which should have been pleaded - ed in abatement - 2u -

(14). For actual fault of his own a Postmaster is liable - So are under officers for theirs. Corp 765. arg? L^d Mansfield 3 Wils 443 -

Trespass on Case or delicto.

401

Post masters are not liable for notes or letters lost through the fault of subordinate officers - 6 Ch 624 - Sal 17. Comp 724. The office is for intelligence - not insurance no hire paid to him by plff therefore not liable as a common carrier. He is an agent for the public, & as such is not liable in such a case - (Martin & Serv^t 42).

Liable for injudicious selection of servants to the public only -

Inkeepers are liable for all property of their guests lost for the want of that degree of care, which the Law requires of them - 3 Bos 179. Palm 374 - 2 Roll 345. Bull 73 - 8 Co 32 - 1 Com 214 - 6 Ch 626 - 3 Bl 165 - 6. Dy 266 - Popk 178. Jones on Bailm^t 135. Not liable for goods stolen by guest's servant or companion, or taken by public enemies - (See Bailm^t & Inkeeper)

To subject Inkeepers for goods stolen &c Plff must have been a traveller, & a guest & received as a guest - 6 Ch 626 - 5 BR 273 - Mod 78. A nightman procuring lodging, is not a guest within the Rule & Co 32. 6 Ch 626. See Bailm^t &c.

Inkeeper is not chargeable as such, unless (15) - less he receives profit from the guest or his goods - 6 Ch 627. Ergo if the guest goes away & leaves his goods, he (Inkeeper) is not liable - Cro 9 188 - 9. Aliter if he leaves his house; for then

^h *liability on the case of debtors.*

is a profit tho' the owner is absent. Exh 627
 Sal 388. "Done, re."

Is he liable for dead goods if the owner's
 absence is but temporary & he is still a guest.
 Ex. going out in the morning on business
 & returning before night - Exh 627. Cro 789

Likewise or non sane memory is no excuse
 for an innkeeper - Exh 628. Cro 622 -

Innkeeper not liable for injuries to the
 person of his guest by third persons - as
 against re. Exh 628. 8 Co 326 -

Innkeeper liable for not receiving guest
 unless he has good reason to refuse - 3 Bl
 166 - Hard 163 - 2 Show 327. 1 Bar 344 - 3 do
 180 - 2. Bul 70. 9 Co 87 - Dy 158. So of a com-
 = mon carrier -

(18) The action lies for deceit in sales; as
 false warranty or false affirmation -
 Exh 629. Ex. affirming rent to be more
 than it was - Sal 211 - Warranting goods
 to be sound, or of such a value * re
 Covt. Broken 17 - 1 Com 166 - 7 - 1 Roll 90
 Yelv 20. Exh 629. Cro 74 - (* 2m. as to
 fraud in the sale of real estate. 2
 Leay 128. Co L 384 - a note 1 Foub 366 -
 2 Cains 193 - Civier Tit 38. c 5. § 57)

Where an express warranty unaccom-
 = panied with any collateral stipu-
 = lation, is false at the time of making

Trespass on the Case Ex Delicto.

It, vendee may support an action upon it, without either returning the property or giving notice to the vendor of the defect. - Assump 22. 24 BE 17. 2 JR 745. 6 Cr 13 - (39) 2 Ch D 101 n -

But if the warranty is coupled with an agreement that vendor shall take back the property, & refund if it shall prove unsound - vendee must return it on discovering the defect, in order to maintain an action on the warranty (2 JR 745) 1 Camp 194 n. 2 JR BE 573)

And if under such an agreement the sale is rescinded by returning the property & an acceptance of it by the vendor; or by returning it only: (where by the terms of the contract no act remains to be done by the vendor) Ind: Aff: for money had & rec? will lie to recover back the price - Secus if the sale is not thus rescinded - 1 JR 133 - 6 - Comp 818. Dony 23 - 7 JR 181 - 5 East 449 - 7 do 274 - Com on Com 38.

Where the contract is not thus rescinded (as where vendor's concurrence in rescinding is necessary & is withheld) the action must be brought on the warranty or special agreement (166) Comp 818. Dony 24. 1 Selw 112. 691 - 2. 3 Cr 42. 4 Maf 135. 7 East 274 - & Ind: Aff: to recover back the price will not lie; As the express contract still exists - there arises no implied one -

Trespass on the Case Ex Del.

But if goods merely warranted ~~sound~~ sound, without such an agreement for returning them, prove to be unsound; the purchaser instead of suing on the warranty, may on discovering the unsoundness return the property even without the seller's consent & sue in *Ind: Assump.* to recover back the price paid. (3 *Est* 83) 1 *Selw* 688. n. 9) thus disaffirming the contract (See *qu* 7 *East* 274.) according to this rule the warranty seems to be regarded as a condition precedent to any right acquired by the vendor under the contract. Vide *Assump.*

116) Or the buyer may in the last case sue on the warranty. (26) -

But a buyer cannot recover back on a count for money had & unpaid unless the property is returned as soon as the unsoundness is discovered; not if the property (if a horse) has been worked by him or "doctored" 17 *R* 136. 4 *East* 449. 7 *do* 274. 1 *St R* 260. In such case his only remedy (if no fraud) is on the warranty 3 *Est* 82. 4 *do* 95. 2 *Ch* 0101. n. t. action on the warranty is in affirmation of the contract & the vendor retains the property. Sues when *Ind: Ass.* is brought.

Upon express warranty an action on the warranty as such, or *assumpsit* will lie (Dow 20) i.e. *Special Assump.*

40 408

16

Trepass on the Case Ex Del.

The action does not lie on vendor for false affirmation, when vendee has been guilty of neglect i.e. when it is his own fault & folly to have confided in it.

As if vendee might have easily learned the true value &c. Ex Vendor's affirming that J.S. would give £100. So if the defects are visible, a general warranty, or affirmation extends not to them - Esp 629-30. 2 Ray 1118. 1 Font 110 Finch L 289 -

2d. Will not a special warranty subject in this case? Esp 630. 1 Com 170-3 Bl 165. Ex - That an apparent defect will occasion no loss or damage - I should think it would.

General warranty of a horse holder good after verdict - tho' he had but one eye - (Pal 211-) upon the ground that the defect, might by possibility be secret or undiscoverable by vendee. He might be blind -

If vendee of warranted goods sell them this does not oust him of his right of action on the warranty * 2 BR 748 14 Bl 17. (* As the warrantor's right to cite in his warrantor to defend, in a suit for failure of title - See 1 Johns NY 517. 72 517 &c -)

To it lies on the ground of fraud, for artfully disguising known defects - Esp 632. 2 Roll R 5. Peak Ev. 229. 9 Cas 105 -

Trespass in the Case of Vendors.

Willfully concealing known defects, amounts also in Law, to a warranty. 2 Roll 5. Ech 629. 632. 2 Lev 120.

And it has been decided in Court that if one without fraud or science, sells property for the price that it would be worth if sound, the seller impliedly warrants that it is sound - unless the buyer expressly assumes the risk 2 Root 407. 2 Lev 120. See 1000 150 / Contra 35 R 757. Peak 115. 123. 2 East 314. 1000 Com 142. 1 John 274. 2 do 179. Careat Emptor - See "Contract" 17. 24 - Contra also now in Court. 4 Court R 428.

In the single case of a sale of provisions the Com. Law implies a warranty of soundness in quality - Semble (3 DC 166 - 1 Houb 166) This exception seems to be founded on the high regard the Com. Law pays to life & health.

171

So where vendor practices fraud by false affirmation, in respect to his title to goods sold, this action lies - Science in this case is necessary when the fraud is the gist but if the action is founded on the warranty of title, expressed or implied, science can not be necessary - The gist is breach of contract Bull 30. Ech 629. 632. 1 Com 171 - Carth 90 35 R 57 1 Jon 109. 373. Cro J 474. 1 Show 63-8. Tal 40 or 210. L Ray 593. 2 Lev 123. Story 632. 2 East 448. 1 Johns R 129

A sale of personal chattels implies a warranty by the vendor that he has the

Trespass on the Case ex delicto.

title to them unless the contract is in-
- tended by the parties, as a bargain of
hazard, & case will lie upon the warranty.

Roberts on Frauds Com 523 or 5.23. 1 Fent 109
373. 2 Sw 120. Com. action for deceit. A 8.

Cr 179. 474- 1 Roll 90. 1 John 274-

If vendee is induced by fraudulent repre-
- sentation to assume the risk of the quality
of the goods - he may still sue if they are
unsound - 6 John 110. & in acc in Com.

If goods are sold by a Bill of sale there can
be no implied warranty of soundness (tho' the
vendor may be liable for any fraud in the
sale) 6 Ch 248. 1 John R 503. Deed excludes
it.

Nor will an action lie in such case
on a parol warranty - The deed excludes
parol evidence of a warranty. (6 Ch 248)
1 John R 414- There can be no binding war-
- ranty in such cases, unless it be in the
deed -

So it lies for injuries occasioned by false
affirmations made to defraud (tho' as for a
fraudulent recommendation) tho' the person
making it had no interest in the fraud
3 Tr 54- 1 Com 107. 1 East 318. 2 do 92. 12 do
632. 638. 3 Tr 226- 8 John 25. 3 do 271- 6 do 81
3 Bos or 367 (If the recommendation be not
fraudulent - this action will not lie) i.e.
if he was honest in giving it.

Trespass on the Case or Delict.

So for injuries done by cheating - or false pretences - or false dice - personating another (ante) 6 Esp 633 - Mod 583 - Cro & Geo. 1 Sid 250. Bull 32. Action lies. There must be damage as well as fraud - If damage & no fraud action will not lie - nor if fraud & no damage -

And it seems now settled tho' formerly decided otherwise (Camp 39) that where an action is brought for the price of goods sold, or labour done either upon a quantum meruit or even for a stipulated price (whether upon warranty or not) the defendant may reduce damages by proving defects in the labour - or in the quality of the goods; & that where the one or the other is absolutely worthless proof of the fact will defeat the action (Camp 39 140-4. n. 8 Johns 453. 16 Esp 43. [2u 4 Esp 45 Peak 80 233 - 2 Sw 169 contra] 1 Selw 691 - 7 East 479. And (seem) if he does not resist the claim in either of these ways but suffers judgment to go for him for the full price or value claimed - he must bear the loss - He can not afterwards maintain (as was formerly the case) a cross action for the defect in the value or quantity or quality. 1 Camp 190. 8 Johns 453.

So of a public nuisance occasioning private damage or obstruction in the highway Bull 26. Carth 194. 451 - But if the party damaged might have avoided the damage by reasonable or ordinary

Liability on the Case & deict.

care he can not recover - 11 East-60.
Bull 20. Cont. post 4th sec

If I by a wrongful act - I make an innocent person liable over to a 3^d person, I am liable to the former. Ex If I chase A's cattle into B's land & thus subject A to damage, I am liable to him for the loss.

Not Ex con 525 CwC 325. Moll. 100. 1 Caith 3-4
All 2. 2 Sw. 282.

So if my servant by my command does an act, which he supposes I had authority to order, but for which he is subjected - I am doubtless liable to him "Contracts-31-100w
Con 177-8. Hutt 53. So to indemnify Sheriff for taking property on my execution at my direction - 2 Pow Con 177-8.

Where a public right is obstructed or violated (18) to the injury of an individual, he may maintain the action. Ex. 100. But he must state & show special damage.

Ex. Plff as an inhabitant of a certain place, had a right to pass a ferry toll free. ferryman refused to carry him. He brought his action stating the common right, but not laying special damage. Action lay not. Sal 12. 5 Co 72-3
Caith 193.

So if a public nuisance occasions private damage, he may recover vs the author of the nuisance. Ex. Obstruction in a highway. Bull 26. Caith 194. 451. But if the party damaged, might have avoided

Traps on the Case Ex Delictis.

the damage by reasonable or ordinary care, he can not recover - 11 East 68. Bull 26 con.

To it lies for injuries received from nuisance in general. Abstracting ancient lights - 9 Co 58. 3 Bl 216. 1 Vent 239. But it is said they must have stood time immemorial. Popk 170. Cro & 118. Sal 459 & Mod 116. Now however long enjoyment (as for 20 years) is sufficient ground for presuming an ancient grant. Esp 636-2 Samsd 175 a & t n 1 Des & Put 405. 1 East 372. 2 Con: R 597-8. (In such case viz 20 years uninterrupted enjoyment or) the jury are bound to presume such a grant.

Enjoying rights 20 years as the tenant of an adjoining premise, will not conclude the landlord, without evidence of his knowledge of the fact. 11 East 372.

How far is the privilege of ancient lights recognized in this country? No adjudged case here. I believe see 2 Con: R 597-8.

If a man having built a house on his own land, sells it, neither he, nor any person claiming under him, may erect any building that will stop its lights tho' they are not ancient. It would be in derogation of his own grant. Esp 636. 1 Lev 122. 1 Con: 2. 14 - 1 Vent 237-9 (I. G. raised a Qu. If the above doctrine is ever enforced in this country it must be with restrictions -

421

Trespass on the Case Ex Delictis.

But obstructing prospect is not actionable a matter of pleasure or fancy merely. 3 BL 217. 9 Co 58. Esp 636.

A house built near a street, is on the street side, immediately entitled to the privilege of an ancient mesuage: (19)
Lent (6 Esp 636-) Ergo, action lies for raising the street - so as to obstruct the windows - 3 Wils 461 - 2 BL 924. Builder not improvident, in this case, as when he builds by another's land.

One recovery of damages for a nuisance is no bar to another, for subsequent damages - Esp 637. Cro E 191 - 2 Leo 103 - Every continuance of it is a new wrong, or the repetition of the original one.

So the author of a nuisance does not discharge himself, by leasing or assigning from actions accruing after the assignment or the lease Sal 460. Cro J 373. Esp 637 - He remains liable for all the injurious effects, of his own illegal act -

So too in the last case, the action lies on the assignee or lessee if the continuance occasions a new injury. Esp 637. Cro J 373. 555 Hyer 250 - Secus - where the whole injury is done by the first erection -

For obstructing ancient lights, action lies both in favor of Lessee for years, & reversioner (20)

Trespass on the case ex delicto -

= signer: for it is an injury both to the inheritance & present enjoyment.

6 Esp 635-7. 4 Burr 2141- Cio C 325. or 237-
11 East 372.

So this action lies for overhanging Plff's house or land, so as to cast water up-
= on it 30 E 216. 3 N. B 184- 1 Roll 157. 1 Com 213- 2 Roll 140. 5 Co 101- Esp 637- Str 634
So for erecting spout &c (Str 634. ut ante 4) 2u. Whether for the spout's barely hanging over action would lie. If owner wished to build & spout was in the way, action would lie -

So for obstructing a right of way over another's land - Esp 639. Cio C 84. 400- Cio P 170. And such right may be presumed from long & uninterrupted usage - Esp 640. Bull 74- Str 909. 11 East- 372-5.

In Con^t. one acquires a right of way over another's land by 15 years uninterrupted use - This is a corporeal right derived from the statute of limitations (as 20 years in Eng^d gives a right to really). Right of way is said to have been presumed in favor of the public from a use of 6 years 11 East 376 2 1 Camp 280.

So, for erecting a manufacture &c & the vapor of which injured Plff's house or Esp 638. 1 Roll 89. Cio C 191-30 E 217. As a smelting house - action lies.

So for infecting the air about one's house or land so as to render it un-

Trespass on the Case Ex delicto.

= healthful. 6th Dig 637. 9 Co 59 a 1 Com
214. 2 Roll 141. (p 8)

So for turning an ancient water course
from A's land, or mill 6th Dig 648. 641 -
1 Wils 174. 4 Co 84. 1 Str 5. 6 East 208 2 Sw. 86-7
10 East 535. (2 Con. R 93-84. I think this case
wrong in principle & strongly contested it - a
one of the judges. he says if A has enjoyed
the use of a stream for 20 years. B may
erect a mill above on his own land. he -
= cause he never has acquiesced in A's use.
- joinder. the country might have been wild)

But a right adverse to the original, or
natural one, may be acquired by 20
years uninterrupted & adverse user. or in
15 years in Con. 4 Day 244 - 6 East 288.
1 St. & Pul 400. 1 Camp 463 - 10 Johns 241 -
3 Caines 307. 8 Mass 136. 15 Johns 213 - 1 Con. R
382. 2 do 584 - If one has used a stream
uninterrupted for 20 years - those below can
have no action to him -

Injuries affecting persons, as standing in
relation to others, of husband, parent, ma-
ster are remediable by this action - They
have been treated of under the title of
the domestic relations - 6th Dig 644 - 5-6 -
Case of Husband (Ball 78. Cro 9 581-538)
of Parent (3 Wils 18. 3 Burr 1874 - 2 Str 166 -
2 Day 1032) Of master (2 Sarrns 169. 5 N
B. 390. 2 Lev 68. Camp 45. 2 Old R 383. 3 Burr
1345. (See Domestic Relations) -

"misfeasance in the exercise of office."

21)

The actions brought in these cases have been in form, *trespass vi et armis* - but they are substantively actions on the case - Esp 645. 2 G.R. 107. See 206. 2^d Ray 1032. Best 307. (p. 3) "Hunt & Wife" 65. Parent & Child 115.

For other personal injuries: If a legal voter tenders a vote, & the returning officer refuses to accept it. case his or him - Esp 647. See 19. 3 Sal 17 - So a candidate for an elective office, may have this action vs the returning officer, if the latter refuses to take & count his votes. Esp 646. 2 Vent 25. 1 Term 206 - 2 Lev 50. 3 T.R. 26-32 -

So returning officer is liable to this action, in favor of the candidate, for making a false return of the votes at an election. Esp 647. 11 Co 99 -

22)

But it is holden that it lies not for a false return of a member of parliament, unless the right is determined in parliament, in favor of p[er]son. or cannot be determined, as in case of disqualification (Sal 502. 6 Mod 45-9 - Denim 17013 127. & 2m Esp. 647. Because the legislature has the ultimate & paramount right to decide upon the election of its own members - But 2m. is this a sufficient reason? I think not - Has not the candidate an absolute right to a trial of the question by jury? Besides, how could the decision of the legislature be binding upon the Court? or upon the parties?

Trespass on the Case ex delicto.

to the action? It is vis inter alios acta.

The Eng.^l Stat. on this subject gives double damages & costs (7-8. W. III.

So it lies vs an officer at Com: Law for making a false return to a mandamus - Esp 648. Bull 82. 3 BL 111 - But not now in Eng.^l since the Stat. of 9 of Ann. if damages are recovered on the writ of mandamus (p 12) "Mand.^s"

So, an Author may at Com: Law maintain this action, vs such as publish his works without his permission 4 Burr 2303

*. The copy right is now secured under certain limitations by Stat. of U. S. (See Stat. of U. S. Tit. "Improvements")

* (Most elaborate of any case to be found in the books - This action lay in Eng.^l for publishing notes taken by Student from oral lectures) -

So for violating the patent-right, it lies vs the violator in favor of the patentee. But the patent must be good in Law. Defendant may deny that Plff is the original inventor - Esp 648. Sal 447. Bull 76-8-9 - 1 DR 882. (As to what patentee must prove in support of his patent, see the authors just cited -

Cognizance of the question now confined to the federal courts (i.e. U. S. courts) not as formerly (vid. U. S. St. *supra*) -

Obstruction in the Case of Delicts -

231.

2^d law for obstructing process; If an officer is prevented by a stranger from executing process, as by locking the door, case lies for the p^lty in the process. N. Haven County. See Sec 698. & Sec 699. Obstruction must be in nature of violent obstruction -

3^d In declaring in special actions on the case no precise form of words is necessary, as there is in formal actions Gilt 2 193. 10th 541 - arg^o. All the actions treated of under this title are special actions on the case.

As to the actions pursued by a man against his wife, daughter & child, Mass. & Genl. - Finis -

Writ of Mandamus.

11

This is a prerogative writ issuing in Eng^d. from the Chancery and in some degree in its effect to the specific relief afforded in Chancery 3 Bl 10 - It may issue from Chancery always (Sal 429 - 1 Vern 175) But the right is now exercised only by the Chancery. (It is called "prerogative writ" as emanating from the high prerogative jurisdiction of the Court, which issues it.)

It is granted only in those cases which relate to the government or the public, & when without it there would be a failure of justice 3 Bac 527 - Bony 506 & Mod 281 -

Its object is to enforce obedience to the acts of the legislature & in Eng^d. to the King's charter; & to prevent disorders from a failure of duty, or a defect of police, i.e. from omission of duty injurious to the public - or the administration of justice - 3 Barn 1267. It issues only in those cases in which there is no ^{other} specific remedy - Generally not granted where there is any adequate remedy by action Bony 506 p 4. 1 W 148. Corp 377 -

The writ may in some cases be granted by the State Court, as it probably may in each of the U.S. by the highest court of ordinary jurisdiction, in the State -

12

The special object of the writ is generally to restore a person to some corporate or other franchise, or right which concerns the public or the administration of justice, & of which he is deprived, or to admit a person to the same rights &c. 6 Ch 60. 11 Co 93. 3 Bac 529 -

Writ of Mandamus.

The writ issues vs some public officer - body corporate - or inferior court: commanding a performance of some official or corporate duty
3 Bac 528. 4 Mod 52 -

It is a writ demandable of right, & the Court of B.R. is bound to grant it, without imposing terms - 3 Bac 528.

It issues to compel officers of corporations, to call meetings - to hold elections &c when by Law it is their duty & they neglect to do it. Str 1003 1157. 1 Lev 91 - 1 Ray 69 - Est 602 -

So to restore a person to every description of corporate office of which he is unlawfully deprived Est 601 1 Ray 431 - 1 Sal 14 - Ex If town clerk, constables &c should be illegally deprived of their offices 1 Vent 77 - 4 Burr 1999. Poph 176 -

So generally to command persons in authority (3) to do their duty - Ex to the judge of an inferior court to proceed to judgt. Str 113 - 2 Keb 871 - 3 Bac 535. b - to Ecclesiastical C^t (Court of probate in Con^t.) to grant probate of a will or administration to whom it belongs - Est 602 - 3 Bac 534 Carth 457 Sal 299 Str 552 -

It lies vs a clerk of a corporation, requiring him to deliver up the books &c. to his successor, on his being removed from office - & refusing to deliver them - Est 603 - 6 G. 2 Str 879 1 Wils 305 (Jedediah Strong's case)

Not fixed by any very definite general rule

Writ of Mandamus.

What offices concern the public - or adminis-
-tration of justice - & to which one may claim
to be restored - or admitted by the writ. The
writ has been much extended in modern
times 3 Bac 529. Decided that a Mayor -
Alderman, Common Councilman, Town-clerk
Constable - Sexton, in Eng^d parish clerk & some
others are entitled to it - 3 Bac 530. 1 Co 94 -
2 Bulst 122. Noy 78. 1 Vent 143 - 153 - 5 Ray 211 -
2 Sid 112 - 1 Roll 535. Sal 175. Comp 371 - 377.

So it lies to restore one to the place of Atty -
in an inferior Court (3 Bac 530. 1 Lev 75 - 1 Keb
549 1 Vent 11) as to our County Court -

The officers in these cases must be of a certain
permanent nature. Therefore an Officer con-
-cerns an establishment or institution depending
on voluntary subscriptions, not-endowed, is not
entitled to it - Ech 665. 120 B 11 - 17 R 331 - 4 do 125.
Ex. Private library company, freemason's so-
ciety &c

But the officer need not be freehold. It is
sufficient that it is an annual officer, & has
been annexed - Ech 666 - 17 R 146 - This rule ex-
-tends the writ to all our public officers in Court.

It lies in Court to command a county treasurer
to pay money to a County Creditor. For a
County not being a corporation is not suable
at Com. Law. So to command Justices to lay
a County tax

Where the officer is merely of a private nature
the writ will not be granted - Ex. In Eng^d.

the office of Steward of Court Baron 666-15240
170ent 143- In Cont. offices of private companies
as library companies &c would fall under the descrip-
- tion of private offices - As to turnpike com-
- panies incorporated, the grant of incorpora-
- tion being analogous to the King's Charters
& of public concern; the writ would probably
lie for their officers - 3 Bac 528 n - So probably
for the officers of a Bank -

The writ never goes to enforce an act, by a
Court: magistrate &c when it is uncertain
whether he has by Law, a right to do it -
666-1701b 265-

Nor when there is another specific legal remedy (5)
Ex - It goes not to a Bank to compel a transfer
of stock; For Case lies - or in particular
cases, a Bill in Equity. 666-1701b 506

It never is granted to compel a court or magis-
- trate &c to do an act, when the doing of it is
discretionary (666-1701b 881- 2 BCR 708) as to ad-
- journ or continue a cause, or to grant a new
trial -

If several are deprived of franchises, officers &c
each must have a separate mandamus -
They can not join; for the wrongs are distinct
& the causes may be different - 666-1701b 9. Sal
443 - Bull 200 - As in case of several alder-
men of the same city.

As to the mode of granting the writ; It is not
usually granted in the first instance though
it sometimes is - The usual mode is by Rule

Writ of Mandamus.

to show cause (6 Ch 69) & this rule is not granted -
= ed but on affidavit of the party applying -
30ae 528. Rule 199-200 - 3BC 111 -

But under pressing circumstances it will issue
in the first instance on motion - 6 Ch 69
Lancaster's 100. Or to sign a poor rate in Eng^d.
It is "general cases" i.e. cases of necessity where
the probable ground is manifest. 3BC 111 -

1) - It is never granted till there has been a de-
= fault - It goes not to prevent a default, in
the first instance 6 Ch 69. Rule 199 -

The writ is directed to the person whose duty
it is to perform the act commanded - 6 Ch 872
Sal 433-6. It is to be delivered to him, & he must
at his peril do the act - or return sufficient
reason for not doing it - return to be in writ-
= ting - because in the nature of a plea to
the writ.

When the act ought to be done by a part of
a corporation aggregate it may be directed
= ed to the whole corporation, or to that
part which is to do the act but not ex-
= clusively to any other part - 6 Ch 673. Sal 699
- 701 - Str 55.

When sufficient cause is shown the writ is
not shown under the rule to show cause
the writ itself issues; at first in the alter-
= native - To do the act or show sufficient
cause for not doing it - 3BC 111 -

2) - If the Writ returns a true & sufficient reason

Writ of Mandamus.

he is excused, and at Com: Law the return could not be traversed - but case lay for false return - 62k 648. 3 Bae 543 - 2^d Ray 481. (our courts have adopted the reason of this Stat -) Trub: on Case: 12 -

And if the complainant prevails either by verdict or otherwise - on the pleadings: he may recover his damages & costs. But if he thus recovers on the writ of Mandamus he is barred of his action for a false return. 1st 9 Ann c 20 s 2 & 3 - Vol 12 p 190 -

Since this Stat - if the return is false (which is a question to be tried by the Jury) the party injured has a peremptory mandamus (i.e. a peremptory order to do the thing required) 3 BL 111 - 62k 648.

So if the return is insufficient upon the face of it, a peremptory mandamus issues both at Com: Law & under the Stat. No issue to the jury is there necessary - 3 BL 111 62k 645. Bull 201 -

Before the Stat of 9 of Anne the only remedy for a false return was an action on the case i.e. the return could not be falsified in the proceedings on the mandamus - 62k 648. 3 BL 111 - 11 Co 99 - And if the false return were made by several, the action might have been by all or any it being for a tort - 62k 105. 3 Bae 544. Carth 171 - 2 - And the action lay for suppression veri in the return (Bony 144) as well as for a position false: - hood -

Writ of Mandamus.

But if any one of the several persons sued voted vs the false return & was overruled, no recovery can be had vs him. - Ech 685. Carth 72. 2^o Ray 504 -

1) At Com: Law, if the return is falsified in the action on the case, a peremptory mandamus issues of course. - Ech 686. 3 Bae 544 Sal 430. It provides the action is in the same court by which the writ of mandamus was issued. For the falsity of the return thus appears from the record of that court - as in BR in Eng? or Sup Ct in Con^t.

But if the action is in a different court the truth of the return must be tried, by an issue joined for that purpose (Sal 428. Ech 686 ante) after recovery on the action: But the record in the action is conclusive I suppose upon the issue -

If after peremptory rule to return the writ, no return is made, an attachment issue for contempt. - 3 Bl 111 - 3 Bae 451-2 Sal 429 434 - Ech 685. And if the writ was by several the attachment must go vs all tho' some would have made a return. - 5th 808. Con^t - contempt is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, & in some cases with corporal or infamous punishment. - 3 Bl 287 - Cro C 146. * Those however who would have obeyed the rule, will not be punished under the attachment. -

If the party to whom the writ is directed fails in respect to the court, in his return, he is punishable for contempt by attachment. - 3 Bl 111 -

Writ of Prohibition.

1)

This is a prerogative writ issuing generally from B.C. to prevent inferior courts from deciding cases out of their jurisdiction. 3 BL 112 - 4 Bac 240 4 Com 487 - F.A.B. 39 - 40 12 Co 6 - & 279 or to prevent them from deviating in the mode of their proceedings from any regulations prescribed by Stat - 2 H BL 100.

It may also in some cases issue out of Chancery - Common Pleas - Exchequer 3 BL 112 - 10. 20 476 - Hob 15 - Palm 523 - 4 Bac 241 - 12 Co 58 - 4 Com 487 1 H BL 476 -

It is directed to the inferior court & the party prosecuting in it; & is founded on a suggestion that the cause itself or some collateral question arising in it, is out of the inferior courts jurisdiction - 3 BL 112 or that the Court is deviating ut supra.

The mode of obtaining a prohibition is by writ to show cause why or to in many instances affidavit must be made that the cause or question is out of the inferior courts jurisdiction. After when that fact appears from the face of the declaration filed in of the inferior court - 4 Bac 244 10. 20 476 - Sal 547 - Holt 593 - Hob 79 - L^d Ray 1211 -

2)

Whether the awarding prohibition is ex debito iustitiae or discretionary, authorities are contradictory. Buller's opinion said to be that it is discretionary - 4 Bac 242 Hob 67 5 Ray 3. 4 - Sid 65 Sal 33 - L^d Ray 220 578. 586 - 5 Ray 92 (Madd R 24 - Madd Eq. 13-14 not discretionary)

Writ of Prohibition.

It lies in some instances, where the inferior Court has jurisdiction of the cause - Ex When a Stat. has been passed regulating the proceedings in such a cause & the inferior Court deviates from those regulations - This case & the case of a want of jurisdiction are said to be the only ones in which a prohibition can issue 2 N D C 100.

For the purpose of obtaining the writ the party aggrieved in the Court below, sets forth upon Record in the Court above, a "suggestion" containing the nature of the cause of his complaint 3 B C 113 - upon which a rule is granted in the inferior Court & adverse party to show cause p 1 -

If the matter "suggested" in support of the rule is sufficient the writ issues - 3 B C 113.

Aliter if it is insufficient - The writ commands the Court below not to hold plea & the adverse party not to prosecute 3 B C 113 -

But if the sufficiency of the cause suggested is doubtful, or presents a question of difficulty; the party complaining is directed to declare in prohibition - 3 B C 113 - 4 B C 248. Cro E 736 -] i.e. to prosecute an action by filing a declaration vs the opposite party upon a fictitious avowment not traversable that the latter has prosecuted in disobedience of a prohibition, before granted; The writ has in fact been granted - Barnes Notes 148. 7 N D 44 - 1 Lev 125 & Mod 151-2 Cro E 736 - 4 B C 248. This is done for the purpose of having the question more deliberately & solemnly

Writ of Prohibition -

considered than on motion - or which the proceedings are summary.

- 3). The decision must follow the suggestion the action is then regularly proceeded with, as if the petition, allegation were true - & the question of the sufficiency of the cause alleged is tried upon the pleadings in the action. If the cause suggested & alleged is adjudged sufficient, judgment with nominal damages is given for Plff - & a prohibition issues to the Deft - the inferior court commanding them to proceed no further - 3 BL 113-14 4 Bac 248.

If insufficient judgment is for Deft & a writ of consultation awarded - i.e. a writ issued upon deliberation or consultation, had. - committing the cause to the inferior court to be there determined notwithstanding the former judicial prohibition - 3 BL 114.

As to a writ of consultation is sometimes granted where there has actually been a prior prohibition or. The party prohibited may take a declaration (pursuing the suggestion) & traverse the fact on which the prohibition was founded - & if the issue is found for him - a consultation is awarded - 3 BL 114. The effect of this proceeding is to revoke the former actual prohibition.

- 4). The Court also of its own mere motion (without any action brought) sometimes awards a consultation, after a prohibition issued. Or when upon further consideration it thinks the suggestion insufficient - 3 BL 114. 4 Com 517.

Writ of Prohibition -

Disobedience to the writ is a contempt, punishable by fine & imprisonment at the discretion of the Court - 4 Bac 262 F.N.B. 40 & 279. 4 DC 287.

It is also contempt to commence a new suit in the same inferior court for the same thing after a prohibition 4 Bac 262. Mod 599. Hen 111.

On the attachment for contempt, the p^lff recovers damages & costs for the other proceedings after the prohibition; & a fine or other punishment is also implied for the public offence 4 Bac 262. Cro C 559. 1 Vent 348. 2 Lev 360. 4 Bac 248 u -

We have a statute vesting the power of granting prohibitions in the Sup C^t. & enabling the Ch^l Justice & 2 Jps^t Justice to do it in vacation - This Stat adopts the Eng. Law on the subject Sta C^t 558.

Finis -

475

Writ of Habeas Corpus.

This is a writ by which, a person restrained of his liberty, may be brought before some superior court, for some special purpose - As either on his own application to be relieved from confinement or to obtain justice, or upon that of some other person, having a right to require his appearance. 3 Bl 129-131. Of this writ the kinds are various -
I. *Ad Respondendum*.

This lies where one has cause of action vs another - confined by process of an inferior court - to remove the prisoner so as to charge him with a new action - in the court above - 3 Bl 129 - 3 Bac 2. 1 Wm 197 c. 249. 2 Mod 198. Not in use here - being unnecessary in our practice.

II. *Ad Satisfaciendum* - This lies where judgt. has gone vs a prisoner; & the plff would bring him up to serve him with process of execution 3 Bl 129 - Not in use here for last reason

III. *Ad faciendum & Accipiendum* - Which lies where a person confined by a process of an inferior court, wishes himself to remove the action to the Sup Court to be there decided - Here his body is removed by Habeas Corp: the proceedings by Certiorari. 3 Bl 130. 3 Bac 245. 1 Mod 235 2 do 198. Frequently called Habeas Corp cum Causa.

This kind of habeas corp: is demandable of course - 2^d. - upon right & without any motion - 3 Bl 130. 2 Mod 336. It instantly supersedes all proceedings in the Court below - & any subsequent proceedings.

Writ of Habeas Corpus:

= *causando* an void an *coram non iudice* -
3 Bac 15. Sal 352. 12 Mod 558.

Not granted (the matter of right) when it would abate a rightful suit; or rather a *procedendo* would be awarded in such case - Ex. J. fine sole being sued in an inferior court - marries & would thus cease - more it - For if proceeds with in the higher court the suit would abate for the non joinder - of the husband - 3 Bac 15. Sal 8. Not in use here - Actions in inferior courts are under our law, removable by appeal when removable at all -

IV. *Ad Testificandum* - When a party ~~who~~ wishes to produce a prisoner as a witness - 3 Bac 3 - 37 Clk 51 - Camp (or Cont) 117 - 48. Kirk 137 -

Formerly holden that this wrought an escape of a prisoner in execution - C. Sid B - 3 Co 44 - 2 Bac 238. See Root 72 - & "Shiff" is not so now -

(3) - But if the Shiff or Gaoler in such case gives the prisoner unnecessary liberty - as to go at large or goes with him in a very circuitous way - it is an escape - 11 Mod 116 - 2 Bac 238. Cro C 14. Hob 202. 3 Co 44 - Shiff &c This strictness held only when prisoner is committed on execution -

Never granted to bring up a prisoner of war - Doug 403 - Over such prisoners the Com. Law have no jurisdiction for such purposes -

479

Writ of Hab: Corp.

They are subject only to the executive go-
= vernment, & must be brought up, if at
all by order of the executive -

There are some other kinds of Hab: Corp:
writs - 3 Bac 2. 3 - But -

V. The principal writ of Hab: Corp: is that
of ad subjiciendum - directed to a person
holding another in custody & commanding
him to produce re to do submit to, & receive
whatever the court or judge shall award -
3 BL 131 - This is a Common Law writ in fa-
= vor of the subject - 1 Burr 631 -

This is the great writ by which release is
obtained, from every species of illegal con-
= finement - 3 BL 131 - Root 92. 3 - And the
Stat- of 16 & 31 of Car II. which give the
full benefit of it to the subject, are regard-
= ed in Eng. as a second Magna Charta -

A person imprisoned by either house of Par- 4)
= liament for Contempt - can not be dis-
= charged by the process (83 R 314) Such in-
= terposition would be an invasion of the
privilege of the Legislature - Rule the
same in this country -

It issues at Com: Law: from B R Chanc?
& by a fiction of privilege or of being a sui-
= cor from C B. & 6 exchequer Cw f 1543 -

3 Barr 856 - 2 Vent 24 - 3 BL 121 - 2 3 Bac 3. 2 Mod
198. 2 Hall 144 - But in case of commitment
for a crime, these two courts could at Com:
Law only take bail for appearance in B R

Writ of Habeas Corpus:-

on remand - 30C 132 - Then having no criminal jurisdiction, could not discharge - But now since the Stat of 10 of Car II. c 10 - the full benefit of this writ may be had (without any fiction lent) in either of these cases - 30C 132 2 Nov 198.

Whether it may issue from Chancery in vacation 2a 30C 132. 3 Bar 3 - 2 Hale 147 - seems not

In Cont. it may be issued by any judge of Sup Ct by the Courts of Com: Pleas, when in session or by the Chief Justice of that Court in vacation 1st of Cont. of 2 do 158 -

It is directed to the Gaoler, or other person detaining to produce the body with cause of his detention - 30C 131 - Gal 250 - 2^d Ray 586 - 518. And the court as the case requires will discharge, admit to bail, or remand - 30C 134 - 5 Nov 22 - 1 Vent 330. 344 -

The great object of this writ is to afford specific relief to all persons, who are restrained of their personal liberty, without lawful cause

51- The Com: Law remedy afforded by this writ - having been evaded by the judges - a Stat was passed (31 Car II.) which in a great measure regulates this writ - 30C 135. 6 - 3 Bar 7-8.

Since this Stat any of the 12 judges may issue it in vacation - 30C 131 - 136 - Cu 9 543 It lies for persons committed by the King or his Council or Secretary of State &c - 30C 135-6 -

Writ of Habeas Corpus:-

By the constitution of the U.S. the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus can not be suspended except when in time of rebellion or invasion the public safety requires it. (Const. of U.S. Art. I § 9) and it must then be done by Congress.

It lies not for persons committed on execution or conviction; & by St. 31 Car II. it is ~~denied~~ denied under special circumstances & restrictions - in case of commitment for treason felony & in certain other cases - 3 Bl 136 - 3 Bac 9 - 10 Mod 429 - Ste 142 -

It lies in favor of children, wards & wives unreasonably confined by parents, guardians husbands - 3 Bac 15. 3 Keb 520 - 2 Lev 128. Ste 982. and the writ may be sued out by the friend of the person confined. Ste 982. 1 Burr 606 - 5 Mod 21 - (2 Lev 120,) Burr 631. 1362 -

Disobedience to the writ punished as a contempt 3 Bac 10 - F. N. D. 68 - 12 Mod 666 - Fines -

Quo Warranto.

This writ lies as any one, who usurps an office, of franchise, without right - or exercises one which he has forfeited. 3 Bl 262 - 2 Inst. 282 -

The proceeding in modern times, is usually by information filed, in B R by the Attorney General - a criminal proceeding - the writ being now disused 3 Bl 263 -

The effect of this proceeding is the removal of the usurping incumbent by a judgment of ouster & It.

See for the proceedings, the authorities *supra* + B R Abr. ("Quo Warranto")
Com - same title - Finis -

Bills of Exceptions.

487

A bill of exceptions is a statement of facts occurring on trial & of some interlocutory judgment founded on them annexed to the record - (facts not originally appearing on record or in Pleading.) called Bill of Exceptions because it contains exceptions to the interlocutory judgment. 30 L C 372. 1 Bos Ab. 325. 9 Co 136. 4 Bos 136. All decisions by the Judge upon any point of law is an interlocutory judgment. Change by the Judge to the Jury - is a judgment within this rule.

Bills of Exceptions were introduced into Eng^d by Statute Westminster 2^d. they were not known at Am. Law. 1 Bos 325. 30 L 372 - 9 Co 13. Dull N A 315. 1 Feb 324 (Kirk 168) - 2 Inst 426. This Stat. of Westminster is probably adopted either by the C^o of Justice or by some legislative act in most of the States in the Union. when taken.

A Bill of Exceptions cannot be taken except in a Court from which a writ of Error lies. as its object is to found a writ of Error & consequently it can be filed only in a Court of Record.

Dull. 316. 1 Bos 327.

But it may be filed in all those courts whose judgments are liable to be reviewed on writ of Error. as in C. P. H. B. Court of Exchequer &c - not in Chancery then - not C^o of Record. 1 Bos 326. 2 Show. 287. 147. Dull 316. 2 Lev 237. Skin 356. 2 Show 287. 147.

In this State it may be filed in Superior Court - County Court or Justice C^o. - Some doubt as to Justice Courts - (Kirk 289) Why? -

Bills of Exceptions.

For what cause.

Some cases in which Bills of Exceptions may be filed have been mentioned under former titles. 'Pleading'. Overruling an offer to demur to evidence.

1 Bac 326. 9 Co. 136. Cro C 249. or 341. 4 Bac 136.

Again. the Bill may be filed for a misdirection by the Judge in point of Law to the Jury, 1 Bos & Pul. 564-5. 2 NDL 288. 1 NR 1-

But the usual remedy for a misdirection by the Judge is a motion for a new trial.

If evidence is admitted or rejected, & the decision is erroneous - a Bill of Exceptions may be filed

1 Bac 326. 2 Lev 237. Bull 316. But such a mistake is more often remedied by a motion for a new trial

But if the Judge admits a party's evidence a Bill of Exceptions will not be allowed because he did not instruct the Jury how to find on that Evidence for there is no Interlocutory Judgment in the Case: i.e. a decision on a point of Law

Nay 405. 1 Bac 326. Bull 316.

If Oyer is refused to a party who is entitled to it. he may file a Bill of Exceptions for this cause. the advantage is usually taken by entering oyer on the Record as a plea "Pleading" 105. So, if ordered when it ought to be refused.

Bills of Exceptions.

491

Again. when a Judge allows or overrules a challenge to a Juror. the mistake is a good ground for a Bill of Exceptions.

tho' often remedied by motion for new trial. For this also is a point of Law, & if incorrect may be objected to. 1 Bac 325. Eyer 231. Ray 486. 2 Inst 427. Pleas'r 105.

But on an interlocutory judgment or order relating to mere practice, & which does not involve any principle of Law. a Bill of Exceptions cannot be taken. - thus if he compels a party to plead within a certain time, if he orders security for costs or refuses to order on motion &c.

Rule - when a decision of any kind is discretionary with the Court, a Bill of Exceptions will not lie for that cause. for a point of Error. would not

The granting or refusing of a new trial is no ground for Error. - Again the imposition of terms on him who moves for a new trial. Of these Error is not predicable.

Ball 316. 1 Bac 327. 1 Root 290.

The Court can not arbitrarily grant a new trial, (tho' it may refuse one) & if it does. - or if it is granted by a Court which has no power of granting it in any case, it is ground of Error.

In prosecutions for Treason or Felony a Bill of Exceptions can not be allowed. the reason assigned (which J. G. does not think the correct one) is that the Judge is of counsel for the prisoner, & must see that Justice is done him.

Bills of Exceptions.

But this is surprising - as the Bill is always founded on a supposed mistake of the C.^t. 1 Sid 84. 1 Lev 18. 1 Keb 324. Ray 486. Keeling 15. 2 Mc Neal. 80. 325.

True reason is that such cases are not within the purview of the Stat. West 2^d. & because in prosecution for Treason or Felony there can not be at C. L. a new trial -

"No man shall be twice punished for the same offence." & "No man shall be twice put in jeopardy for of his life for the same offence." are 2 maxims of the Com: Law - May not a Bill be filed for the use of the prisoner - How far Bills of Exceptions are allowed on indictments for mere misdemeanors appears not to be clearly settled -

1 Bac 325. 2 Hawk 428. 1 Leon 5. 1 Vent 386. Bull 316. Keeling 15. 1 Mc Neal 326-7. Ray 486. 1 Sidrop 55. It has always been allowed in England on indictments for mere trespass or breach of the peace. (1 Leon 5. 1 Bac 325.) for the Defendant - for he is often entitled to a motion for new trial - but the prosecutor never can except in one particular instance See "New Trials".

Regularly when a Bill of Exceptions is allowed, the Court will not suffer the party to move in arrest of Judg^t. on the point on which the Bill was allowed 1 Bac 327 2 Lev 237. 1 Vent 386. 2 Johns 117. & the party's remedy is by his writ of Error. i.e. on the points bro't upon the Record by the Bill -

But this rule has sometimes been dispensed with in H. B. Bull 316-17.

Confined to Specific points -

As the object of the Bill is to draw before a

Bill of Exceptions.

495

higher Court the judge. on some collateral point it is regularly not allowed to embrace in a Bill of Exceptions the whole merits of the case. The Rule therefore is that a Bill containing a general statement of the whole facts & arguments in the cause is inadmissible. tho' sometimes practised.

Bull 316. Morgan's Op. 465. 8 Term R 549.
Comp 161. 1 Bl R 555. 2 Sw 276.

And if the Court below allow such a general Bill the Court above will quash the Bill of Error.
1 Bl R 555. Comp 161. Dist 77. 339. 454.

Now certified.

As to the mode of stating & authenticating this Bill. I observe that it is authenticated in Eng^d by the signature of the Judge. & it is certified by the Judge's appearing in the Court above & acknowledging his seal. & then for the first time it becomes part of the Record.

1000 & Sub 32. Comp 161. 1000. 325-6.

In Cont. The Bill becomes part of the Record in the Court below & is exemplified with the rest of the Record.

The Bill must contain a statement of the Interlocutory Judgment & of the facts on which that Judgment was founded. & if the facts are truly stated, it is the duty of the Judge below to certify it. if the statement is not true he is not bound to certify it.

Dec 326. Bull 316.

If the Judge below refuses to certify a

Bill of Exceptions

correct Bill - the Stat of Wilm. 2^d provides a writ compelling him to sign it.

Bac 326. 1 Lev 237. Bull 316. Comp 161-2. Show 116.

In this State the Bill is certified by the presiding Judge (if more than one) or by the Judge if there is but one.

A motion for a new trial is not so remedial as a Bill of Exceptions as the former is discretionary the latter strictly just.

When to be tendered -

In the English practice the Bill must be tendered or the substance of it reduced to writing - at the trial i.e. during same term. Bull 315. Sal 288. Holt 341

In Con^t. The party must give notice or move to file a Bill at the time the cause comes & the Bill itself must be filed within 24 hours after verdict. (if trial by jury) or of judgment of Court. It must be presented before the end of the term i.e. before Court rises. West 569. 575. 2 Sw 276. In computing the 24 hrs Sunday is excluded - 'his dominicus non est iudicium'. Vid. Rules of Sup. Ct. 3 day 28-9.

A Bill of Exceptions is no supersedeas of the Judgment but merely enables the party to obtain a supersedeas by writ of Error. Bac 327. 12 Mod 609.

Outline of Con^t. Bill of Exceptions -

(It is a separate instrument or writing.)
Begins thus. Litchfield Co. ss. County Court

Bills of Exceptions.

499

Such a time such a year N.D. or C.D.
Return - Lett Plea Not Guilty.

On the trial of the said cause to the
jury on the aforesaid issue the ~~plea~~ offered
in evidence such a witness to prove such
a fact to the admission of which evidence
the ~~plea~~ objected - & (stating grounds -)
but that the Court overruled objection.
to which decision he now excepts & prays
the Court to certify this his Bill of Exceptions
that it may become part of the Record &c -

This Bill when it becomes a part of the
Record is a foundation for a writ of Error.
In Eng.^o it is no part of the Record in the Court below
1 B. & C. 32, nor till certified in the Court above.

Writs of Error.

13. A writ of Error is a commission to the Judges of
a higher Court, to examine the Record on which a judg.^t
has been given in a Court below, & to affirm or reverse it
according to Law. 2 Bac 187. 3 DC 407. Term 25. 2 Inst 40.
Heir. 209.

In Eng.^o the writ of Error does not summon the ~~def~~
in error to appear &c. He is summoned by scire facias ad
audiendum errores. 2 Bac 215. 207. 3 DC Appx n. 3 p. 21.
(last head) Secus in Conn.^t 2 Ins. 276.

In Conn.^t it is an original writ summoning the
def^t in Error to appear - to hear the original
record, & the errors assigned &c. & contains the
assignment of errors.

Writ of Error.

When writ of Error is founded on a mistake in the legal opinion of the Ct. below it is founded on some point of law appearing on the record. As if ~~the~~ -

But not to rectify an Error in the determination of facts, or weighing of Evidence.

2 Bac 187. 3 Bl 407. Civ & 233. Ry 35. Leon 233. 5 Com 286. 1 Roll 746. Owen 142.

The term "Writ of Error" without further description usually means - an ^{one} Error founded on an error apparent on the Record 2 Bac 187. 3 Bl 407

But there are writs of Error founded on errors in fact - i.e. on errors not apparent on the Record below. See infra 14. 15 &c -

3 Bl 407. 2 Bac 187.

If on a judgment of reversal the Plaintiff in Error can recover any thing in the nature of debt or damages or land it is then considered as an action - because there is a judgment quod recuperet - for by the reversal of the judgment below it is apparent that Plaintiff in Error

And a Release of all actions will bar such a Writ of Error.

If the Cause is one which entitles Plaintiff to reversal of Judgment & costs below it is not considered as an action & of course a release will not bar it - Co. Lit 288. b. 2 Bac 187. 225. 8 Co 152. 1 Roll 788. 2 Roll 405.

Coram Vobis.

There is however another species of writ of Error founded on matter of fact - before the record -

This lies to Courts of Error capable of trying the questions of fact - as D. R. but not to others, as the Exchequer Chamber (that C. has no jury)
 'Pleading' 31. 39. 'Parent & Child' 63. Cro J 5. 1 Vent 207
 2 Lev 38. 2 Bac 215.

Or it may be brought in the Court in which the original judgt. was rendered - & then it is called a "writ of coram vobis"

Ex. Judgt. of feme covert alone - or of Infant appearing without guardian or next friend -
 3 Bac 151-7. 4: 39. 2: 148. 217-8. 228. Cath 122. 179. 367.
 Cro J 5. 10. Kirk 114. Sal 400. 2 Roll R 53. 3 Com. 177.
 5: 300. 286. 1 Vent 207. Yelv 58.

This is not strictly writ for an Error of the Court - but consists in an error on some extrinsic fact - In case (sup) of feme covert, Baron & feme may join in a writ of Error to reverse the judgt. & then before the C. that renders it or a higher one - In case of Infant (sup) Court on information will appoint a Guardian ad litem

So, if Pff or Dep is dead when judgt. is rendered (15)
 4 Bac 143. 2: 218. Ray 59. 5 Com 286. Kirk 232. Cath 338-9.

If Dep returns that the original party is alive he may come in, & plead "in nullo est erratum".

Writs of Error.

Carth 339. "Pleading" death of parties".

So, if the Judge who gave judgt. was interested in the cause. 3 Com 177. Str or Sty A 639.

So if one dies, & recovers as Executor of I. S. I. B. being alive, Semb. 3 Str 129. Compare with 5 Com 177. 1 Roll 744. A writ of Error will lie to reverse the judgt. either before a higher Court or Coram Robis. The same of I. S. as such. I have no doubt judgt. in this case may be reversed in both ways. Post 18.

A writ of Error will not lie on any judgt. of a Court not of Record (for it is founded on the Record) (2 Bac 194.) as County Court in Eng? Co. Lit 288 b.

Hence in Eng? it lies not on any decree or sentence of Chancery - 2 Bac 194. 5 Com 289. 1 Roll 744. Dull 235. For this is not a Ct. of Record. The remedy in Eng? is by appeal to the house of Lords -

But on a judgt. given in the petty bag office, in Chancery it does lie in B. R. For this Court proceeds according to the Com: Law & is a Ct. of record - 3 Bl 48-9. 2 Bac 194. 1 Roll 744. Dy 315. Mo 570.

It lies on a judgt. of non-suit - Dy 92 a. Str 285. 1 Roll 744. 174 DC 432. In this last case the judgt. must appear I conclude on a bill of exception - (But not on a voluntary non-suit.) So also on a judgment by default 2a?

In Conn: by Stat: Error lies on a decree or sentence in Chancery, as on judgt. rendered by Courts of Law. Stat. Conn: -

To an judg^t of County Courts & of single magis-
= trates (36) to Sup^r Court. And from judg^t of
Superior Court. to Supreme Court of Errors.

As was observed (ante 13. 14) this writ lies. In
matter of Law apparent on the face of the
Record & matter of fact - not thus apparent.

Still, Assigning Error in Law & in fact together (16)
is ill - 2 Bac 217-8. 5 Com 300. Pl^{am} 3 B15. 10 Mod 741.
1 Sid 147. Leon 105. Ray 231. 1 Vent 252. For they re-
= quire diff^t trials - matters of fact - by jury.
of Law - by the Court. 2 Bac 217-8. Yelo 58. Sid 93.
Ray 59. This fault is in the nature of duplicity

But tho' matters of fact & of law are blended in
the assignment of Error, yet if left in Error
pleads "in nullo est erratum in records" he loses
the advantage of the double assignment, & that
plea gen^{ly} confesses the error in fact, or rather
= in the fact assigned for error, (for there is room
for but one trial & perhaps not that for the
confession may preclude the necessity of it)
2 Bac 209. 218. Earth 338. g. 1 Vent 252. 1 Lev 6.
Lat 268. 1 Mod 113. 206. 2 Bac 267. He should demur.

But a general demurrer would reach the
defect tho' it is called duplicity. 2 Bac 218. Earth
338-9. Writs of Error not being within the Stat.
27 Eliz which requires a demurrer for duplicity
to be special - 1 Bac 95.

If the unsuccessful party should assign
Infancy & Conviction both at once, it would be

Writs of Error.

duplicity, for either of them is sufficient to arrest judgment. & on each there should be a distinct issue, as there always must be for every error in fact.

(17) Thus assigning several errors in fact amounts to duplicity. 5 Com. 300. Fitz N.D. 20. See, when several errors in Law are assigned - 5 Com. Plead 315. 30. (Duplicity is not predicable of mere matter of Law as then one issue reaches through the whole record.)

For errors in fact require several distinct answers or issues. but Errors in Law do not. "In nullo est erratum" answers the whole.

If an error in fact be well assigned, it should be traversed (otherwise Def^t in Error cannot prevail) Pleading in nullo est erratum confesses it. 2 Bac 218. 1 Com 303. Gelo 57. 1 Sid 93. Ray 59. 231. Com. Pl.^o 15.

Thus if Pl^{ff} in Error pleads that "he was an infant" Def^t by pleading in nullo est erratum confesses it. (N.B.)

But if it be ill assigned, In nullo est does not confess it. Cro J. 12. 29. 529. Ray 231. 1 Roll 758. 2 Sid. 277. As if the assignment contradicts the record. (part 18. or alleges a fact, not assignable as Error.

Decided by the Sup^r C^t. that assigning with insuff^t errors in Law, error in fact, not assignable does not vitiate the writ. this was on special demurrer. (Hail 27. 30.) In another case on

plea in abatement, founded on the blending of Error in Law & in fact Sup Ct ordered the assignment of the error in fact, to be struck out & reversed for the other. Root 262. 2 Sw. 277.

An assignment of Error in fact; which contradicts (18) the record is not good. 2 Bac 218. 9 - 1 Roll 757. 79 Ex. That the Court did not sit on the day of the date of the judgment. That the Judge died before judgment. So. that Plff in error did not appear when his appearance is entered on the record. Cro C 12. Cro J 518. Thil 154 Hob 204 1 Roll 762. Dy 89. Cro E 469. Ray 231 - 5 Com 301 - Sul 262. 1 Roll 757.

In none of these cases does the plea "in error - to est erratum" confess the assignment. (supra).

General Rule. That the Deft in an action cannot assign for error, what he might have pleaded in abatement in the original action, unless he pleaded in abatement & his plea has been overruled. Carth 124. 65 R 766. 72 R 267. 299. (He is deemed to have waived the advantage) vide "Pleading" division "Abatement".

When error in fact is assigned the proper conclusion of the assignment is with an "averment" hoc paratur &c 1 Bac 412. Carth 367 1 Com 300. Contra Yelv 58. 2 Bac 218. & that the conclusion should be to the contrary. Qu. - What if an issue would be thus formed? Ex. In fancy assigned, Plff can't conclude that for there is no issue. no one has denied that

Writ of Error.

he was an infant. Case in Yelv. cannot be Law.) it should conclude like a special plea in bar with a verification.

Coram vobis. in what cases.

Gen. rule. That for error in fact (ut ante) a writ of Error *coram vobis* lies - 5 Com. 286. 1 Roll 747. 62. Cases of fine court & Infant (ante) Sal 400. 4 Bac 39. 2: 215. 218. 3 Com 177.

So if one dies & recovers judgment as Executor or administrator to D. P. D. P. being alive - 1 Roll 761 - 2 Lev 38. 1 Vent 207. Cro B. 5. (ante 15)

And although it may be carried to a higher Court a *coram vobis* is the most usual way in these cases -

But this rule cannot hold where the Court rendering the erroneous judgment cannot try an issue in fact - as the Exchequer Chamber. It must be brought to the House of Lords -

1191 - But generally if the Error is in Law, a writ of Error *coram vobis* does not lie. Since it would refer the question to the very judges who committed the alleged error. 2 Bac 215. 10r 5 Com. 286. Moore 186. 1 Sid 208. 1 Lev 149. Contra. 1 Roll 749.

Exceptions. When the error is occasioned by the default of the Clerk of the Court, or Sheriff or other Officer of the Court. Roll 746. 3 K. B. 21. Then error *coram vobis* lies for error in Law.

Writs of Error.

Since in these cases, the error does not proceed from any fault or mistake in the Court - it is not an error in the judgment of the Court. If it was the fault of the Court. Error coram vobis would not lie - 5 Com 286. 1 Roll 746. 14. Mo 186.

If the error is in the process error "coram vobis" lies - For this is not an error in the judgment. The judgment being rendered only on the pleadings of which the process forms no part. If therefore the judgment is vitiated by a defect in the process it is not a mistake in the opinion of the Court - 12 Dec 245. 5 Com 286. F. & D. 21. Pepp 181. 1 Roll 746. 16 - Process; what? Vid 306 279 -

At what time to be brought.

Old rule. That a writ of Error tho' brought on an interlocutory judgment could not be brought till final judgment for the party might prevail after an interlocutory judgment against him - 1 Roll 749 -

But in Eng? it seems, it is now settled (20) that the test may be before final judgment - tho' the return day must be afterwards - 2 Dec 199. 1 Vent 255. 3 Feb 308. Latel 133 - 1 Sid 104. 466. 1502 280. Str 807. Com. Annu^{nt} 2 C 4 - 2^d May 1531 -

Thus final judgment may be waived & a writ of Error brot on an interlocutory judgment & I see no harm that can result from this practice

Writs of Error.

by which useless Technical Objections are removed.

In Conn^t. the old rule prevails - (1 Root 181. 290) & our Courts have decided that an agreement of the parties to dispense with final judgment should not supersede the rule - (Conn^t. R.)

By joint parties -

It is a gen^l rule in Eng^d. that where a judgment is joint ag^t several, they all must join in a writ of Error, to reverse it - "New Trials" 50. Carth 367. 1 Roll 747. 5 Com. 290. 2 Bac 198-9. Sty 406. Carth 7. 8. 3 Mod 134 - And if one refuse there must be a summons & severance - For an entire judgment must be reversed in total - or not at all - Inconvenient that each should have a separate writ (10) -

But in Conn^t. the Superior Court, & C^t. of Errors have reversed a judgment as to some of the Defts. & affirmed it as to others. Ex. Where there was a joint judgment ag^t several some of whom were adults & others infants - Reversed quoad the infants only. as they pleased by Attor? Kirk 114 -

But the Com. Law rule is otherwise - 2 Bac 198-9 228. 1 Roll 775. Cro 289. Is not the Com. Law rule the correct one on principle? If the Infants had not been parties the damages might have been much less -

Tho' if the parts of a judgment are separate it may

Writs of Error.

be reversed in part - 1st 189. 2: 808. 4 Burr 2022.
 Thib 116. 1 Root 138. Ex. When costs & damages are
 allowed, where damages only should be
 given, judg^t may be reversed as to the costs -
 & affirmed as to the rest.

So (according to our decisions) if the judg^t is
 severable - Ex. Erroneous as to part of the
 costs, as, where there should be no more costs
 than damages - 1 Root 138.

So if Judg^t tho' not actually separate is se-
 parated by any rule, it may be reversed
 as to part & affirmed as to the residue - 1 Root-
 138. See also C. L.

Who may have the writ -

No person can maintain a writ of error ex-
 cept one who is a party or privy to the original
 judg^t. Thus if the suit regards an estate of
 inheritance his heir, after death of original par-
 ty may maintain writ of error.

The privy must be a person to the subject-
 matter of the suit. As heir of an estate of inheritance
 2 Bl 355. 1 Root 747 - 755. 1 Sid 317. 2 Burr 1454
 1 Leon 201 - 7 Bl 107 - 109.

The Executor &c. where it is personal - as debt or damages.

For law on this point see Title "Evidence"
 42.

And it is a general rule that no person tho' (22)
 a party to the judgment can reverse it or
 a writ of error unless the error was to his advantage
 - age - or a damage to him. Fitz. N.D. 21 -

Hob 70 & Co 39 - § 16 59. 2 Dec 199. - 199: 220 -

If therefore one of several Co. Defs obtains judgment & the others are subjected the former can enter join in a writ of error to reverse it. Those who obtain judgment have been reversed must all join in bringing the writ of error. - Vide Corp 425, 2 Dec 199. Str 892. Rev 210. Hob 70. Str 190. Long 90.

But this rule is not universal. - The prevailing party may himself sometimes maintain a writ of error. This he may do where the error is the fault of the court & "after the manner of judgment" this is allowed for the sake of regularity. (Str 971. Hardec 57. 7 Med 189.) in judgment.

Thus if judgment omits an amendment or a capias - the party for whom judgment is given - may reverse it by writ of error.

So if on a verdict for damages & costs & the judgment is entered for damages only. the prevailing party may reverse it.

2 Dec 220. 5 Co 39 § Co 59 - Henk 211. 1 Roll 759 Feb. 107.

John?

Ans. In cases of this kind the judgment is incomplete. it is in itself defective.

Again - If on a conviction of two defendants in an action de delicto - the whole damages & costs are adjudged against one only - The other - or the party obtaining it - may assign for error.

Feb 107 2. 7 Med 189. Hardec. 57.

And a plff may appear the want of jurisdiction in a Ct. in which he brt the action
2 Cranch 126

When a Supersedeas.

In England the rule formerly was that showing the writ of error to defendt in error operated as a supersedeas of his judgment in the Court below. for 4 days in which time he is to obtain it from the Clerk of Errors. 1 Roll. 492.

2 Bac 210. 2 Keb 129. 1 Vent 255.

But it seems now that the writ is no supersedeas till it has been allowed by Clerk.

172 280. 1 Port & Lel. 478. Jams. 376. 2 Bac 210

By supersedeas is meant a suspension of the right of proceeding party below, to enforce the judgment by final process or execution.

The allowance of the writ is a supersedeas only for 4 days after judgment signed. unless bail in Error is put in within that time - If he does put in bail the supersedeas continues - till writ of Error is determined. otherwise not. 172 280.

The permanent supersedeas then is the effect of putting in bail in Error. which must be put in within 4 days after judgment signed - 172 280.

Bail in Error is put in for the security

Writ of Error.

of Plff below - for the satisfaction of the original
judgt in the event of its being affirmed -

In Eng^d the recognizance of bail in error is
with 2 sureties in double the amount of
the judgt below as it is intended to be
an ample security - It is prescribed
by Stat 3 Jac 1st & by Stat 13. 16. 17. Jac 2^d.

4 Jac 672-3. 1 do 212.

25)

In this State (Conn^t) if a suff^t recogni-
zance with sureties is taken it becomes a
superseas of the judgt & exorⁿ below from
the time of serving the writ on the
defendant in Error. The Recognizance is to
secure all the damages debts costs & interest
due for which consors become liable. 1796 98.
2 Day 307 & 370.

The writ of Error it is said is good (the no superseas) without
bonds - Sed. qn. de hoc. L. 3. conceives it to be reasonable.

In English Practice Executors & Administr^{rs}
when Plffs in Error on a judgt de bonis
testatoris &c may have a superseas on
their writ of Error without putting in bail
4 Jac 672-3. Cro J. 350. (Altho in Conn^t no
difference between them & others.) Not within
Stat 3. Jac II. which requires bail, in order to make the
writ a superseas - In Conn^t.

If a copy of the writ is delivered to the
Officer it becomes a superseas of the
Execution - if he has execution in his hands -

(26)

It is here (Conn^t) subject to a plea in
abatement being in the nature of an origi-
nal writ -

And in 1816 - it was settled that the time
for pleading in abatement of a writ of

error is the same as that allowed for pleading in abatement of an original writ - i.e. by the second opening of the Court on the second day of the term. 2 Day 552 2 Cont. 12 67.

If a writ of error abates or dis-continues thro' the fault of the P^{ty} in Error a 2^d writ of Error. sued out by him is not superseded.

But if a P^{ty} in Error is now sued he can not even have a 2^d writ of Error. Salk 263. 2 Bac 609. 1 Keb 658. 2 Ray 97. Comb 19 393 -

Reason is he abandons his right to complain

But if the writ of Error abates by the act of God - as by death of P^{ty} in Error - or (in Eng^d.) of Chief Justice - the rule is different. (In Eng^d this writ is not subject to plea in abatement - not an original writ) - 1 Keb 658. 686. Yelv 208.

How far amendable.

Writs of Error are not within the Statutes of Jeofails - & Amendments - (Stats enacted to cure or rectify slight mistakes or errors) For the object of these Stats is to affirm the judg^t & guard ag^t its reversal - that of the writ of Error directly the reverse -

But now by Stat 5 Geo 1st a writ of Error -

Writ of Error.

may in England be amended so as to con-
form to the Record on which it is founded
5 Mod 16. 69. Salk 49. Carth 520. Comy D. Amend
2 C 4. 2 Bac 202. 209. n.

A writ of Error does not abate in Eng^d.
by the death of ~~Heff~~ in error but a
Dei: fa: may issue aft^r his representative
(according to subject matter of writ) to
show cause why judg^t. should not be
reversed. ~~Aliter~~ If ~~Heff~~ dies.
This rule must be founded on the statute
4 & 5 Ann.

2 Bac 207. - 9. 1 Vent 34 - Sal 264. Yel 208.
Carth 236. 293 -

(27)

The allowance (we have seen) of a
writ of Error is not stricti juris. it may
sometimes be disallowed. It is to prevent
writs of Error being taken on mere fri-
volous pretences - Allowed by Clerk of Error.

Then. Judge examines Record & if he sees
no ground for writ of Error. he will not
sign it.

Roll 492. 2 Bac 210. 4 do 681. Salk 264. 321.
2 Sw. ^{2d} 277.

See Bill of Exceptions 5. b. "New-Trial" 47.

Debt on judg^t. may be sustained not-
withstanding a writ of Error pending on the
same judg^t. for though the execution is sus-
pended the debt or duty remains.

An erroneous judg^t. is binding until it is
reversed by due course of Law. 1 Roll 742. - 35

77R 458. 370b 345. 1 Lev 153. Ray 100. 8 Co
142. a & b. 1 Root- 176- 2. 2m 490. 2 Dec 211. 22y 32 p 57.
Side 236 - 1 Lev 153. Ray 100. 8 Co 142 a 142 b. Skin 388. r 328
Comy 177-8. Root- 176.

But tho' an action will lie on the original judgment notwithstanding writ of Error yet it is discretionary with Court to stay the proceedings in it till the writ of Error is determined - 28.
27R 78

If a 3^d person obligates himself to pay what shall be recovered in a suit ag^t A.B. & judg^t is recovered ag^t A.B. but a writ of Error is brought by A.B. the 3^d person may plead the pendency of the writ of Error in bar of an action ag^t him on his obligation. because it is not yet ascertained whether he will have to pay any thing - as the suit against A.B. is not determined

274 DE 372.

When Judg^t on exⁿ below is completely executed - as by taking Deft's body in execution & committing him to prison, the writ of Error is not superseded. 4 Dec 670. 7 N.D. 237. 1 Vent 30.

To. if Exⁿ has issued - & property has been seized upon the Exⁿ & sold according to Law, a writ of Error will not affect the validity of the sale. no supersed. 1 Vent 30. (4 Dec 684) Fort.
This is agreeable to

If Ex^r. has issued, & goods are taken & not sold. according to 2 Roll 491. 2 Bac 210-11. 370. the writ is a supersedeas. & the goods are to be restored. But this seems not to be law. For execution when begun must be completed. Yelv S. 4 Bac 084. Cow 255. Park 147. 323. 2^d Ray 990. Cro E 597. 2 Bay 370

All the acts under the Execution have relation to the first. The Execution is indivisible.

(29)

According to our practice. an erroneous judgment, as to the original bail as a final judgment, i.e. the original bail, if not subjected by the first judgment, are not liable on its reversal. 2 Sw. 175-6. Root 567. 2 H Bl 372. analogous. This rule is founded on the construction given to our statute. See in Eng? 10ac 212. Cro 94-5. Stra 419. 526.

If Plff in Error does not assign error, judgment is not affirmed (reversed it certainly cannot be) But the first judgment remains good (i.e. nothing is done upon it) Left in Error there one does not recover costs on the writ. But must resort to the bond. 2 Bac 216. Sid 294. 2 Feb 527.

This rule is not applicable to our practice. Errors are assigned here when the writ issues. In Eng. as I suppose after the return of the "Sci fa. ad audiendum errores".

Writ of Error.

Effect of Reversal.

A reversal of judgt. in some cases overreaches & avoids the proceedings (on the execution) under the original judgt. In others it does not - See Rule page 31.* Ex. If goods are taken on the execution & kept "till reversal, by the of-
- ficer - or if goods or lands are delivered to the creditor at a valuation & judgt. is afterwards reversed - the property is restored to the debt-
in the execution. The Pitt in error - 2 Dec 23-2 370. 1 Roll 77-8. or 778. Feb 179. Cro 246. See 3 Com 177. 3 Leon 89. 3 Mod 325.

* The rule laid down by L^d Coke is that "col-
- lateral things executed" are not reversed on a reversal. "Collateral things executory" are - 8 Co 142 a. b.

But if the Sheriff had sold goods on execution ac- (31)
- cording to Law to a stranger the sale would be valid. This rule supposes that the Sheriff is required to sell them. The Law will not vacate an act authorized & enjoined by itself - Cro 278. Cro 246. 3 Les 89. 2 Dec 23-2 Feb 179. 8 Co 143. Mod 573.

What is the remedy if debt is below? The man recover in damages to the amount of the goods sold
8 Co 143 a. Cro 246.

So too. if on execution escapes & the original judgment is reversed before judgt. aft. Sheriff is executed, the action for the escape is gone by the reversal of the 1st judgt. For "Nul til reversed" may be pleaded to it by the Sheriff.
But if judgt. & exⁿ had been obtained on the Sheriff before the original judgt. was reversed

Writ of Error.

then the jud^t. to him is not reversed by the reversal of the original jud^t. because the collateral thing is executed - the time for pleading and trial record is past. 8 Co 142a. Hamd 38.

But in this case the Plff may be relieved af^t. execution by audita curia. which is a writ relieving af^t. execution -

Cro J 146. 2 Bac 231-2.

But if the Plff has been compelled to pay on the execution, what relief has he, after the reversal of the original jud^t? By Bill in Equity. J.G. knows of no other. *
Maddox Ch 131.

Suppose that on the original judgment prop-
erty has been taken & delivered according
to law at an appraisal into the hands of
the plff in the suit below in satisfaction of
his jud^t. & afterwards the jud^t. below is
reversed. So the property to be restored -
J. Gould thinks that it is. No harm can
be done him. for he is no longer entitled to it -
+ Co 143b. Cro J 246. Feby 179. 108. Brownlow 107-8)

* If this is not the remedy I suppose that plff
below must have a new action - but there
is no such case.

So if as above the Plff in execution has sold
them to a stranger & then the jud^t. is re-
versed. Now, will the vendor hold the
goods. sent rec^d. for he must look to
the title of Vendor. he must take his rem-
edy on grantor's warranty of title ex-
pressed or implied. If there is none - it is

Writ of Error.

his loss - Cro. 246.

If Sheriff has taken property on execution & sold it to stranger when he has no authority to sell it. was not by law bound to sell it. a subsequent reversal will divest the right of purchaser to hold it. divest the sale - it must be restored -

2 Bac 232.

Then if a judgment of outlawry is rendered against A.B. & on an execution of "capias ultagatum" the Sheriff takes goods of outlaw & sells them & then the outlawry is reversed. Then the sale is not valid. it creates no title - For the Sheriff in selling them acted without authority - He is required to keep them, & not sell - 1 Roll 778. 5 Co 90. Cro. E 278. 3 Bac 778

In this State (Connecticut) a writ of Error is barred within 3 years from the time of rendering final judgment below.

33

1 Root 54. In Eng? the limitation is 20 years.

2 to 837. 2 Bac 200. Under Stat 10 & 11 Wm 3^d.

5 Am 290.

Under Statute of U.S. State the time for bringing writ of Error is ten years.

When judgment below is affirmed on writ of Error. the Deft in Error recovers his costs on the writ of Error & his costs above - When it is reversed

no costs are taxed on the writ in Error. on either side - Plff in Error does not; because Deft in Error is not considered to be in default for not abandoning his judgment below.

Units of Error.

When j.^t of reversal ~~is~~ puts a final period to the controversy the P^lff in Error recovers his costs below under the name of damages.

Now in most cases where def^t below is P^lff in Error & reverses j.^t below. this reversal will generally put an end to all controversy. but not always.

Examples

Jud^t below on demurrer to declaration was for P^lff. def^t brings writ of Error & reverses j.^t for insufficiency of declaration. This puts an end to the controversy.

On the other hand when j.^t is for def^t & P^lff below reverses it. In most cases the judgment of reversal does not put a final close to the controversy. Ex. On a demurrer to declaration the judgment below is for def^t. the P^lff below reverses it in Error. This only proves that declaration is sufficient - but he has no j.^t for damages on property. He therefore has a right to enter his writ de curro in Court above or to have it remanded to the Court below to be there tried (2nd 35-37. Cases 4. 8. 10.) In an Interlocutory Jud^t the effect is the same. it does not decide the merits of the controversy. In point of Law he has a right to try it again.

This may happen where there may be

Writs of Error.

several reversals of judgment & yet the merits may not be decided - In Conn.^t the whole costs follow the final event.
Conn.^t R. 150.

But where he does not proceed to further trial by Entry he is not entitled to costs. Conn.^t R. 150.

If Plff in Error has paid any thing on (34)
the erroneous judgment he may recover back the sum under the name of damages on the reversal. And is also entitled to the costs that ought to be awarded him

But he may go for the reversal only & recover back money he has paid in an action of Ind: Assumpsit. vide "Assumpsit" 11-

But if Plff in Error has paid nothing he recovers nothing but the costs he was entitled to on the reversal of the judg^t or on the judg^t of reversal -

But where the case requires further trial & Plff enters for another trial, the costs await the final event. Conn.^t R. 150.

Under our Statute when judgm^t is affirmed the Plff in Error is entitled to interest on the original judgment at the discretion of the Court. The rule is the same as in Eng^d.

1 Bos & Oul 29. 2 H Bl 284. For the writ of Error has superseded the original judg^t & delayed collection. But tho' the rule leaves this to the discretion of the Court. yet in our practice the Court always award. as a matter stricti juris.

But interest is not allowed according to English practice aft^r the bail in Error (along 723. 2 GR 57. 78.) in debt on recognizance

Rule of practice in Court that when on reversal the P^{ty} in Error would enter his writ in the Court above for trial he must do it in the same term in which he obtains the jud^gt in Error.

1 Root 85 And also that the writ of Error must be brought in the same county in which the original jud^gt was awarded. Root 259.

to now of writ of Error in C^t of Errors.

According to practice in Court writ of Error must be signed by a Judge of the Court to which it is returnable. 2 Sw 277.

In Court if on "nil til record" the copies are claimed to differ from the Record, the Court will order the original record to be brought up. Root 88.

35.)

Cases exemplifying the effect of an affirmance or reversal of jud^gt on writ of Error.

A vs B.

in the Court below.

Case I. Judgment below for A to recover of B. \$20 debt + \$10 costs. Jud^gt reversed for insufficiency of the declaration before A had collected any part of his execution. Jud^gt above is that Jud^gt below be reversed & that B recover of A. So the amount of the debt incurred by B in the

Court below. But no costs are recovered by B. on the writ in Error. For P in Error never recovers costs accruing on the writ of Error.

I. The case as before except that A has collected the contents of his Execution. viz \$20. debt & \$10 costs. Judgt. of reversal as before and that B recover \$40. viz the \$30. paid to A. on the erroneous Judgt. & \$10 costs which B ought to have recovered in the Court below. *Summit* 11-

II. Judgt. below in favor of A as before. affirmed in the Court above. Here the judgt. above is that the judgt. below be affirmed, & that A the Debt in Error, recover his costs on the writ in Error. The judgt. below is again operative. Interest is allowed on the writ judgt. if the Court in their discretion think proper & execution is issued for it. The practice is, I believe to allow it of course. *Pat. Court*.

IV. The judgt. below was in favor of B the writ below. & by writ of Error reverses the judgt. The judgt. in this case is merely a judgt. of reversal. If the Court above is competent to try questions of fact (as D in Ex. & Sup. Ct. in Err.) A on the judgt. of reversal enters the cause in the Court above, for trial, & on final judgment. If he prevails, recovers together with his debt or damages all his costs, which accrued before the judgt. of reversal as well as those which have accrued since. But he recovers no costs on the writ in Error. If A had paid the costs taxed

Writs of Error.

against him on the judgt. below, he would have recovered that on the judgt. in Error as damages - But I must enter the action if at all, in the same term in which the judgt. of removal is rendered, Moore 85.

V. The Court which reversed the judgt. in the last case was not competent to try questions of fact (as the Exchequer Chamber in Engl. & the Court of Error in Am.). The case is either re-manded to the Court below, where it must be again proceeded with - or if it is ripe for final judgt. it will be rendered & execution issued by C.^t of Error. See Decided Pleason & Coles v. Chester - Court of Error 1803. 1 Day R 27-152. See and 30. 2 Day 10. Case 319.

VI. Remover on the Court below to the declaration - Declaration adjudged insufficient. On writ of Error the judgt. is reversed. Here it would generally be allowed for I to enter. Since his declaration is adjudged insufficient - Still he may enter - it that if his declaration can be helped by amendment he may have an opportunity to do it. See Am. & Eng. Court. And the Court below never wishes to enter for trial.

VII. Declaration in the C.^t below adjudged insufficient - Reversed on writ of Error. Here I enter for trial if the Court above can try questions of fact. For he has a good declaration & the merits have not been tried - Since the

Court above has rendered only a judg^t of reversal, not a judg^t "quod recuperet". And the Court above cannot on the judg^t of reversal ascertain the damages.

VIII. Plea in bar demurred to below, & adjudged sufficient - Judg^t reversed. A enters for trial for as yet there is no judg^t for A to recover. & on the face of the record, he has for aught that appears - a right of recovery.

IX. Plea in bar adjudged insufficient below. Judg^t reversed - If I should enter - it would be to no purpose - I does not wish to enter. For his object is only to defend & that object is attained by the reversal.

X. Plea in abatement - judgment below that the writ abate - Judg^t reversed above. Pff enters for trial. For he has a good writ; & has a right to prosecute to final judgment.

XI. Plea in abatement as in the last case. Judg^t of "respondent ouster" in the Court below. Reversed in error. I cannot enter: for he has no writ. May he not enter if his writ can be aided or amended? as in case VI.?

XII. If error is brought for the admission or rejection of evidence: Pff below may enter for trial, on reversal whether he is in error Pff or Dft.

Writs of Error.

- whether the judg^t of reversal is for or against him.

Ex. A's witness was excluded below. On a bill of exceptions the judg^t is reversed. A enters for trial. Here he is Plff in Error & the judg^t in error is in his favor.

D's witness was excluded below. Judg^t reversed. Here D is plff in error. & the judg^t of reversal is in his favor. Yet A may enter for trial if he pleases, for he may possibly prevail notwithstanding the admission of D's witness.

Note. In all the above cases in which the original Plff is supposed to enter for trial, on a reversal of judg^t the Court above is supposed competent to try questions of fact. If this be not the case, the record is remanded to the Court below & there the final trial is had (See IV & V Cases supra) Stat. Court.

When the judg^t in error puts an end to the litigation between the parties, the action is never entered in the Court above, nor remanded for trial; The litigation is always ended when the judg^t is affirmed. But it is in many cases otherwise on a reversal of judg^t.

New - Trials

The mode of obtaining a new trial in Eng^d (45) is by motion made after verdict or before judg^t.

On this motion the regular course is to obtain a rule calling upon the party in whose favor the verdict is, to shew cause why new trial should not be granted.

The granting of this rule suspends the judg^t & prevents it from being entered up, till the motion is disposed of. & the reasons of the motion are afterwards discussed before the Court sitting in Bank.

It may be granted at any time before judgment. Bony 760.

In this State a new trial is sometimes obtained by a petition to the Court or by motion. Formerly by application to Legislature (Hist 183) or petition Stat. Court.

Again - The granting of new trial here differs from the English practice in other respects. A new trial here is often had after final judgment is rendered in pursuance of the verdict.

When the ground of the motion is any matter which occurred at the trial, as any interlocutory judgment of the judge the application is made by motion. But

New Trials.

on petition when application is founded on
any thing arising after trial or on discov-
ery of new & material evidence

Will lately - There was no time lim-
ited in this state within which the ap-
plication for a new trial must be made
but it is now limited to 3 years by Stat
of 1804. Conn. -

The petition states the grounds of the application
& the opposite party may demand to examine them.

46)

But the petition is not stay of the proceed-
ings tho' the granting of new trial does.
It is accompanied with a summons to the adverse
party & is signed & served, like petitions in Chancery.
An application for a new trial is accord-
ing to rule an appeal to the
discretion of the Court. (part 52) Thornton genlly
new trial is not granted where justice has been done. 2 Will-
306-7. Bull 326. 3 East 451. 1 Bos & Pul 338.

Let where a point is raised by the Judge
on the trial the determination of that ques-
tion is stricti juris. It involves no discretion
In such case the Ct. considers itself in the situation of the Judge at N.P.
Where Court has decided & wrongly
decided a point the application for a
new trial is to the discretion of the
Court - But where Judge at N.P.
reserves the point at law for the determ-
ination of the Court in Bank. The determina-
tion of this point is stricti juris.

Ex. In trial of a suit evidence
of a certain kind is offered which is
objectionable. Now if it ought not to have

been admitted. [Thus the objection to its admission is overruled & the evidence admitted, yet the application for a new trial is to the discretion of the Court. But if Judge admits it, saving the point of law, it is then strictly just. 2 Wils 306-7. 1 Bos & Pul 339. Bull 326. 3 East 451. 1 Bos & P. 338.

This discretion entitles the Court to refuse its interposition when justice does not require it. Thus there must have been a deviation from the strict rules of Law. Hence in what is called "hard cases" the C. will not grant new trial. 3 Bos 391. 2. - 1. Lord 2. Salk 116. 644. 646. 648. 1 Bos & Pul 338. 1 Bos 394 or 395. 2 ER 405. See 4 ER. 469. Where 2^d Kenyon speaks of a presumption raised by the Jury. contrary to evidence. in which case no new trial, if the verdict is according to Equity & conscience. This rule does not apply in all cases. (Post 51. 61-2. 67) - On this principle it is that a new trial will not be granted to left to let in the defence of Wrong.

In gen'l again. it will not be granted to aid the defence of infancy of coverture or any unconscionable plea or defence in general. 1 Bos & P 52 - 454. 1 Bos & P 35. 5 ER 1242. (Post 67-8) -

Now for a new trial will be granted to assist a party in taking advantage of Statute of Limitations is not clear. See 1 Bos & Pul 228. 3 ER 124 -

In consequence of this discretion the Court in granting a new trial has the power of imposing terms or conditions on the party applying for it. not on the other party.

It is Equity - Maxim is He who would have Equity, must do Equity!
 Ex. Discovery of certain facts under oath. Summation of facts not intended to be litigated. Production of books, papers &c.
 &c. too. again. where the testimony of the party on whom the application is made depends upon witnesses who are infirm who are going abroad &c. the Court in granting a new trial may impose as a condition that the depositions of such witnesses be taken.

3BC 392. 2. Lick 146. 7DR 524.

A condition of this latter sort is wholly unnecessary in Court for depositions may (in civil cases) be used as of course or right.

471

In English practice on the ground of motion is any thing which depends on the trial the information of the fact on which the Court in Bank must act is generally taken from the Report of the Judge

But if it is any thing which did not appear at the trial the fact is to be decided on affidavit - as. That one of the jurors was interested in the trial &c.
 3BC 391. 1. Lick 235. 2. Lick 146.

Court practice is somewhat diff. But Court all civil cases, we have no Vice Pres Courts.)

I remarked under title "Writs of Error" - that Error is not predicable of the decision of the Court in granting or refusing a new trial. yet if it is granted in cases in

which there can be no new trial (un-
der any circumstances) as vs one tried for felony
it must be proved for Error. Post 76

2 Bay 304. Hist 41. "Bills of Exceptions" 5-6. "Writ of
Error" 27-

Judge Gould apprehends that the power of
granting new trials is limited altogether to
the Westminster Court. that inferior Courts
have no power to grant them -

In Comm. New Trials are grantable by
Statute only by Superior Court & County Courts.
Stat Comm. "Action Civil." Hist 9. The Stat. does
not extend to single magistrates -

The practice of granting new trials was (48)
unknown in what may be called the
ancient practice of English Courts. The
only remedy was by a proceeding of
attainder in the King for their verdict.

Blackstone traces practice to reign of Edw. 3.

3. Oaths that it did not prevail till
the time of the Commonwealth - 1655;

3 BE 387-8. Stra 601. 3 BE 387-8. 1 Bur 394.

Sal 648. Bac "Trial" 2 1. Stra 462. 10 W 213. Str 995.

Loius The cases in Edw 3. were for misbehavior of Jurors.

Those in time of Cromwell (1655) were for excessive damages,
affording a presumption of misbehavior since for various causes.

Of late years new trials are granted after
trials at Bar. i.e. before the whole Court
sitting at Westminster, & for same reasons as after J.P. trials - post 5.
Formerly held contra - except in single
instance of misbehavior of Juror.

1 Bur 395. Stra 585 - 1005. Bac Ab. Trial
2. 2 Bay 1300. 1 Sid 58. Sal 648. 7 Mod

(49)

The general principle now is -
That in all cases of sufficient importance
new trial shall be granted if it can
be made fully to appear that injustice
has been done at the first trial.
If of small consequence new trial is not generally granted
3 Bl 380. ³⁹² Burr 395. 5 Br 638. 11 Mod 202. 1 Inst 2.
It not being strictly just - & the "play not being
worth the candle".

The object is the attainment of justice & equity.

1 Burr 395. 3 Bl 380. 392. Burr 12. 6 Br 2193 - 4 Br 58.
See Trial 24 -

It is a well rule in English practice that
a motion for a new trial can not
be made after a motion in arrest of judgment.
But the rule does not hold "e converso". See 847.

The reason assigned is in that if judgment
is arrested the granting of a new trial
would be unjust. Tho' there is an ex-
ception via where the cause for new
trial was unknown at the time of moving in
arrest - See At. Trial 21. Bull 325 - b.
(Rule not universal)

50

It was formerly held that where there
were several Co. Defts. & all accused
convicted, or part convicted & part ac-
= cused, no new trial could be granted
in favor of one or a part of them, for the
verdict, it is said, must stand or fall in toto -
Dial 326. 3 Salk 302. 12 Mod 275. 3 Tatt 609.
2 Stra 814.

Rule seems to have been overturned by Const
of King's Bench in time of L^d. Gleny.

672 619 .538 .

Causes for granting new Trials are various.

1.st Want of due notice of Trial to the party on whom the verdict is found is a ground for a new trial.

But if Deft has appeared & defended, he can't have a new trial for this cause.

He waives the defect of notice.

Talk 646. Bull 327. Bac. & Trial L 1. Talk 435. 428: (or 428 435)

The rule does not mean the want of due service of the writ.

but the want of notice by the Atty to the other (Deft), according to the rule of practice that he will bring on cause at such time. Here it is not necessary. (51)

2.nd A defect in the Judge, or a mistake made by him in point of Law.

Bill of Exceptions is a concurrent remedy.

Ex of defect.

If the Judge was intermeddled in the suit or stood in such a relation to the party as would disqualify him.

11 Mod 119 - 5 Bac 244 Ex. of Mistake - If he improperly admits inadmissible evidence or vice versa.

Bac. & Trial L 3. 6 Mod 242. 7 W. 53 & 64. 10 B. 262.

So also, for a misdirection of the Judge to the Jury in point of Law. A Bill of Exceptions may also be filed Bull 327 422 753.

New Trials.

New Trials for a mistake of either of these kinds have been granted after a trial at Bar. (when made by the whole Court) 1 Burr 395: For 585: 1108. ante 48) Not Common.

In Court there is no such thing as a trial at Bar.

It may not be improper here to consider for what causes are Trials at Bar allowed -

The grounds are the qualities of great value - probable length, & probable difficulty in the trial alone 420. Not a matter of right -

(52) No new trial for misdirections in Law, if justice is done. 2 Str 5 (ante 46)

The improper admission or rejection of evidence is a good ground for a new trial yet when a witness has been admitted who was incompetent but not objected to at the trial this admission is not a substantive ground for a new trial tho' the incompetency was not known at the trial -

1 Str 717. Feake's Case 187 (Post 72-75) -

In Court however a new trial was granted on this ground. The evidence not being objected to at the trial. Pannell v Landon. Aug^t 1790.

It is said that if a cause has been lost by the testimony of a person legally infamous - a new trial may be granted

New Trials

in Equity. Pe Ch. 194. As for reasons, in resorting to Equity see
1 Burr 364-57. The rule of Law is contrary to
this. That no new trial will be granted -
Ash 653. 12 R 717. 1 Bos & P 430. n. 12 R 534

But we must understand the rule as con-
templating a case where the objection was
not taken or not established at the trial
15 R 717. 1 Bos & P 430. n.
[For a person legally infamous may testify truly].

Although a witness called to prove a certain
fact is improperly rejected yet if another
witness testifies to the same fact, or if it was
not contested, a new trial will not be
granted

3 Eas 451. - Held in Eng? that incompetency of witness arising
from interest, discovered after trial, is not per se suff. ground for
granting a new trial. 15 R 717. Peake Ev. 187. This in Conn. -

3. For any defect or incompetency in the
jury or in any single juror.

If a juror might have been challenged
as incompetent, at the trial but the fact
was unknown to the party or whose ver-
dict was. The party subjected may have a
new trial. See "Trust of Judge".

See also "Trial" L 4 7 Mod 54. 1 Vent 30. Style 129.

For it has been determined in our Courts
that if the cause of challenge is such
as does not affect his impartiality, no
new trial will be granted. as if juror is
incompetent as not being a freeholder.
But if he had been a near relative
to the party in whose favor verdict was
it then would be ground for new trial. 2n.

New Trials.

we must have known of the cause of challenge at the trial.
 In this state, C^t motions in arrest of judg^t
 have been concurrent, where ground of new
 trial was that in the last case. See "Pleadings" -

4. His conduct on, part of the jur. Bro: -
 - cry, and corrupt practices, 'any thing'
 which conduces to show that jur.
 acted - partially - so inattention or
 or referring issue to chance -

See "Trial" L 4 2 Lev 140. Tota 642 See
 "Verdict" H. Jon 83. "Pleadings" 17 -

And in a particular case where the foreman
 of the jur. declared before trial, that the
 Off^r should never obtain a verdict
 whatever his testimony might be -
 Talk 645. See "Trial" L 4

In our early times perfect unanimity
 in the jur. in finding a verdict
 was not requisite. But for a long time, that it
 has been necessary. 300 375-6 & if they are not unanimous
 a new trial must be granted.

And in English practice Court have a
 singular method of enforcing unanimity
 - ity & in some of the U. S. by casting
 the jur., from place to place (wherever the Judge goes)
 And the Judge will not discharge them till they agree.
 See "Verdict" F. 300 375-6.

In this state they are usually discharged in
 case of invincible disagreement, at the
 end of the term, but not before, except by agree-
 - ment of parties. See if agreement of parties is

now necessary? -

If the Jury are not ultimately unanimous the verdict is, in strictness, ill, & a new trial must be granted. A Verdict of eleven has been set aside in Eng.
See Ab. "Verdict" 3.

But an expedient has been adopted both in Eng^d & in this state, to relax or scale the rigor of this rule. This is done by permitting the defendant jurors to come in silent, the verdict being delivered in writing by the foreman. Say 100. Comb. 14. Dist 418. 141 Comb. 14. See Ab. Trial 24. Verdict 24 which. And they are not afterwards allowed to testify in their defence.

By the rule of Com. Law - as soon as an issue is delivered to the Jury, they are to be looked up in some apartment by themselves - and they are not to eat or drink without the permission of the Court. Their eating or drinking does not destroy the verdict but subjects them to punishment - is a fine -

See Ab. Verdict 3. 300 375. 10 Centis 125. (Co Lit 227. 12 Mod 111. 1 Leon. 132. 2 Ray 148. 218)

If the Jurors eat or drink or accept of any refreshment from one of the parties, & then find the verdict in favor of that party. the verdict is bad & there must be a new trial -

New Trials.

See So. Term. Re. Tent 125. C. Lit. 227. 12 Nov 11.
In Court. The jury go where they please. The practice
is a very bad one & contrary to direct Statute Law. 1 Con't
2. 401-2.

(56)

For the purpose of relieving jurors from
hardships of confinement & abstinence -
tell a verdict is delivered to the Court -
Courts have devised what are called prize
verdicts, written & delivered sealed to the Judge
out of Court. See So. Verdict B. C. Lit. 228.
Plowd 211 - 300 877. By 217. 116 33.

And yet the prize verdict does not bind
the Jury. They are still at liberty to
give a public verdict opposed to the
prize. See "Verdict B. C. Lit. 227.

The Jury & eaters or drinking after a
prize verdict delivered at the expense of
one of the parties does not violate the
verdict, unless they change it in favor of the
party treating them. If they do thus change it, it will be
at side. Tent 125.

No occasion in Court for prize verdicts
as Jury go where they please, & eat & drink
at their leisure & pleasure. Good misadventure.
1 Con't. 2. 401-2.

(57)

Prize verdicts are admitted in all civil cases, ^{Criminal} in some
But a prize verdict - can never be given
in case of Felony - of life or member
or where the personal appearance of light
& uniform to his conviction - (as in Fe-
-lonies, &c.) See So. Verdict B. Baym 193. Tent-
37. 2 Tent 875-897. C. Lit. 227 c.

C Vaughan (147.) says that a Juror have a right to form their verdict partly (or wholly) upon their own personal & secret knowledge. This seems not to be law. The very oath of a juror forbids it. 300 374-5. See At Verdict 70. 1 Sid 133.

But a Juror has no right to communicate his secret knowledge to his fellow-jurors - & if he does it will vitiate the verdict.

The result then is this. If any Juror empannelled on the Jury is acquainted with any fact, he is to make known his knowledge to the Court & be sworn as a witness - & then he may still act as a Juror.

1 Mc Nally 238. 300 374-5. Again Each of the parties has a right to cross-examine witnesses for him. If the Jury receive his testimony it is the testimony of a 3^d person not under the witness's oath. 1 Sid 133. See at Verdict 70.

And once more. The true rule is inferable from the fact that New Trials may be granted and frequently are, because verdict is contrary to evidence. (Post 60).

Again The Jurors have no right to examine or re-examine witnesses in their chamber any witness who has testified in Court - & if they do the verdict is bad. All evidence must be delivered in open Court. That opposite party may cross-examine & rebut it. (58)

New Trials.

On E 189. 411 - If they disagree as to what he said they may come into court & have him re-examined there.

If the Jury take with them any written evidence not exhibited at the trial the verdict is bad - and a new trial must be granted. 1000 235. Bac At Verdict 21.

nor have they a right to take out any written evidence (tho' it has been exhibited at the trial) without consent of parties or of the Court Co Lit 227 - If they do it is a high misdemeanor.

But there is a strange distinction laid down viz. That if the writing furnished evidence for both parties the verdict is good - but if for that party alone in whose favor the verdict is it is bad.

Bac At Verdict 24 2^d Nov. 178. Cro E 411 - 12 Mod 250. 2 Roll 714.

In Court it is the practice to deliver to the Jury all the documentary evidence without any mutual consent or leave of the Court.

(59)

When Jury are guilty of misconduct they are not allowed themselves to testify to that fact - Evidence must be derived "aliunde" 1500 11 - Barnes 438. 441.

Not formerly the rule Cro E 189. 5 Bac 288.

But Judge Gould conceives the principle of this rule to be that no juror can testify to his own misconduct. "Temo audiendus re for an unprincipled juror might set aside the verdict."

If the Foreman delivers a wrong verdict by mistake, it may be set aside, & a new trial granted.

The other jurors are admissible (or compellable) to testify to the fact. - Barr 383.

In Conn't. held that any one juror is inadmissible to prove misconduct of fellow jurors for the purpose of impeaching their verdict. 5 Conn't. R 348. See:-

In Conn't. a motion for arrest is concurrent with new trial, when the jury have misconducted (at supra.) See Pleadings, division "Motions in arrest" -

V. Juror's finding a general verdict when directed by the Court to find specially is not illegal conduct. It is a ground for new trial. For the Jurors are not bound to find specially. (This direction is generally founded on the application of one party, or both.)

If the verdict is against the opinion of the Court, new trial is granted. See Trial 24. 10. 20 213.

where justice has been substantially done
29 R 5. - 5 R 425. or 525.

It is now a rule that if in point of Law (62)
the Plff was entitled to recover money:
at damages only, & the Jury have found
for the Deft. a New Trial will not be granted.
- 4 Burr 2093. 4 R 758. Bac Ab. Trial L4.
Note 49. for the case is too small & besides justice
is substantially done.

VIII. Smallness of damages - found by the
verdict - is in some cases a ground for
a new trial - But this ground has never
prevailed (I believe) except in actions
on Contract or for some sum certain. As
in a promissory note &c

But where the damages are merely presump-
tive (as in tort) an application for a new trial
has never prevailed - The objection to new
trial is that there is no criterion.

Bac Ab Trial L4. Strange 940. 1051. 4 R 655.
Hall N P 327. 10 Dam 332. 2 R 366.

It has been said - that there is
no reason why new trial should not be granted for
smallness of damages in case of Tort. & J. G. 40; the same
opinion (2 Dam 354 2 Co L³.)

Where Jury have made damages too (63)
low through a mistake in point of Law.
or in point of fact as by computation,
or if there is any unfairness. a new trial may
be had - 5 R 425. 1259. Sal 47. But in

New Trials

these cases, it is granted on the score of mistake or fraud.

IX. On the other hand - If the damages are excessive - good cause in both contracts & torts -
Formerly held contra in case of torts.

Str 426 - Dac Ab. Trial L 4 -

Combert. 17 Bull 327.

But this doctrine has not prevailed -

Now in case of contracts there can be no difficulty - In cases ex delicto - the rule is not so definite, but new trials may be granted
Dac Ab. Trial L 4 - ; Str 529. 1 St. 277. 5 St 257
4 St 157. 2 Wils 244. 405. 3 St 62 Str 691-2.
1 Darr 609. 3 St 1846. Sal 649 - Comb 357 - Com 231 -

It has been sometimes contended that a new trial will not be granted unless the excessiveness of damages will raise a presumption of partiality in the Jury - From the current of cases, it seems not necessary, tho' some of even the modern cases look that way. Com 231 - 5 Com 155 -

This case of excessive damages is the converse of the last case -

Where there is a fixed rule of damages & a mistake has been made in computation by the Jury so that the Plff obtains a verdict for more than is due - a new trial may be had - But if the Plff will remit the excess upon the record he may prevent a new trial - & where the sum is certain there is no difficulty in doing this - (as in an action on a note or bond) 2 MA 113, 123. Ch B. 213 - 1 N DL 88. Com 571 - Bay 498 2 Wils 212. 1 East 637 (see Part 73) - So. if the mistake is occasioned by Plff's misconduct - Ch B. 213. 1 N DL 88. &c.

In Conn^t. a new action has been granted when on an action of book debt the deft suffered a default & the Plff took judgment for too much - This was for a fraud upon

the party & the Court.

But in case of Crim. Con. - new trial has never been granted - for this cause - i.e. for excessive damages. 4 DR 551 (or 4 DR 561, 1 Burr 609. See Id. Trial L4.

See 4 DR 554-56. where L^d Kenyon entertains a doubt whether Court have a power to grant a new trial. But Ch Justice Buller holds that the Court can for that cause as well as for any other. 1 DR 277-

New Trials have been granted for this cause in Assault & Battery - in False Imprisonment also. 1 DR 277. 5 St 257.

It does not appear that a new trial has ever been granted for excessive damages in action by Parent for the seduction of his child - 3 Eccl 18. 2 DR 5. 167. (65)

It seems that a new trial may be granted for this cause in an action of Slander. (In principle no possible reason why a new trial should not be granted in any case) i.e. for this cause.

5 Bac 250 pl 90. Talk 644. 1 Burr 394. 2 Johns 208. Style 462. No case in which it has been granted in case of Slander for excessive damages only. In Sty. 462. Misconduct of Jury was (2 Eccl 249. 1 Ler 97.) an ingredient -

Rule laid down in R. B. is that a new trial may be granted for excessive damages in any case whatever - in any sort of action. 1 DR 277. Com. Dis.

New Trials

trial & 1. 4 JR 657. 5 JR 257. Salk 649.
2 BL R 929. 1327. 2 JR 166. And this appears to
be the true rule.

X. In Court. New trials are grantable
by express Statute provision for mis-
pleading. St. Con. "Actions Civil"

But no such gen'l rule in English prac-
-tice. Now suppose that in action
of debt on bond where plea is infame
the Atty should plead Non est factum

3 Burr 1385. 1 East 637. 2 JR 131. 10 Mod
202-3. See At Trial L 5. - In 2 JR. 131 -
Ch Jus. Buller remarks that it was proper
to grant a new trial as the Court &
the Counsel were both mistaken in point
of Law, &

But the neglect of one's Atty or Counsel
is no cause for a new trial. The remedy
of the Client is to the Atty. & therefore
the

1 Mod 22. 222. Salk 645. 3 Mod 87. 84-
112. 113. See Trial L 5.

As if Atty should neglect to appear &c

A new trial for mispleading has never
been granted in Court. except on petition
never on motion.

The petitioner must state the wrong plea

+ the plea he intends to make & he must state that he is able to prove the truth of the plea. And he must prove it on the hearing of the Petition.

1 Mod 573. 2 Sw. 271.

How far mere surprise, by the introduction of unexpected evidence is a ground for a new trial, is not very clear. *Willis vs Overton S. C.*

Mere surprise is not of course & of itself a ground for new trial (by English rule) tho' with other grounds it may be sufficient.

100 R 298. *Cony D. Trial* 61-
3 East 167. 222. 2 Ash 319. *Plt* 691. 3 *Morgan*
86-7. 25 R 131.

XI. The absence of material witnesses at the trial, thro' inevitable accident as by age, sudden illness, or other ~~some~~ casualty.

See *Ab Trial* 2 b or 4 - 11 Mod 1. 6 St 22.

Such an absence is ground for a postponement or a continuance.

But a new trial for this cause is not grantable unless the witnesses will make affidavit of what he can testify - that the Court may discover whether the testimony is material.

See *Ab Trial* 2 b. *Salk* 645. 3 *Morg* 84 -

New Trials.

And (sent) new trial will not be granted if the defence to be proved is an unconscionable one -- For the trial will not be postponed in such a case. (a fortiori no new trial) 1 Bos & Pul 454.

In Comm^{ty} when application is by petition it must state the testimony, & before new trial is granted the witness must testify, on the trial of the petition, what he knows -

If the attendance of a material witness is prevented by concealment or unfair practice of the opposite party it is a good ground for a new trial. (as on 22nd inst -

11 Mod 141 - See Trial 2^d b. post 72.

But if a witness is absent - wilfully, or by his own negligence - no new trial will be granted, for it is the policy of the Law to make the witness liable - and the opposite party is in no fault.

1 Damr 322. See Ab Trial 2^d b. Falk 653.

"Title Evidence" - Prejudice on the case as to the party's remedy in such cases is by action on the case or the witness -

And a new trial is never granted for the absence of a witness whose testimony the party wishing for it might by due diligence have obtained - it is in consequence of his own laches -

Falk 647. Str 691 - 10 Mod 98. 2 Mod 22.

See in Ch 194 - See Ab Trial 2^d b -

New Trials

A mistake made by a material witness in the testimony given on the first trial is not a ground for a new trial. See 1st Trial L. B. 3 Morgan & Spry Jan 28.

Neither for mistake nor forgetfulness - or any omission in his testimony - See Trial L. B. Tager 28. Rockwell vs Kellogg Sup. Ct. (N.Y.).

XII. The discovery after trial of new material evidence is said to be a good cause for new trial. 12 Mod 584. See 1st Trial L. B.

But in several later cases the rule is held contrary. See 7 Term R 219. A debt had been subjected in debt or account, & afterwards discovered a receipt & yet new trial was not granted. See in Ch 194. See 1st Trial L. B.

And this latter opinion appears to be Law in England.

12 Mod 98. 1 St 84. 2 St 113. 713. 1 Bos & P 428. 430. 3 Mod 93. Sal 273

But yet in a very recent work of practice the rule is again qualified. 2 Archbold 226. Says that where new evidence is discovered after trial, & justice requires new trial it will be granted. 20 Cr 95. But it may be granted, on discovering that the testimony at the trial was false - this mistake or alias. 10 Cr 428-30. But it is clear that a new trial will not be granted on this ground to set the party into a defence of which he was apprised at the first trial. 2 Cr 113. 1 St 84. 2 Archbold 226 7 Term 309. In Conn. newly discovered material evidence is made ground for

New Trials

new trial by Statute. And if by due diligence the party applying for a new trial might have known of the evidence before trial - New trial is not granted -
 Kent 282-3. 2 Bro. 270.

Application on this ground has usually been made (in Conn^t) by petition - as motion must be made within 48 hours after verdict - but in Eng^d it is made by motion -

1) Petition must state the new evidence & the substance of the old - The witnesses to the new facts must be named tho' all need not be (Kent 283. 2 Bro 270. Most sig. testify on petition -

For Class XIII see p. 52.

2) XIV. Misconduct of party. - as where one of the parties was treated the same - or by stratagem (as by falsely imprisoning him or arresting him by careful process) with a view of preventing his testimony - ante 68. 55.)
 11 Mod 141 - See Trial L b.

Again where the party for whom the verdict was found, has importuned one of the jurors to find in his favor.

So where a party makes any representations in favor of his own side, to a juror and the verdict is for him - (new trial granted even if evidence is decisively in his favor.)

2 Roll 716. See at Verdict J. More 452 -

3) Similar practices by a party's attorney have the same effect - 2 Cent 173. See at Trial L b.

And any kind of embrassery practised by

New Trials.

one of the parties - or his attorney, is a good cause for a new trial - 11 Mod 119. 1 Dent 125.
Bac Ab Trial L 6.

The term 'embracery' is any attempt to influence a jury corruptly, as by bribes, promises, &c.
& Embracery is an indictable offence
1 Hawk Pleas of C 259 4 DE 140. 2 Vent 173.

It was formerly holden in Eng^d that a new trial should never be granted in an action of Ejectment. because in that action the judgt. is no appeal - is not conclusive - for unsuccessful party in (74)

Salk 648. 650. Bac Ab Trial L 7. (St 1106 "except under special circumstances")

The parties are petitioners.

This rule is never applied in Court. Here the Judgt. is final, as in other cases. The reason of the rule does not exist here. ("cessante ratione cessat ipsa lex")

(But now (1826) held by Sup Ct of Gr. contra - Quod mirum!)

In Eng^d. Now now is that new trial is to be granted to Dept when the verdict is in favor of the Plff - because the parties are not left in statu quo. he might in the mean time be turned out of possession.

But when the verdict is for Dept the gen'l rule still prevails - that a new trial shall not be granted Plff "except for very particular reasons" for the parties are in statu quo. it does not change the possession.
4 Burr 2224. Bac Trial L 7. 1 Barn 323 -

75)

It was formerly held that after two successful similar verdicts for the same party, a second new trial ought not to be granted - 1 Lev 97. 1 Sidr 131. Falk 649 - 1 Mod 22. 308 387. 5 Sim 155. Sac "Trial 21 -

And in point of fact a 2^d new trial is not often granted tho' the rule is now exploded. Burr 2108. Ex. Case in Penn^a Jan in 1798 or 1799.

A new trial is not in gen^l grantable upon any exception not made at the trial which might have been taken there -
10 Mod 202 - 3.

In gen^l new trials are not grantable on the deft - in criminal cases of any kind tho' frequently they are in his favor -
Coup 37. 3 Wray. 108. 2 Str. 899. 1238. 12 Wils 17.
3 St 59. 1 West 86-7. ante 6-71 -

76.

In criminal prosecutions for offenses higher than misdemeanors a new trial is never grantable for either party. For it is a maxim. "That no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of his life". 6 TR 638.

How far the Court may discharge the Jury on their failing to agree in a verdict has been a subject of much controversy - In Felonies (in Eng^d) take it to be that they cannot be discharged -
2 Hawk Ch 47 §1 - Foster's Crown Law 16.

Thinlock's case) Raym 84. 4 Co 45. Earth 465.
Comberb. 561. 2 Johns 381. 18 It (Goodwin's case)
seems not even with prisoner's consent

(Let it be understood that without a verdict there
is no trial.) But this rule means that he can't be
put twice in jeopardy of his life -

Doctrine laid down in Coke's case. is -

That Jury can not be discharged in Capital
Capital cases, ~~for~~ for their disagreement, except -
in cases of clear physical necessity - as if juror dies -

But in Comm'. new trials have been granted
in favor of the deft - even after conviction -
So by the Judiciary Law of the U S. Act 86-7-

But where the offence ~~is~~ does not sur-
-mount a misdemeanor i.e. where it does
not amount to Felony - the cu'l rule is that
no new trial can be granted ag't the deft. "No man
can be twice tried for the same offence -

(77)

11th 849. 1238. 101. 15th 154. 12th 124. 2 Ray 63
2 JR 484. 1 Wils 17. 3 It 59. 1 Root 86-7. Dec.
'Trial' L 8. 1 Barn 316. Hunt 253.

3

But when the offence is not higher than a misdemeanor
the Court may grant a new trial in favour of deft - 6 JR. 638.
11th. 968. 2 Ray 63 - 5th 1102 - Dec Trial L 9. 5 Bun 2669.
in case of libel - so of perjury - Long 760. 1 East 159.

But of late new trials are granted ag't deft in actions
on Penal Statutes for mistakes of the Judge in point
of Law - But there are Civil Suits - 4 JR 753 - 758.
5 It 20. 3 East 451 - 3 May 118.

New Trials -

But new trials in these actions have not been granted on the ground of a mistake in the Jury - on the ground that the verdict is against evidence -

452 758. 526 20. 3 May. 118. Plr 899. 1238. 1240
17. 3 St 59.

But a new trial may be granted or kept if he has obtained an acquittal by any fraud practiced - as by bribery &c - even on an indictment. Plr 1238. Lat 446. 12 Nov 9. Bac Ab. Trial 28. Most 93. (Contra 124 cited 12^d May 63 -) Lat 90. 15 Nov. 336.

Granting a new trial after judgt. in Court vacates the judgt. But terms are imposed when necessary.
* See next, case - infra.

(80)

When there have been one or more new trials the question of Costs presents some difficulty - according to English practice. Where the Costs are directed to abide the issue - if the party who was successful on the first trial succeeds again he shall have the costs of both trials -

If the party who obtains the new trial prevails on the second trial, he has the costs incurred on the 2^d trial only - & the costs of the 1st trial are taxed neither way. 852 619 - 1746 639 - 641 - 352 507.

The rule in Court is more simple - that the whole costs shall follow the final determination of the suit -

New Trials -

* See next page *supra*

And in a qui tam prosecution new trial cannot be granted as to the civil part - unless it is grantable & granted as to the criminal part - (Root- 86-7).

(78)

In Court. if pending the petition for new trial, the respondent dies - his executor may be cited in by sci. fa. (as in actions) & the petition may proceed, provided the right of action survives to or af. the executor according to the nature of the case is to him, if his testator was Plff in the action, af. him if his testator was Def. - "Pleas &c" Sup. Ct. Hartford Ct Feb^y. 1800.

Note. as to the last case, that the Stat. relating to "abatement & amendment of writs" was made before our courts had power to grant new trials - (But see. Forw. Rev 273 &c)

(79)

If the right of action does not survive in the last case, the petition must abate - Because no new trial can then be had -

Subject to the foregoing qualifications, the petition might, doubtless proceed, if pending the petition - the petitioner should die -


In Eng^d when the costs are directed to abide the event if the party who was successful on the first trial - succeeds again - he shall have the costs of both trials;


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
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
But if the party in whose favor the new trial is granted, prevails on the second, he shall have the costs of the second trial only. Yet in this case the other party has not the costs of the first trial. These are not taxed on either side. 87 R 619 - 1 G. Bl 639 - 41 - 37 R 507 -


In Conn.^t the whole costs generally follow the final count of the suit -































































































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